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Achieving Strong, Sustained and Shared Growth in Africa in the Post-crisis Global 
Economy 
 
The aftermath of the global financial and economic crisis, which Africa weathered on 
balance well, presents a unique opportunity to rethink continent’s economic strategies for 
the decade ahead.
4 Given the continent’s vast economic potential, the poverty reduction 
agenda ‘beyond MDG’ should focus on building a prosperous Africa. The way Africa can 
achieve prosperity is through economic growth, which is strong, sustained and shared. 
 
The African Development Bank, the UNECA and the AUC undertook a joint study in 
collaboration  with  the  Korea  Institute  for  International  Economic  Policy,  which 
highlights key challenges ahead of the continent to reach strong, sustained and shared 
growth. The study provides evidence on the impact of the crisis and longer term trends, 
examples of good international practices in selected areas, policy recommendations, and 
suggested actions for the way forward.  It aims to contribute to promoting Africa’s voice 
on development globally and especially in the debates at the G20.  
 
I.  Africa in the aftermath of the global financial crisis 
 
Africa’ ’ ’ ’s immense economic potential has been reconfirmed by the pre-crisis growth 
and a fast and strong rebound from the crisis. At an average of 5.6 percent a year, Africa 
was  one  of  the  fastest  growing  developing  regions  during  2001-08.  The  growth  was 
spread across countries, with about 40 percent of them growing at or above 5 percent, 
with many sectors contributing (resources, finance, retail, agriculture, transportation and 
telecommunications).
5 The  continent  has  also shown  unexpected  resilience during the 
global financial and economic crisis and is now staging a robust comeback (Figure 1). 
Africa is projected to be the second fastest growing region in 2011, after Asia.
6 This 
strong  rebound  has  brought  a  renewed  recognition  of  the  continent’s  substantial 
economic potential.  
 
With Africa rebounding,  how  should  the  continent  exit  from  the  crisis  measures? 
Effective counter-cyclical response has helped some African countries weather the crisis. 
Short-term  stabilization  policies  need  to  be  phased  out  not  to  jeopardize  debt 
sustainability and undermine investor confidence, while strategic capital investments to 
                                                 
4 The real GDP grew on average by only 2.5 percent, but the performance varied from 6.8 percent decline 
(Seychelles) to 9.9 percent growth (Ethiopia). The impact on SSA was severe, as growth collapsed from an 
average of 6.1 percent during 2001-08 to 1.6 percent in 2009. Since the crisis was an external shock, the 
countries that were more open to trade and grew faster before the crisis experienced larger growth falls in 
2009. Correspondingly, they are expected to recover the fastest, alongside the global revival. 
 
5 McKinsey&Co. (2010), ‘Lions on the Move:  The progress and potential of African economies’, which 
discusses these developments, underscores that Africa’s growth has been creating business opportunities in 
at least four groups of industries:  consumer-facing industries, agriculture, resources, and infrastructure. 
 
6 African Development Bank and OECD (2010), ‘African Economic Outlook 2010’, AfDB: Tunis and 
OECD: Paris.  
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raise productivity need to be made. Given the fragile global recovery, where feasible, 
African governments may want to keep a looser stance also in 2011 to prevent stop-go 
patterns  and  ensure  continued  rebound  of  their  economies.  When  exiting  the 
interventionist  policies,  fiscal  consolidation  should  in  most  cases  precede  monetary 
tightening, even if it may be technically and politically more complex. In some countries, 
social outlays and public expenditures on infrastructure need to stay protected, and even 
scaled up to support social stability and post-crisis growth.  
 
Strong, sustained and shared growth is a key priority for macroeconomic policy 
ahead,
7 given that stabilization was mostly maintained throughout the crisis.  Africa’s 
high growth during 2001-08 was a positive turnaround, but it was not sufficient to narrow 
the income gap with more advanced economies. At the same time, about 40 percent of 
Africa’s  low-income  countries  (LICs)  had  inflation  below  5  percent  even  though 
empirical evidence shows that such rates are usually not appropriate targets for LICs and 
may even hamper growth. To put Africa on a path of strong, sustained and shared growth, 
macroeconomic  policy  for  the  next  decade  needs  to  move  from  overemphasizing 
macroeconomic stability and to focus on growth. For example, countries that now have 
inflation above 10 percent and low growth (e.g., Nigeria) could stimulate growth while 
lowering inflation only to high single digits, as Nigeria intends to do. Countries that are 
expected to grow below their trend growth in 2010-11 with inflation in single digits (e.g., 
Kenya) could stimulate aggregate demand without fueling inflation (Figure 2). 
 
With the policy objectives shifting to growth, how can macroeconomic frameworks 
become more flexible but maintain credibility? During the crisis, countries with more 
flexible  macroeconomic  frameworks  fared  better.  To  achieve  greater  flexibility  of 
macroeconomic frameworks, pro-cyclical fiscal policies could be replaced by rule-based 
and counter-cyclical frameworks that leave room for discretion in case of unexpected 
shocks. African countries could aim for balanced budgets (after grants) over the cycle, 
with annual budgets anchored in medium-term expenditure frameworks. On the monetary 
side, where conditions allow, flexible inflation targeting (IT) regimes, now in place in 
South Africa and Ghana, could be considered by other emerging and frontier markets.   
 
Unlocking  entrepreneurship  across  regions  and  sectors,  with  well-designed  and 
supportive policy and actions, would make growth not only strong but also shared and 
sustainable.  Africa will achieve such growth if it is underpinned by a vibrant private 
sector  and  productive  entrepreneurship.  While  the  formal  private  sector  remains 
limited, in some countries it has been thriving (e.g., Mauritius, South Africa). Dynamic 
private sectors have appeared in other countries, including the flower business in Uganda, 
leather  processing  in  Ethiopia,  and  even  the  film  industry  ‘Nolywood’  in  Nigeria. 
Industrial policy can play an important role in nurturing the entrepreneurial spirit across 
the continent, not by picking winners, but by removing obstacles to entrepreneurship in 
high-potential sectors and industries.  
 
                                                 
7 For growth to be sustainable, it needs to encompass social and environmental aspects.  
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Increasing  resilience  through  mobilizing  domestic  resources  would  also  make 
Africa’s growth more sustainable and help prepare the continent for the next crisis. Most 
countries in Africa, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, face large resource gaps due to low 
domestic  savings  and  high  investment  needs.  These  gaps  can  be  reduced  by  raising 
domestic tax revenues – by deepening the tax base, strengthening tax administration and 
formalizing the informal sector. Private savings can be raised by banking sector reforms 
and through innovative ways such as leveraging the local wealth or securitizing future 
resource inflows (remittances, oil revenues). As many countries still rely on official aid to 
supplement their resources, donors need to disburse it in adequate amounts and in timely 
manner. Support through ODA needs to be guided by national expenditure priorities and 
balance  the  competing  needs  of  the  social  sectors  and  longer  term  economic 
development.  It also needs to be designed so as to crowd in private sector investment.  
 
Building  social  safety  nets  would  help  ensure  that  growth  is  shared  with  the  most 
vulnerable. The recent global financial and economic crisis has again underscored the 
importance of creating mechanisms in Africa to protect the most vulnerable segments of 
population against unexpected external shocks. As the global financial crisis has turned 
into a job crisis, African countries realized that they should be paying more attention to 
public  works  programs,  such  as  labor-intensive  infrastructure  investment.  Moreover, 
short-term  social  safety  nets  should  be  supplemented  by  well-targeted  longer  term 
protection programs to ensure shared growth in the medium term. 
 
II. The decade ahead: overcoming obstacles, seizing opportunities 
 
Obstacles  to access  to  credit  need to  be  eased,  especially those pertaining to trade 
finance, SMEs and smallholder farmers.   For export-dependent countries with limited 
access to trade finance, development of multilateral trade finance programs and national 
guarantee programs would facilitate the flow of trade at all times and hence regional 
integration. There are number of ways in which some of the underlying constraints of 
rural credit can be addressed by modern technology. For example, transaction costs can 
be reduced with mobile banking (e.g., Kenya) and information asymmetries reduced with 
biometric  technology  (as  it  is  being  investigated  in  Malawi).  Remittances  can  be 
leveraged for SME lending through, for example, securitization of these flows (through 
‘diaspora bonds’).  
To make the most out of globalization, attracting stable private capital flows is a 
priority  in  the  light  of  the  large  development  needs,  especially  when  climate  change 
implications are considered. At the same time, volatility of these flows will need to be 
managed. Where inflows are particularly large and do not reflect economic fundamentals, 
targeted controls at short term inflows could be considered on a temporary basis. African 
countries need an increased access to world markets to expand their exports. They 
should continue to demand relaxation of rules of origin requirements, lowering non-tariff 
barriers, and efficient delivery of aid for trade. They need to reiterate calls for a balanced 
and  early  conclusion  of  the  Doha  Development  Round.  Developed  countries  should 
discourage protectionist practices in trade and finance, which would lead to low levels of 
trade volume and capital flows, and to put an end to agricultural subsidies.   
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Attracting development-friendly FDI would help boost growth,
8 provided that host 
countries  create  a  competitive  environment  so  that  foreign  investors  can  enhance 
productivity of existing domestic activities and generate positive spillovers. Open trade 
and  investment  regimes  contribute  to  the  creation  of  such  environment.  Given  the 
linkages between trade and investment, measures to encourage regional integration and 
trade could bring in additional ‘market-seeking’ FDI. Moreover, some minimal threshold 
of development is needed for the host countries to benefit from FDI. Raising human 
capital, technological capacity and developing infrastructure are thus crucial to attract 
‘development-friendly’ FDI and generate positive spillovers for domestic economies.  
 
Regional integration can be a source of resilience during crises and of sustainable 
growth. Integration would help African countries diversify their economies and build up 
protection against external shocks, while increasing efficiency due to the economies of 
scale. At the same time, efforts to promote regional integration need to be well-designed 
and  coordinated.  The  numerous  and  overlapping  regional  trade  agreements  carry 
substantial inefficiencies and need to be streamlined. To address the costs of regional 
integration, strategies include a transparent, equitable, and rule-based system for sharing 
gains and resolving disputes. Moreover, regional agreements need to be incorporated in 
national strategies and policies, with involvement of the civil society in their formulation 
and implementation. Finally, regional strategies have to focus on developing areas of 
industrial complementarity to raise countries’ capacity to trade.  
 
A  stronger  human  capital  base  is  needed  to  transform  African  countries  into 
knowledge-based societies. In today’s knowledge-based world, no country can thrive in 
the global or regional economy without a capacity to generate, transmit, and utilize new 
knowledge. There is substantial mismatch between the demands of modern economies 
and skills possessed by the recent university graduates in most African countries. While 
unemployment among the educated is high, shortages of skills, especially in ICT, high-
level technical skills and foreign languages persist. To address them, a comprehensive 
overhaul  of  Africa’s  higher  education  systems  is  needed.  In  parallel,  new sources  of 
financing for higher education need to be identified, including from the private sector. 
Different  forms  of  state  support  should  also  be explored,  including  credit-guarantees, 
loan  subsidies,  and  grants.  Africa  should  also  revamp  immigration  policies  to  ease 
mobility of skilled workers to help address skill shortages.  
Reducing  the  substantial  productivity  gap  will  also  require  much  stronger  human 
capital base. Low-productivity agriculture still accounts for most employment in many 
African  LICs,  with  the  surplus  labor  typically  working  in  the  informal  urban  sector. 
However,  in  some  frontier  markets  (e.g.,  Uganda,  Mozambique),  labor  productivity 
accelerated in recent years and grew about as rapidly as in India. The large productivity 
gaps with advanced economies also imply that through the catch up process, African 
countries could grow at rates approaching 10 percent annually. With such rates they even 
could, on average, converge to the per capita income levels of the new EU members 
around the year 2050. For this to happen, structural transformation to high value-added 
                                                 
8 ‘Development-friendly FDI stimulates jobs creation, is a channel for transfers technology and managerial 
know-how, does not disrupt local communities and helps countries embark on green growth path.    9 
activities would need to markedly accelerate, while an enabling external environment and 
improved educational systems would also need to be in place. Moreover, the importance 
of strengthening institutions and improving governance in Africa cannot be overstated.  
Closing Africa’s infrastructure deficit is a key priority in this regard, as the low levels 
of public goods and productivity-enhancing investments have been particularly damaging 
the continent’s growth and development. For example, World Bank estimates suggest 
that if the entire SSA had Mauritius’ infrastructure, its growth of real GDP per capita 
would increase by 2.3 percentage points a year. Similarly, North Africa’s growth would 
rise  by  1.1  percentage  point  a  year. Moreover,  infrastructure services  on  average  are 
costly relative to other developing regions and to the purchasing power of consumers. 
Still,  vast  differences  exist  across  countries  and  sectors.  Oil  exporters  have  a  greater 
deficit than oil importers, in part because most of them spent the windfall revenues of 
2000s mainly on consumption rather than investment. Among sectors, the deficit is most 
pronounced in the power sector, while the  ICT  gap is much smaller.  In fact, several 
African frontier markets are ahead of India in the usage of mobile phones, demonstrating 
Africa’s capacity to rapidly adopt modern technology.  
Innovative  forms  of  financing  for  infrastructure  will  need  to  be  found  while 
traditional mechanisms strengthened, given the large financing needs – currently about 
$93 billion a year total and still $76 billion a year if all the efficiencies were addressed. 
Given the central role of public funds in financing infrastructure investments, increased 
efficiency  in  their  allocation  and  disbursement  must  be  a  priority.  Among  emerging 
donors, China’s infrastructure financing in Africa has increased rapidly, often backed by 
future  export  revenues  (oil,  cocoa,  iron).  Innovative  ways  to  mobilize  private  funds 
include  Kenya’s  domestic  issuance  of  infrastructure  bonds,  Ghana’s  2007  Eurobond 
issuance, and the current plans of Nigeria to establish oil-financed infrastructure fund 
(sovereign wealth fund).  
Africa is well positioned to embark on a low carbon growth and development path, 
given its abundant natural and biological resources. Investment opportunities in Africa’s 
renewable energy sources, such as solar, hydro, wind, thermal and biomass could draw 
international financing. They  would not only help address global climate change  and 
local  energy  shortage  problems,  but  also  create  a  new  global  market.
9 Yet  public 
resources alone cannot fully cover the costs of climate change and set clean development 
schemes  customized  for  each  African  country;  private  financing  will  need  to  be 
mobilized as well. Moreover, African countries should actively utilize projects boosting 
green industries, such as clean energy or green agriculture, initiated by multilateral or 
regional institutions. The African Development Bank’s issuances of clean energy bonds 
in 2010 are clearly steps in the right direction.  
Africa needs to advance its voice in the global economic arena to mobilize attention 
on long-standing obstacles to its development and seize opportunities. Even though many 
African countries depend on access to concessional funds from the IFIs, they have only 
                                                 
9 A relevant example to the African context is South Africa’s Green Economy Summit (May 2010), which 
called for development of green growth policies and regulations to support the clean technologies.   10 
marginal voice in the governance of these institutions. The current international financial 
and economic architecture remains dominated by the major economies. Yet a cardinal 
lesson from successful development elsewhere, in particular Asia, is the importance of 
country  ownership  and  commitment,  of  policy  and  strategies  being  determined  by 
country circumstances, the country’s own priorities. This lesson has to be reflected in the 
key  policy  and  standard-setting  organizations,  and  when  decisions  are  made  on  the 
allocation and use of resources for Africa. Hence there is a need for continental and 
regional representation in the key policy and decision making international structures. 
Greater scope is also needed for African-led institutions to engage on equal terms in 
global  discussions,  to  put  forward  African  perspectives,  and  to  draw  attention  to  the 
implications  of  decisions  by  global  bodies  for  Africa.  In  this  regard,  Africa’s 
institutionalized representation in the G20 is a priority. 
III.   Africa as a new global growth pole 
 
The pre-crisis growth and the rebound have clearly demonstrated Africa’s capacity 
to become a new global growth pole. Africa has changed -- from historically a slow 
growth region to one of the fastest growing regions in the world. Fundamental changes 
took  place  on  the  continent  showing  an  improving  economic  and  socio-political 
environment. African economies are now expected to become a new source of global 
economic growth. The sources of this growth stem from improved capacity to design and 
implement efficient policies, abundant natural resources, a growing labor force, and rapid 
urbanization.  
 
Emerging positive perceptions would materialize into even more private investment, 
increased trade, and accelerated growth in Africa. If all African countries would catch up 
with the 7 percent growth rate of fast-growing economies on the continent and continue 
to grow at that rate, the GDP per capita would double in 10 years and quadruple in 20. 
Africa’s  collective  GDP  is  estimated  to  reach  $2.6  trillion  in  2020,  and  consumer 
spending is set to stand at $1.4 trillion.
10 In that case, Africa would play a significant role 
in  rebalancing  of  the global economy,  not  only  through  exports,  but also  as  a  major 
consumer market with its large population. Supporting Africa’s current efforts to realize 
its immense economic potential could thus soon be beneficial to the entire world.  
 
In Africa an alternative can be found to what is now called the new normalcy in the 
global economy of low growth, high unemployment and instability on the one hand, high 
levels of absolute poverty, and unexplored human potential. Economic history reveals 
that large part of poverty reduction can be achieved by growth – but it has to be strong, 
shared and sustained. If Africa can achieve at least two decades of such growth it could 
become  a  new  source  of  dynamism  in  the  global  economy.  Further,  although  Asian 
markets continue their breathtaking expansions, China and India would have to increase 
their  consumer  spending  markedly  if  it  is  to  replace  the  growth  lost  by  advanced 
countries  since  the  onset  of  the  crisis.  The  world  needs  a  new  driver  of  consumer 
                                                 
10 McKinsey  Global  Institute  (2010),  Lions  on  the  Move:  The  Progress  and  Potential  of  African 
Economies, McKinsey Global Institute: Washington DC.  
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demand, a new market, and a new dynamo, which is Africa. Future growth in the 
world economy and future jobs in the developing world will depend on harnessing both 
the productive potential and the untapped consumer demand of the continent. Therefore, 
every job not created, every business lost and every entrepreneurial idea not realized in 
Africa are drivers lost to global growth. 
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Sources: African Development Bank database and IMF WEO database.  
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Figure 2. Africa: room to grow and room to inflate 1/ 
 



























































Source:  Authors’  calculations  based  on  the  African  Development  Bank  database.  1/  Growth  gap  is 
calculated as the difference between the potential growth (average of 2006 – 2008) and the actual growth in 
2010. Inflation gap is calculated as the difference between the targeted/trend inflation (average of 2001-
2008) and the actual inflation in 2010. In cases where inflation trend was below 5 percent, target was set as 
5. Similarly, where inflation trend was above 10 percent, target was set at 10. Positive growth gaps mean 
that countries should aim at higher growth; positive inflation gap means that there may be some room to 
inflate, especially for low income countries with inflation below 5 percent.    14 
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Atteindre une croissance africaine forte, soutenue et partagée dans une 
économie mondiale d’après crise 
 
 
La  crise  financière  et  économique  mondiale,  que  l’Afrique  a  surmontée,  offre  au 
continent une occasion unique  pour revoir ses stratégies économiques pour la décennie 
à  venir
13.  Compte  tenu  du  vaste  potentiel  économique  du  continent,  le  plan  de  la 
réduction de la pauvreté au-delà des OMD devrait se concentrer sur la construction 
d’une Afrique prospère. L'Afrique ne peut atteindre la prospérité que par une croissance 
économique forte, soutenue et partagée. 
 
La  Banque  africaine  de  développement,  la  CEA  et  la  CUA  ont  entrepris  une  étude 
conjointe en collaboration avec l'Institut coréen de politique économique internationale 
qui met l’accent sur les principaux défis que le contient doit relever pour atteindre une 
croissance forte,  soutenue et partagée.  Cette étude revient également sur l'impact de la 
crise  et  les  tendances  à  long  terme,  cite  des  exemples  de  bonnes  pratiques 
internationales dans certains domaines, et suggère des recommandations de politique et 
des actions pour l'avenir. Elle vise à contribuer à la promotion de la voix africaine sur le 
développement globalement et plus spécialement dans les délibérations du G20.  
 
IV. L’Afrique à la suite de la crise financière mondiale 
 
L’énorme  potentiel  économique  de  l’Afrique  a  été  reconfirmé  par  la  croissance 
d’avant la crise et une reprise rapide et forte à la suite de cette crise. Avec un taux de 
croissance  moyen  de  5,6%  par  an,  l’Afrique  comptait  parmi  les  régions  en 
développement ayant connu une croissance très rapide au cours de la période 2001-
2008. La croissance était répartie entre les pays, avec près de 40 pourcent d’entre eux 
                                                 
13 Le PIB réel a augmenté en moyenne de seulement 2,5 pour cent, mais la performance a varié de 6,8 pourcent 
(Seychelles) à 9,9 pourcent de croissance (Ethiopie). L'impact sur l'Afrique subsaharienne a été sévère, la croissance 
s'est effondrée passant d'une moyenne de 6,1 pourcent pendant  la période 2001-08 à 1,6 pourcent en 2009. Comme la 
crise a été un choc externe, les pays qui ont été plus ouverts au commerce et qui ont révélé une croissance rapide 
avant  la crise ont connu les baisses de croissances les plus importantes en 2009. En conséquence, on s'attend à ce 
qu’ils se relèvent plus rapidement, au cours de la reprise mondiale. xvi 
 
affichant un taux de croissance supérieur ou égal à 5%, avec la contribution de plusieurs 
secteurs (Ressources humaines, finances, commerce de détail, agriculture, transports et 
télécommunications)
14 .  Le  continent  a  également  fait  preuve  d’une  capacité  de 
résistance  au  choc  pendant  la  crise  financière  et  économique  mondiale  et  connaît 
actuellement une reprise en force. (Graphique 1). L’Afrique prévoit d’être la seconde 
région en termes de croissance en 2011, derrière l’Asie
15.
 Cette forte croissance a donné 
lieu à une reconnaissance renouvelée de l’important potentiel économique du continent.   
 
Maintenant que l’Afrique est en pleine reprise, comment doit-elle retirer les mesures 
mises en place pendant la crise? Les politiques anticycliques ont permis à certains 
pays africains de surmonter la crise. Ces politiques de stabilisation à court terme doivent 
être relaxées petit à petit pour ne pas compromettre la soutenabilité de la dette et trahir 
la confiance des investisseurs, de même que des stratégies investissements de capital 
pour élever la productivité doivent être prises. Cependant, vue la fragilité de la reprise 
mondiale, dans la mesure du possible, les pays africains devraient continuer avec des 
politiques non-restrictives même en 2011 pour garantir une reprise soutenue de leurs 
économies.  Pour  sortir  des  politiques  interventionnistes,  bien  qu’il  puisse  être 
techniquement et politiquement plus complexe, l’assainissement des finances publiques 
doit dans la plupart des cas précéder le resserrement monétaire. Dans certains pays, les 
dépenses sociales et d’infrastructure doivent être protégées et même augmentées pour 
soutenir la stabilité sociale et la croissance de la période après crise. 
 
Une croissance forte, soutenue et partagée est une priorité dans la mise en œuvre 
de la politique macroéconomique,
16 étant donné que la stabilisation était en grande 
partie maintenue pendant la crise. Bien que la forte croissance de l’Afrique au cours de 
la période 2001 – 2008 fut assez forte, cela n’a pas suffit à réduire l’écart de revenu 
avec les pays les plus avancés. Parallèlement, le taux d’inflation qu’affichaient près de 
40% de pays africains  à faible revenu était de moins de 5%, bien que l’expérience 
                                                 
14 McKinsey&Co. (2010), ‘Lions on the Move:  The progress and potential of African economies’, qui 
traite de ces développements, souligne que la croissance en Afrique a crée des opportunités d'affaires dans 
au moins quatre groupes d'industries: les industries de bien de consommation,  de l’agriculture, des 
ressources naturelles, et des infrastructures 
15 Banque africaine de développement et OCDE (2010)  Perspectives Economiques en Afrique, BAD: Tunis et 
OCDE: Paris. 
16 Une croissance soutenable requière des aspects sociaux et environnementaux. xvii 
 
montre que de tels taux d’inflation ne sont généralement pas indiqués pour les pays à 
faible revenu et pourraient même compromettre la croissance. Pour mettre l’Afrique sur 
la voie d’une croissance forte, soutenue et partagée, la politique macroéconomique au 
cours de la prochaine décennie doit cesser d’accorder trop d’importance à la stabilité 
macroéconomique et mettre l’accent sur la croissance. Par exemple, les pays affichant 
actuellement un taux d’inflation supérieur à 10% et un faible taux de croissance (ex. 
Nigeria) pourraient procéder à la stimulation de la croissance tout en réduisant le taux 
d’inflation jusqu’autour de 9% comme ce que le Nigeria a l’intention de faire. Les pays 
qui escomptent un taux de croissance inférieur à la tendance en 2010-2011 avec un taux 
d’inflation autour de 9% (ex. Kenya) devraient stimuler la demande sans provoquer 
l’augmentation du taux d’inflation (Graphique 2). 
 
Comment les cadres macroéconomiques peuvent-ils devenir plus souples tout en 
restant crédibles pendant que les objectifs de politiques s’orientent vers la croissance ? 
Pendant la crise, les pays aux cadres macroéconomiques plus souples se sont mieux 
tirés  d’affaire.  Pour  plus  de  souplesse  des  cadres  macroéconomiques,  les  politiques 
budgétaires  pro-cycliques  pourraient  être  remplacées  par  des  cadres  anticycliques 
fondés  sur  des  règles  permettant  la  discrétion  en  cas  de  chocs.  Les  pays  africains 
pourraient avoir pour objectif les équilibres budgétaires (après les subventions) au cours 
du cycle, avec des budgets annuels ancrés dans les cadres de dépense à moyen terme. 
Sur le plan monétaire, tant que les conditions le permettent, les régimes souples de 
ciblage de l’inflation, actuellement en place en République Sud-africaine et au Ghana, 
pourraient être envisagés par d’autres marchés émergeants ainsi que d’autres marchés 
dynamiques.    
 
La promotion de l’esprit d’entreprenariat appuyée par une politique industrielle 
bien élaborée, contribuera à rendre la croissance non seulement forte, mais également 
partagée et soutenue. L’Afrique ne réalisera cette croissance que si elle dispose d’un 
secteur privé dynamique et d’un esprit  d’entreprenariat. Bien que le secteur privé 
formel reste sous-développé, il enregistre de bonnes performances dans certains pays 
(ex. Maurice, République Sud-africaine). Des secteurs privés dynamiques continuent à 
émerger dans d’autres pays, notamment l’horticulture en Ouganda, le traitement du cuir 
en  Ethiopie  et  même  l’industrie  cinématographique  ‘Nolywood’  au  Nigeria.  La 
politique industrielle peut jouer un rôle important dans  le développement de l’esprit 
d’entreprenariat à travers le continent, non pas en choisissant « les gagnants », mais xviii 
 
en  réduisant  les  barrières  à  l’entreprenariat  dans  les  secteurs  et  industries  à  forte 
potentialité.   
 
Le renforcement de la capacité de résistance au choc à travers la mobilisation des 
ressources  nationales  contribuera  également  à  rendre  la  croissance  africaine  plus 
soutenue et permettra à ce continent de se préparer à faire face aux prochaines crises. La 
plupart  des  pays  africains,  en  particulier  ceux  de  l’Afrique  sub-saharienne,  sont 
confrontés à des déficits énormes en matière de ressources, en raison du faible taux 
d’épargne nationale et des besoins énormes en matière d’investissement. Ces déficits 
peuvent être comblés par l’augmentation des revenus générés par la taxe intérieure – en 
renforçant  l’administration  fiscale  et  en  formalisant  le  secteur  informel.  L’épargne 
privée peut être stimulée par le biais des réformes du secteur bancaire et à travers les 
voies novatrices comme la mise en valeur des fortunes locales ou la titrisation des flux 
de  capitaux  (e.x.,  transferts  des  migrants,  recettes  pétrolières).  Etant  donné  que  de 
nombreux pays continuent à compter sur l’aide publique pour combler leurs déficits, les 
bailleurs  de  fonds  doivent  non  seulement  augmenter  l’aide  mais  aussi  assurer  un 
déboursement prévisible.  Le support par l’APD doit être guidé par les priorités des 
dépenses  nationales  et  par  un  équilibre  entre  les  besoins  concurrents  des  secteurs 
sociaux et le développent économique de  long terme. 
 
La mise sur pied des filets de sécurité sociale permettra de s’assurer que la croissance 
est partagée avec les plus vulnérables. La récente crise financière mondiale a une fois de 
plus souligné la nécessité de mettre en place en Afrique, des mécanismes de protection 
des couches les plus vulnérables de la population contre les chocs extérieurs inattendus. 
La  crise  s’étant  transformée  en  crise  de  l’emploi,  les  pays  africains  on  apprécié 
l’importance  des  programmes  de  création  d’emploi  comme  les  travaux  publics,  les 
investissements dans les infrastructures à forte intensité de main-d’œuvre. Par ailleurs, 
des filets de sécurité sociale doivent être mis en œuvre à travers des programmes de 
protection à plus long terme bien ciblés, en vue de garantir la croissance partagée à 
moyen terme.  
 
 
V.  La décennie à venir: surmonter les obstacles, saisir les opportunités 
 
Les obstacles à l’accès au crédit doivent être levés, en particulier ceux ayant trait au 
financement  du  commerce  ainsi  que  le  crédit  aux  PME  et  aux  petits  exploitants xix 
 
agricoles. En ce qui concerne les pays dépendant des exportations et ayant un accès 
limité  au  financement  du  commerce,  l’élaboration  des  programmes  multilatéraux  de 
financement  du  commerce  ainsi  que  les  programmes  nationaux  de  garantie, 
contribueront  à  faciliter  les  flux  commerciaux,  et  en  conséquence,  l’intégration 
régionale.  Il  existe  de  nombreuses  façons  parmi  lesquelles  certains  obstacles  sous-
jacents  au  crédit  rural  peuvent  être  levés  à  travers  la  technologie  moderne.  A  titre 
d’exemple,  les  coûts  des  transactions  peuvent  être  réduits  à  travers  les  transactions 
bancaires mobiles (ex. du Kenya) et les asymétries de l’information diminuées à travers 
la technologie biométrique (méthode qui fait l’objet d’investigation au Malawi). Les 
transferts de fonds de migrants peuvent servir d’effet de levier en faveur des crédits aux 
PME, par exemple à travers la titrisation de ces flux (à travers ‘les bons de la diaspora’).   
 
Afin de tirer le meilleur parti de la mondialisation, l’attraction de flux de capitaux 
privés stables est une priorité pour le développement. Par ailleurs, la volatilité de ces 
flux  de  capitaux  doit  être  gérée.  Lorsque  les  flux    entrants  sont  particulièrement 
importants et ne reflètent pas les fondamentaux économiques, des contrôles sélectifs de 
ces  flux  pourraient  être  envisagés  sur  une  base  temporaire.  Les  pays  africains  ont 
besoin d'un accès accru aux marchés mondiaux pour accroître leurs exportations. 
Ils doivent continuer à exiger l'assouplissement des règles d'origine, la réduction des 
barrières non tarifaires, et une prestation efficace de l'aide pour le commerce. Ils ont 
besoin de réitérer les appels à une conclusion équitable et rapide du Cycle de Doha pour 
le  développement.  Les  pays  développés  devraient  décourager  les  pratiques 
protectionnistes dans le commerce et les finances qui réduisent le volume des échanges 
commerciaux  et  des  flux  de  capitaux ;  ils  devraient  notamment  mettre  fin  aux 
subventions agricoles.  
 
Attirer  des  IDE  productifs  pourrait  permettre  de  stimuler  la  croissance
17,  à 
condition que les pays hôtes créent un environnement compétitif afin de permettre aux 
investisseurs étrangers de renforcer la productivité des activités nationales existantes, en 
vue  de  générer  des  retombées  positives.  Des  régimes  libres  de  commerce  et 
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d’investissement favorisent la création d’un tel environnement. Etant donnés les liens 
étroits  entre  le  commerce  et  les  investissements,  des  mesures  de  promotion  de 
l’intégration  et  du  commerce  régional  peuvent  attirer  des  IDE  ‘à  la  recherche  des 
marchés’.  Par  ailleurs,  un  seuil  minimum  de  développement  est  nécessaire  pour 
permettre au pays hôte de bénéficier des IDE. Le développement du capital humain et 
technologique  est  en  conséquence  d’une  importance  capitale  pour  attirer  des  IDE 
productifs et la génération des retombées positives pour les économies nationales.   
 
L’intégration  régionale  peut  constituer  une  importante  source  de  résistance  au 
choc pendant les crises et de croissance durable.. L’intégration permettra aux pays 
africains de diversifier leurs économies et de se prémunir contre les chocs extérieurs, 
tout  en  renforçant    l’efficacité  résultant  des  économies  d’échelle.  Parallèlement,  les 
efforts  de  promotion  de  l’intégration  régionale  doivent  être  bien  coordonnés.  Les 
nombreux accords commerciaux régionaux qui se chevauchent, présentent des lacunes  
de taille et doivent être rationalisés. Pour réduire les coûts de l’intégration régionale, il 
faudra notamment mettre sur pied un système transparent, équitable et fondé sur les 
règles  claires  de  partage  des  gains  d’échange  et  de  règlement  des  différends.  Par 
ailleurs,  les  accords  régionaux  doivent  être  intégrés  dans  les  stratégies  et  politiques 
nationales dont la formulation et la mise en œuvre doivent bénéficier de la participation 
de  la  société  civile.  Enfin,  les  stratégies  régionales  doivent  se  focaliser  sur  le 
développement des zones de complémentarité industrielle afin d’augmenter la capacité 
commerciales des pays. 
 
Une base de capital humain plus solide est nécessaire pour la transformation des 
pays africains en sociétés où le savoir occupe une place centrale. Dans le monde 
actuel fondé sur le savoir, tout pays est contraint de disposer de capacité adéquate de 
générer, de transmettre et d’utiliser de nouvelles connaissances. Il existe une disparité 
de taille entre les exigences et attentes des économies modernes et la compétence des 
récents diplômés des universités dans la plupart des pays africains. En plus du taux de 
chômage   élevé des personnes éduquées, il se pose encore le problème de manque de 
compétences, particulièrement dans le domaine des TIC, des connaissances techniques 
de haut niveau et des langues étrangères. Pour résoudre ces problèmes, il est nécessaire 
de  procéder  à  une  restructuration  totale  du  système  d’enseignement  supérieur  en 
Afrique. Par ailleurs, il est nécessaire d’identifier de nouvelles sources de financement 
de l’enseignement supérieur, notamment par le secteur privé. Il est également nécessaire 
d’explorer de différentes formes d’appui du gouvernement, notamment, les garanties de xxi 
 
crédit,  les subventions et les crédits. L’Afrique devrait également revoir les politiques 
d’immigration pour faciliter la mobilité des travailleurs qualifiés pour aider à faire face 
au déficit de compétence. 
La réduction de l’important déficit en matière de productivité nécessitera également 
une base de capital humain solide. La majeure proportion de chômage dans de nombres 
pays africains à faible revenu s’explique encore par une agriculture à faible rendement, 
ainsi  que  le  surplus  de  la  main-d’œuvre  exerçant  en  général  dans  le  secteur  urbain 
informel. Cependant, dans certains marchés dynamiques (Ouganda et Mozambique, à 
titre  d’exemple),  la  productivité  du  travail  a  connu  une  accélération  au  cours  des 
récentes années et a enregistré une croissance presque aussi rapide qu’en Inde. Le grand 
déficit de productivité par rapport aux économies développées indique qu’à travers  le 
processus  de  rattrapage,  les  pays  africains  pourraient  afficher  un  taux  de  croissance 
annuel  avoisinant  10%.    Avec  de  tels  taux,  les  pays  africains  pourraient  même,  en 
moyenne,  se  rapprocher  des  niveaux  de  revenu  par  habitant  des  nouveaux  pays 
membres  de  l’UE  autour  de  l’année  2050.  Pour  la  réalisation  d’une  aussi  rapide 
croissance,  la  transformation  structurelle  en  activités  à  haute  valeur-ajoutée  doit 
connaître une accélération sensible,  alors qu’un environnement extérieur favorable et 
des  systèmes  éducatifs  améliorés.    En  outre,  l’importance  du  renforcement  des 
institutions et l’amélioration de la gouvernance en Afrique ne peut pas être surestimée. 
La  résorption  du  déficit  de  l’Afrique  en  matière  d’infrastructures  constitue une 
priorité de taille, étant donné que les niveaux faibles des biens publics et l’amélioration 
médiocre  de  la  productivité  des  investissements  ont  eu  des  effets  néfastes  sur  le 
développement et la croissance du continent. Par exemple, les estimations de la Banque 
mondiale suggère que si l’ensemble des pays de l’Afrique sub-saharienne disposait des 
infrastructures de l’Ile Maurice, la croissance du PIB réel par habitant connaitrait une 
augmentation  annuelle  de  2,3  points  de  pourcentage.  De  même,  la  croissance  de 
l’Afrique du Nord enregistrerait une augmentation annuelle de 1,1 point de pourcentage. 
Par ailleurs, les services infrastructurels sont en moyenne  plus chers en Afrique par 
rapport aux autres régions en développement et au pouvoir d’achat des consommateurs. 
Des  disparités  énormes  sont  observées  à  travers  les  pays  et  secteurs.  Les  pays 
exportateurs de pétrole affichent un déficit supérieur à celui des pays importateurs de 
l’or noir. Cette situation s’explique en partie par le fait que la plupart d’entre eux ont 
consacré la manne des années 2000 principalement à la consommation plutôt qu’aux 
investissements.  Le  secteur  dans  lequel  le  déficit  se  fait  le  plus  sentir  est  celui  de 
l’énergie, alors qu’il est de loin moins perceptible dans le secteur des TIC. En effet, de xxii 
 
nombreux  marchés  dynamiques  africains  se  classent  avant  l’Inde  en  matière 
d’utilisation  des  téléphones  portables ;  ce  qui  illustre  la  capacité  africaine  à  adopter 
rapidement la technologie moderne. 
Il  sera  nécessaire  de  trouver  des  formes  novatrices  de  financement  des 
infrastructures  parallèlement  au  renforcement  des  mécanismes  traditionnels,  vu 
l’énorme besoin financement actuellement environ 93 milliards de dollar  EU par an en 
total et plus 76 milliards de dollar EU par an.si tout les gains d’efficacités sont atteints. 
Vu  le  rôle  central  des  fonds  publics  dans  le  financement  des  investissements 
infrastructurels, le renforcement de l’efficacité dans leur allocation et leur décaissement 
est une priorité. En ce qui concerne les bailleurs de fonds émergeants, le financement 
des  infrastructures  par  la  Chine  en  Afrique  a  connu  une  croissance  rapide,  souvent 
soutenue par les revenus d’exportation futurs (pétrole, cacao, fer). Parmi les moyens de 
mobilisation  des  fonds  privés,  on  peut  citer  l’émission  nationale  des  obligations 
infrastructurelles au Kenya, l’émission des Euro-obligations par le Ghana en 2007 ainsi 
que le plan de création d’un Fonds d’infrastructure financé par les revenus pétroliers au 
Nigeria (Fonds souverain de patrimoine).  
L’Afrique  est  mieux  placée  pour  se  lancer  sur  une  voie  de  croissance  et 
développement a faible émission de carbone, vu ses abondantes ressources naturelles 
et  biologiques.  Les  opportunités  d’investissement  dans  les  sources  d’énergie 
renouvelable en Afrique à l’instar de l’énergie solaire, de l’hydroélectricité, de l’énergie 
éolienne  et  thermique  ainsi  que  de  la  biomasse,  pourraient  attirer  des  financements 
internationaux. Non seulement ces opportunités d’investissement permettront de lutter 
contre les changements climatiques ainsi que les problèmes locaux relatifs aux pénuries 
énergétiques,  elles  constitueront  également  l’occasion  de  créer  un  nouveau  marché 
mondial.
18  Mais  les  ressources  publiques    toutes  seules  ne  peuvent  pas  couvrir 
totalement les coûts du changement climatique et permettre de mettre sur pied des plans 
de  développement  adaptés  à  chaque  pays  africain;  des  financements  privés  doivent 
également être mobilisés. Par ailleurs, les pays africains doivent activement capitaliser 
sur  les  projets  stimulant  les  industries  vertes,  à  l’instar  de  l’agriculture  basée  sur 
l’énergie  propre  ou  agriculture  verte  initiés  par  les  institutions  multilatérales  et 
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régionales.  L’émission  des  bons  d’énergie  propre  par  la  Banque  africaine  de 
développement en 2010, constitue une étape déterminante dans la bonne direction.   
 
L’Afrique doit faire entendre sa voix sur la scène économique mondiale en vue de 
mobiliser  l’attention  sur  les  obstacles  qui  depuis  longtemps  entravent  son 
développement et saisir les opportunités qui se présentent dans la conjoncture actuelle. 
Bien que de nombreux pays africains dépendent de l’accès aux financements accordés à 
des conditions préférentielles par les IFI, ils ne disposent que des voix marginales dans 
la  gouvernance  desdites  institutions.  L’architecture  financière  et  économique 
internationale actuelle reste dominée par les grandes économies développées. Pourtant, 
la leçon capitale tirée des bons processus de développement dans les autres régions, 
particulièrement en Asie, est celle de l’importance de l’appropriation des politiques et 
stratégies déterminées en fonction des conditions locales et des priorités du pays, ainsi 
que l’engagement à les mener à bon port. Cette leçon doit se refléter dans la structure et 
la gouvernance des organisations internationales ainsi que lors de la prise des décisions 
qui ont un impacte sur l’Afrique. D’où la nécessité d’une représentation continentale et 
régionale au sein des principales structures internationales de politique et de prise de 
décisions.  Il  est  également  nécessaire  d’accorder  plus  d’envergure  aux  institutions 
dirigées par les Africains, afin de leur permettre de participer aux débats mondiaux sur 
des bases égalitaires, de présenter les perspectives africaines et d’attirer l’attention sur 
les  conséquences  des  décisions  des  institutions  internationales  sur  l’Afrique.    À  cet 
égard, la représentation institutionnalisée de l'Afrique au G20 est une priorité. 
 
VI.  Afrique: nouveau pôle de croissance mondiale 
 
 
La croissance de l’avant crise et le rebond de  l’Afrique ont clairement démontré la 
capacité du continent à devenir un nouveau pôle de croissance mondiale. L'Afrique a 
changé,  passant d’une  région dont la croissance a été  historiquement lente à l'une des 
régions les plus dynamiques au monde. Des changements fondamentaux ont eu lieu sur 
le  continent,  démontrant  une  amélioration  de  l'environnement  économique  et xxiv 
 
sociopolitique.  Les  économies  africaines  sont  désormais  appelées  à  devenir  une 
nouvelle  source  de  croissance  économique  mondiale.  Les  fondements  de  cette 
croissance proviennent du renforcement de la capacité à concevoir et à mettre en œuvre 
des politiques efficaces, des ressources naturelles abondantes, d’une main-d'œuvre plus 
importante, et de l'urbanisation rapide. 
 
De  nouvelles  perceptions  positives  se  concrétiseraient  également  grâce  aux 
investissements privés, à l'accroissement des échanges, et à la croissance accélérée en 
Afrique.  Si  tous  les  pays  africains  atteignaient  le  taux  de  croissance  de  7%  des 
économies à forte croissance du continent et continuaient de croître à ce rythme, le PIB 
par habitant devrait doubler en 10 ans et quadrupler en 20 ans. Le PIB de l'Afrique 
devrait atteindre  2,6 milliards de dollars en 2020, et les dépenses de consommation 
s'établiraient  à  1,4  milliards  de  dollars.
19 Dans  ce  cas,  l'Afrique  jouerait  un  rôle 
important  dans  le  rééquilibrage  de  l'économie  mondiale,  non  seulement  grâce  aux 
exportations, mais également en tant que marché de grande consommation due à son 
importante  population.  L’appui  aux  efforts  actuels  de  l'Afrique  pour  réaliser  son 
immense potentiel économique pourrait prochainement être bénéfique pour le monde 
entier. 
 
L’Afrique peut offrir une alternative à la nouvelle « normalité » de l’économie mondiale 
de croissance faible, de chômage élevé, d'instabilité, de  niveaux de pauvreté absolue 
élevés, et de potentiel humain inexploité. L'histoire économique montre qu’une grande 
partie de la pauvreté pourrait être réduite par la croissance ; mais  cette dernière doit être 
forte, soutenue et partagée. Si l'Afrique peut réaliser une telle croissance pendant au 
moins deux décennies,  elle pourrait devenir une nouvelle source de dynamisme dans 
l'économie mondiale. En outre, bien que les marchés asiatiques continuent leur forte 
expansion, la Chine et l'Inde devraient augmenter leurs dépenses de consommation pour 
remplacer la croissance perdue par les pays développés depuis le début de la crise. Le 
monde a besoin d'un nouveau moteur de la demande de consommation, d’un nouveau 
                                                 
19 McKinsey Global Institute (2010), Lions on the Move: The Progress and Potential of African 
Economies, McKinsey Global Institute: Washington DC. xxv 
 
marché, et d’un nouvel alternateur, qui est l'Afrique. La croissance future de l'économie 
mondiale  et  les  emplois  futurs  dans  les  pays  en  développement  dépendront  de  la 
mobilisation  à  la  fois  du  potentiel  productif  et  de  la  demande  de  consommation 
inexploitée du continent. Par conséquent, tout emploi non créé, toute entreprise perdue 
ainsi que toute idée d'entreprise non réalisée  en Afrique constituent des moteurs de 
croissance perdus pour le monde.  xxvi 
 
Graphique 1. L’Afrique et les autres régions : taux de croissance du PIB réel (2006 – 
2011) 
 
Sources: Perspectives économiques en Afrique et PEM, FMI.  
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Graphique 2. Afrique: possibilités de croitre sans accélérer l’inflation 1/ 


























































Source: Calculs des auteurs à partir de la base des données de la BAD.  
1/ l’écart de croissance est la différence entre la croissance potentielle (moyenne de 2006 – 2008) et la 
croissance  réelle  en  2010.  L’écart  d’inflation  est  la  différence  entre  l’inflation  cible/la  tendance  de 
l’inflation  (moyenne  de  2001  –  2008)  et  l’inflation  réelle  en  2010.  Dans  les  cas  où  la  tendance  de 
l’inflation était de moins de 5%, l’inflation cible était fixée à 5%. Dans le même ordre d’idées, lorsque la 
tendance de l’inflation était supérieure à 10%, l’inflation cible a été fixée à 10%. Un écart de croissance 
positif signifie que le pays doit avoir pour objectif un taux de croissance supérieur ; un écart d’inflation 
positif signifie qu’il pourrait tolérer un taux d’inflation élevé, en particulier en ce qui concerne les pays à 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The  aftermath  of  the  global  financial  and  economic  crisis,  which  Africa  weathered  well, 
presents a unique opportunity to rethink the continent’s economic strategies. The key question 
that arises in this context is ‘what should be Africa’s agenda for poverty reduction beyond the 
MDGs?’ Given the continent’s vast economic potential, the agenda should focus on building a 
prosperous Africa. The way to achieve this is through economic growth, which is strong, 
sustained and shared. In that context, Africa’s economic strategies need to take into account 
the rising importance of Brazil, Russia, India, China, Turkey, South Korea, and South Africa, 
as sources of trade, investment and increasingly also knowledge sharing. A related question is 
then how African countries can best position themselves in this new global order to achieve 
strong, sustained and shared growth. 
 
To shed light on these issues, the African Development Bank, the C-10, the UNECA, and the 
AUC  undertook  a  joint  study  in  collaboration  with  the  Korea  Institute  for  International 
Economic Policy. The study highlights the key challenges that Africa faces to reach strong, 
sustained and shared growth. It provides evidence on the impact of the crisis and discusses 
longer term trends, gives examples of good international practices in selected areas, makes 
policy recommendations, and suggests concrete actions for the way forward. The aim of this 
paper is to contribute to promoting Africa’s voice on development globally and especially in 
the debates at the G20. The paper includes specific Proposed Actions to the G20, notably: an 
infrastructure  project  development  initiative,  an  investment-enabling  legal  facility,  and  a 
catalytic investment portfolio guarantee fund. 
 
The main message that the study aims to convey is that while Africa still faces enormous 
challenges, its economic potential is immense. The study then suggests some ways that would 
help Africa turn this potential into tangible achievements. It first reviews Africa’s strong pre-
crisis economic performance, continued prudent policies that the continent adopted during the 
crisis,  and  an  unexpectedly  fast  and  strong  rebound.  It  underscores  that  going  forward, 
macroeconomic policies need to shift from overemphasizing stability to focusing on growth. 
In the following section, the study identifies the following areas that, if addressed, would help 
Africa achieve strong sustained and shared growth: (i) making finance inclusive; (ii) making 
the most out of globalization through managing capital flows and trade linkages; (iii) building 
strong  human  capital  base;  (iv)  moving  the  composition  of  production  and  employment 
toward high value-added activities; (v) building modern infrastructure; (vi) embarking on the 
green  growth  path;  (vii)  amplifying  Africa’s  voice  in  the  global  economic  arena.  If 
undertaken, reforms in these areas – together with continued adequate and timely support 
from the G20 and development partners -- would facilitate Africa’s growth take off. And if 
that were to happen, specifically if Africa could grow at 7 or more percent for the next two 
decades,  the  continent  would  emerge  as  a  new  and  additional  global  growth  pole.  A 
prosperous Africa would be beneficial to the entire world. 
 
Another  key  message  is  that  while  Africa  due  to  its  delayed  take-off  can  draw  on  good  
practices from other developing regions, it also has – and increasingly so -- its own good 
policies to share with others. Examples include the effective response to the crisis, where 
Africa  resisted  protectionist  tendencies  and  also  continued  with  overall  prudent 
macroeconomic stance. Another area where Africa can be proud of its achievements is the 
innovative application of ICT such as m-banking (Kenya), m-agriculture (Niger, Senegal), 
and in general rapid adoption of the mobile technology.  Finally, already prior to the crisis 
Africa has markedly built up its capacity to design and implement good economic policies. So 3 
 
when the financial crisis hit, African countries showed leadership. With the support of the 
African Development Bank, UNECA and AUC, Africa drew on this capacity and swiftly 
created the Committee of Ten African Ministers of Finance and Central Bank Governors (C-
10)  to  provide  the  continent’s  views  on  key  economic  issues.  Now  that  Africa  has  been 
rebounding, the C-10 has also shifted its focus from crisis responses to policies that would 
facilitate strong, shared and sustained growth – the main theme of this study. 
 
The  study  is  organized  as  follows.  Following  the  Introduction,  Part  I  maps  out  Africa’s 
economic situation in the aftermath of the global financial and economic crisis and discusses 
pro-growth  policies  for  the  next  decade.  Part  II  discusses  major  issues  for  Africa’s 
development, while Part III discusses alternative models for Africa become another global 
growth pole. Key policy messages and the way forward are in Conclusions.  
 
PART I. BEYOND THE CRISIS: PRO-GROWTH ORIENTED MACROECONOMIC POLICIES
1 
I.1. The Crisis and the Recovery 
 
I.1.1. High pre-crisis growth, but more is needed 
 
Africa’s GDP grew by 5.6 percent during 2001-08, compared to only 2-3 percent during the 
previous two decades. Prior to the crisis, Africa grew faster than most other regions. The 
growth was broad-based, with about 40 percent of the countries growing on average by 5 
percent or above per year.  
 
A combination of factors contributed to Africa’s impressive growth performance. Prior to the 
crisis,  Africa  was  experiencing  booming  conditions,  with  buoyant  export  revenues  and 
increased capital inflows as global investors faced low interests at home and were searching 
for new sources of profit.  In  addition to supportive external environment and debt relief, 
domestic  factors  such  as  reduced  conflict,  greater  political  stability,  and  prudent 
macroeconomic policies underpinned the continent’s growth. A number of African countries 
undertook  key  structural  reforms  that  improved  the  business  environment  (e.g.,  Rwanda, 
Ethiopia), the financial sector (Nigeria), administration, and governance (Sierra Leone). Some 
also further opened up their economies to trade and investment.  
 
Africa’s high growth during 2001-08 was a positive turnaround, but only about 25 percent of 
low-income countries (LICs) grew at 7 percent or more a year during this period. At the same 
time, about 40 percent of the countries had inflation below 5 percent while 75 percent of the 
countries had inflation below 10 percent (Figures A.1.a and A.1.b). In contrast, in the 1990s 
only 45 percent of LICs had inflation below 10 percent.  Some countries slashed their rates 
markedly  from  mid-double  digits  to  low-single  digits  (e.g.  Guinea  Bissau)  or  further 
consolidated their stabilization gains by moving from high single digit to low single digit 
inflation rates (e.g., Cape Verde, Republic of Congo).  
 
Yet in most cases very low inflation rates (below 5 percent) are not appropriate inflation 
targets for Africa’s LICs. Empirical evidence shows that for LICs inflation hampers growth 
only if it exceeds a certain threshold (typically between 10 - 20 percent); below this threshold 
the  positive  impact  of  reduced  inflation  on  growth  is  insignificant.  Moreover,  it  is 
                                                 
1 This section contains case studies on (i) fiscal policy experience of South Africa and (ii) monetary policy 
experience of Kenya. They are issued in a standalone Annex, together with Korea’s experience with capital 
flows management; the Annex is available upon request.  4 
 
recommended that to avoid unintended contractionary effects in the event of shocks, LICs 
should not aim at inflation below 5 percent.
2 At the same time, once inflation is stabilized at 
low level and expectations adjust, faster growth may be achieved without raising inflation.  
 
The overall low inflation before the crisis and the growth rates suggest that macroeconomic 
policy on the continent was too focused on stabilization and not enough on raising growth and 
living standards. One lesson of the pre-crisis experience is that countries with currently higher 
(above 10 percent) inflation and lower (below 6 percent) growth (e.g., Malawi, Zambia) may 
have room to stimulate growth while keeping the inflation in high single digits.  
 
Africa’s growth of GDP per capita was lagging that of most other regions before the crisis. 
The income gap between Africa and the advanced economies narrowed only marginally in the 
past decade, with Africa’s per capita GDP amounting to only less than 10 percent of per 
capital GDP in the European Union. Subsequently, the gains in income poverty reduction, 
especially in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) were modest – 73 percent of the SSA population was 
still living on less than 2$ a day in 2005, almost unchanged from 76 percent in 1990.
3 
 
Moreover, large differences in growth rates persisted among subgroups and countries. For 
example, oil exporters grew faster than oil importers (Figure A.2.a) and also achieved positive 
fiscal and current account balances (Figure A.2.b). A growth gap emerged between resource 
poor  fragile  countries  (e.g.,  Burundi,  Central  African  Republic)  and  the  frontier  market 
economies  (Figures  A.3.a  and  A.3.b).
4 The  low  growth  in  Africa’s  resource  poor  fragile 
countries  suggests  that  in  addition  to  utilizing  aid  effectively,  these  countries  need  to 
implement key structural reforms to restore investor confidence and generate peace dividends. 
 
I.1.2. 2009 was a challenging year for Africa 
 
In 2009, Africa’s high growth was interrupted by a severe external shock in the form of the 
global  financial  and  economic  crisis.  Several  exceptions  aside  (mostly  emerging  market 
economies such as South Africa), the impact through the financial channels of transmission 
was weak given the continent’s limited financial integration and low level of cross-border 
lending (most lending by African banks is deposit-based).
5 Also, the resilience of African 
countries, especially the middle income ones, to external financial shocks increased in the run 
up to the crisis; it was much higher than prior to the last global recession in the early 1990s.
6  
                                                 
2 Nigeria is a good example in this regard. With current (August 2010) inflation above 10 percent, the Central 
Bank aims reducing it to 9.5 percent but not lower, stating that growth is the key priority. Empirical evidence 
supports for LICs to keep inflation between, say, 5 and 10 percent, but not necessarily lower (IMF, 2005).  
 
3 Similarly, about 50 percent  of the SSA population  was  still living on less than 1.25$ a day in 2005. As 
Ravallion (2008) pointed out: “…in 1981 China’s poor outnumbered Africa’s by almost 4:1. Yet by 1996, SSA 
had overtaken China in the total count of the poor.” 
  
4 Frontier market economies are countries that improved their economic fundamentals and accessed or about to 
access  international  capital  markets.  In  this  paper,  they  include  Cape  Verde,  Ghana,  Kenya,  Mozambique, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia. See Deutsche Bank Research (2009) for discussion. 
  
5 Some countries (e.g. Nigeria) saw their trade credit lines dry up. 
  
6 Due to low cross-border lending, even countries with strong foreign bank presence have not accumulated large 
external  private  sector  debts  (denominated  in  foreign  currency).  Hence  they  avoided  deterioration  of  net 
investment positions and a currency crisis.  The absence of housing finance and real estate markets has implied 
an absence of a key mechanism that amplified the financial shocks in other regions.  5 
 
While shielded from the crisis through financial channels, most African countries were hit 
hard through the real channels such as declining exports and FDI and in some cases also aid, 
remittances and tourism receipts. Subsequently, in 2009 most key macroeconomic indicators 
deteriorated. The real GDP grew on average by only 2.5 percent, but the performance varied 
from 6.8 percent decline (Seychelles) to 9.9 percent growth (Ethiopia). The impact on SSA 
was severe, as growth collapsed from an average of 6.1 percent during 2001-08 to 1.6 percent 
in 2009. Since the crisis was an external shock, the countries that were more open to trade and 
grew faster before the crisis experienced larger growth falls in 2009. Correspondingly, they 
are expected to recover the fastest, alongside the global revival (Figures 1.a and 1.b below). 
 
Regarding  other  key  macroeconomic  indicators,  the  curtailed  demand  in  the  advanced 
economies  and  lower  commodity  prices  led  to  marked  deterioration  of  trade  and  current 
account  balances;  oil  exporters  took  a  particularly  heavy  hit.  A  number  of  countries 
experienced  ‘twin  deficits’,  as  worsening  current  account  balances  were  accompanied  by 
rising fiscal deficits; no marked reversal occurred in 2010 except for oil exporters (Figure 
A.4.a). In low income countries in general and (resource poor) fragile states in particular, the 
deterioration of the current account balances to high levels raises concerns about maintaining 
hard-won debt sustainability over the medium term (Table A1).  
 
The crisis, which was not at all of Africa’s own making, had other dire consequences for the 
continent,  such  as  slowdown  in  progress  with  poverty  reduction.    ILO’s  estimates  of  the 
impact of the crisis on working poverty (i.e. people living on less than 1.25 dollar a day) 
range from stagnation (at about 52 percent of all working population) to an increase of about 
15 percent in 2009, which would reverse the recent gains and bring the working poverty rates 
back to 2003 levels. Unemployment in Africa is also estimated to have increased markedly, 
by about 1 – 4 million people between 2008 and 2009. Specific examples include the mining 
sector in Zambia where 28 percent of jobs were lost already in 2008, while the manufacturing 
sector in South Africa shrank by about 20 percent in 2009.  
 
Figure 1.a. Fastest growing countries in 2008 declined the most in 2009 1/ 
 


































































































Source: African Economic Outlook and authors’ calculations. 1/ Correlation coefficient -0.489 at 1 percent 
significance level.  6 
 
Figure 1.b. Least growing countries in 2009 are expected to rebound the most in 2010 1/ 




































































































Source: African Economic Outlook database and authors’ calculations. 1/ Correlation coefficient -0.762 at 1 
percent significance level.  
 
I.1.3. Africa’s recovery in 2010 and 2011 needs to be supported by appropriate policies  
 
Africa  has  shown  a  surprising  resilience  during  this  crisis  and  is  now  staging  a  robust 
comeback.  The continent as a whole avoided recession, and output in only 10 out of 53 
countries contracted in 2009. Unlike in the past recessions where Africa lagged the global 
recovery, this time Africa’s recovery is in synch with the world economy (Table A1). The 
growth is expected to reach 4.5 percent in 2010 and 5.2 in 2011. Except Madagascar, all 
African  countries  are  projected  to  record  positive  growth  in  2010  and  in  2011.  Many, 
including some fragile states, are recovering fast as the commodity prices rebound. According 
to the African Development Bank’s projections, in 2011 Africa will be again one of the fastest 
growing developing regions, second only to Asia (Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2. Africa and other regions, real GDP growth (2006 – 2011), percent 
 
Sources: African Economic Outlook and IMF WEO.  
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Several factors have helped Africa weather the crisis relatively well, especially: (i) cautious 
macroeconomic policies adopted across many countries prior to the crisis; (ii) appropriate 
counter-cyclical  measures  were  adopted  where  feasible  (East  Africa),  focusing  mostly  on 
removing  supply-side  bottlenecks  (infrastructure);  (iii)  increased  trade  and  investment 
linkages with Asia and other emerging market countries; and (iv) in some sub-regions (East 
Africa), more intensive regional integration also played a positive role. The counter-cyclical 
policies in particular constituted a welcome deviation from the past pro-cyclical stance. In that 
context,  timely  financial  support  from  the  multilateral  financial  institutions,  including  the 
African Development Bank, also helped prevent large pro-cyclical cuts in fiscal expenditures.  
 
Nevertheless,  as  the  recent  turbulence  in  Europe  and  downward  growth  revisions  in  the 
United States showed, the global recovery remains fragile and the earlier risk of slower global 
recovery has materialized. Accordingly, risks surround also Africa’s recovery, mainly through 
trade and investment linkages with Europe and the United States. On a positive side, countries 
with intensive trade linkages with China and India (e.g., Angola, Namibia, Gabon, Benin) 
could  receive  extra  stimulus  from  Asia’s  robust  recovery.
7 Regardless  of  these  opposite 
trends,  the  re-priced  risk  associated  with  emerging  and  frontier  markets  may  be  raising 
Africa’s cost of capital over the medium term, with possibly negative implications for the 
continent’s potential  growth. As the investors’  attention shifts from market signals to the 
quality of policies, African countries would benefit from adopting even better policies and 
communicating them effectively to partly offset the perception of being ‘higher risk’.   
 
When  designing  their  exit  strategies  from  the  crisis  intervention  policies,  African 
policymakers need to take the uncertain global recovery into account.  To prevent stop-go 
policies, exits from crisis interventions should be gradual and well coordinated, both across 
countries and policies. According to the African Economic Outlook projections, about 40 
percent of countries will experience higher fiscal deficit in 2010 than in 2009, suggesting the 
continent should not aim for quick exits (AfDB and OECD, 2010). Clearly, policies aimed at 
short-term stabilization are not sustainable over the medium term as they would jeopardize 
hard-won debt sustainability and undermine investor confidence. However, in light of the 
weak global recovery, where feasible, African governments may want to maintain somewhat 
accommodative policies also in 2011, while gradually refocusing on medium term objectives. 
Such approach would raise predictability and help Africa reach strong, sustained and shared 
growth.  
 
Given the overall case for gradual exits from accommodative policies, the key question is how 
much  policy  space  African  countries  have  to  pursue  this  stance  in  2011.  The  continent 
absorbed the global economic crisis well, but the impact was varied. In some countries (e.g., 
Swaziland, Cape Verde) the crisis has reduced the fiscal policy space by raising deficit and 
financing it through debt. In others (e.g., Ghana, DRC) inflation accelerated, cutting the room 
for policies to stimulate aggregate demand. Finally, in spite of overall sound levels, in some 




                                                 
7 China-Africa trade represents close to 10 percent of continent’s exports and imports (Osei and Mubiru, 2010). 
 
8 For example, Chad’s reserves collapsed by almost 50 percent between 2008 and 2009, from 3.8 months of 
imports to about 2 months. Similarly, Malawi’s international reserves declined by 35 percent and stood at mere 2 
weeks of imports in 2009 (down from 1 month in 2008).  8 
 
While the fiscal situation deteriorated in a number of countries (Figures A.6.a and A.6.b), 
most  have  emerged  from  the  crisis  with  stronger  fiscal  positions  than  the  advanced 
economies. Many of the countries hit hard in 2009 were oil or mineral exporters who are 
expected to rebound in the near term. A few exceptions aside, debt sustainability has not been 
so far a major concern, even though the problem may arise over the medium term unless the 
current stance is reversed. Given that in 2010 (and even 2011) many countries are projected to 
grow below their trend growth, the key policy challenge is to bring them on a path of strong, 
sustained  and  shared  growth.  Often,  the  countries  underperforming  on  growth  are  over-
performing on inflation -- with inflation rates either below 5 percent or within 5 -10 percent, 
but  below  their  trends  (Figure  3).  In  these  cases,  countries  should  not  avoid  stimulating 
aggregate demand for the fear of slightly raising inflation.  
 
The above factors suggest that growth should be the key macro priority even in the near term 
for most African countries, especially LICs. For those with ‘room to inflate’, inflation is not a 
priority right now as moderate increase can be reversed later, once high growth is restored. 
Still, with deteriorating fiscal and current account deficits, fiscal policy needs to ensure that 
any  ‘extra’  public  expenditures  are  pro-growth  oriented.  As  in  2009  and  2010,  African 
countries should thus focus on increasing infrastructure outlays, which alleviate supply-side 
bottlenecks and stimulate medium-term growth while raising short-term aggregate demand. 
Building social safety nets will ensure that in the future the most vulnerable segments of the 
population are protected and growth is shared. A positive effect would be also the creation of 
automatic fiscal stabilizers on the expenditure side, now missing in most African countries.   
 
Figure 3. Africa: room to grow and room to inflate 1/ 
 


























































Source:  African  Economic  Outlook  and  authors’  calculations.  1/  Growth  gap  is  calculate  as  the  difference 
between the potential growth (average of 2006 – 2008) and the actual growth in 2010. Inflation gap is calculated 
as the difference between the targeted/trend inflation (average of 2001-2008) and the actual inflation in 2010. In 
cases where inflation trend was below 5 percent, target was set as 5. Similarly, where inflation trend was above 
10 percent, target was set at 10. Positive growth gaps mean that countries should aim at higher growth; positive 
inflation gap means that there may be some room to inflate, especially for low income countries with inflation 
below 5 percent.  
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In reversing the accommodative policies, where feasible, Africa countries should not rush, but 
opt  for  exits  that  are  gradual  and  orderly.  Many  countries  may  want  to  start  with  fiscal 
consolidation, even though it may be technically and politically more complex than monetary 
tightening.
9 In  LICs,  another  reason  for  starting  with  the  fiscal  consolidation  is  the  weak 
transmission mechanism of the monetary policy, as demonstrated during the past crisis.
10 At 
the same time, African policy makers need to ensure that important social outlays as well as 
public expenditures on infrastructure remain protected.  
 
Finally, it remains undisputed that the global crisis has caused significant, and possibly long-
lasting collateral damage to African economies, which needs to be resolved through a global 
partnership. The actions of African countries need to be supplemented by measures taken by 
developed countries, including provision of adequate and timely financial assistance. Without 
such support, the social consequences of the crisis could reverse the achievements in terms of 
higher growth, greater macroeconomic resilience, and some poverty reduction recorded over 
the past decade. The international community thus needs to listen to Africa’s voice on the key 
strategic  issues  and  continue  to  work  in  partnership  with  African  countries  to  ensure 
coordinated and smooth exit from the most severe global recession of the past 60 years.  
 
I.2. Pro-growth macroeconomic policies for the next decade 
 
I.2.1. Shifting from crisis response to supporting growth 
 
With Africa rebounding, objectives of macroeconomic policy have shifted from containing 
the crisis to stimulating medium-term growth and job creation.
11 The key lessons from the 
crisis  are  that  macroeconomic  frameworks  need  to  be  more  flexible  while  maintaining 
credibility. On the fiscal side, pro-cyclical policies need to be replaced by rule-based and 
counter-cyclical fiscal frameworks that still leave room for discretion in case of unexpected 
shocks. On the monetary side, where conditions allow, consideration should be given to more 
flexible  inflation  targeting  (IT)  frameworks,  which  of  course  need  to  be  accompanied  by 
flexible exchange rate regimes.  
 
Specifically, phasing out pro-cyclical fiscal policies that prevailed in the run up to the crisis 
would help achieve strong, sustained and shared growth and reduce output volatility.  African 
countries could aim for balanced budgets (after grants) over the cycle. Given the need to raise 
efficiency  of  public  spending  and  maintain  debt  sustainability,  annual  budgets  should  be 
anchored in medium-term expenditure frameworks; if set in nominal terms rather than as 
shares  of  GDP  they  would  play  a  counter-cyclical  role.  Donors  could  support  these 
frameworks by giving adequate official aid in a timely manner. To avoid pro-cyclical fiscal 
cuts  in  downturns,  African  governments  need  to  improve  their  access  to  debt  financing. 
                                                 
9 Moreover, as fiscal consolidation would reduce aggregate demand, continued accommodative monetary stance 
would be possible without fueling inflation (Brixiova, Kamara, Ndikumana, 2010). 
 
10 In spite of lowering of policy rates, growth of money supply and especially real credit to the private sector 
declined markedly in 2009. 
  
11 In particular, going forward policy priorities should not overemphasize vey low inflation at the cost of growth, 
as was sometimes times the case before the crisis, particularly in low-income countries. 
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Developing efficient local government bond markets is thus crucial, together with gaining 
access to international bond markets on more competitive terms.
12  
 
As the increasingly globalized economy requires quick responses to shocks, there has been a 
world-wide trend towards more flexibility in monetary and exchange rate regimes.
13 Among 
monetary policy frameworks, flexible inflation targeting (IT) has become increasingly popular 
all over the world during the past decade. Some African countries already adopted inflation 
targeting (IT) framework (e.g., South Africa, Ghana), others are planning to do so in the 
medium  term  (e.g.,  Kenya,  Uganda).  The  crisis  has  reiterated  the  need  for  flexibility  in 
macroeconomic frameworks and brought the option of adopting flexible IT frameworks back 
on  the  top  of  macroeconomic  policy  agenda.
14 Another  lesson  from  the  crisis  was  that 
monetary policy should aim at price stability over the long-term, but not over react to short 
term deviations from inflation targets, especially at times when output growth is below the 
potential.    
 
Recent global developments showed the negative effects that freezing up of credit can have 
on growth. As the view that in developing countries monetary policy affects output mostly 
through the credit channel has gained acceptance, African central bankers have increasingly 
focused on credit as the key part of the monetary transmission mechanism. The crisis has also 
shown that in Africa cuts in policy rates do not necessary increase credit to the private sector, 
pointing  to  structural  rigidities  and  inefficiencies  in  financial  systems.  With  these 
impediments,  private  sector  alone  will  not  be  able  to  drive  Africa’s  near-term  recovery; 
effective state interventions will be needed. 
    
I.2.2. Private sector development and industrial policy 
 
African policy makers have recognized that for growth to be sustainable over the longer term, 
it needs to be underpinned by a vibrant private sector. At the same time, in spite of efforts to 
undertake structural reforms and deregulation, the formal private sector in Africa remains 
limited, exhibits low levels of productivity and is highly concentrated in natural resources and 
primary  production.  The  recent  global  economic  crisis  increased  the  attention  of  African 
policymakers on the need to shift from development driven solely by markets to the balance 
between the market and the state. The government has a role to play also in private sector 
development beyond deregulation, through learning, industrial and technology policies.
15  
 
                                                 
12 Kasekende, Brixiova, and Ndikumana (2010) discuss the counter-cyclical fiscal policies adopted by African 
countries during the crisis.  
 
13 In  1970s,  90  percent  of  all  countries  had  fixed  exchange  rate  regimes;  in  2000  less  than  30  percent  of 
countries.  In Africa, the share of countries with flexible regimes has also increased over time. This is to some 
extent to be expected – as economies mature, the value of exchange rate flexibility rises (Rogoff, et al. 2003). 
According to the IMF classification, 44 countries out of 192 practiced formal inflation targeting as of April 31, 
2008, up from 19 countries (among 187) that had this regime in 2003. Some countries target inflation informally. 
 
14 Weeks (2010) explains why monetary targeting is ineffective in SSA -- as bond markets are under-developed, 
open market operations do not work. Khan (2010) discussed the evolution of monetary policy frameworks in 
sub-Saharan African. Heintz and Ndikumana (2010) discussed constraints that need to be addressed for the 
flexible inflation targeting to become effective and for central banks to play a greater development role. 
    
15 Stiglitz (2010) covers the main elements of learning, industrial and technology policy. 
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The crisis has also underscored the importance of export diversification to mitigate adverse 
external shocks. Africa’s past experience suggests that lowering barriers to competition alone 
is  not  enough.  Also,  rather  than  picking  winners,  policymakers  need  to  design  industrial 
strategy to identify high-potential export sectors. Specifically, the industrial policy should 
target sectors that are: (i) ‘nearby’ (requiring capabilities similar to those in current production 
so  as  to  increase  economic  density);  (ii)  relatively  sophisticated  (raising  the  level  of 
technology);  and  (iii)  facilitating  exports  of  other  sophisticated  products  (having  strategic 
value).
16 In this regard, the oil sector can be particularly challenging to leverage for export 
diversification because it uses a specific set of skills, often completely different from other 
existing activities (e.g. Algeria). In such situations, industrial policy should aim at ‘rising 
product density’ through providing the necessary public goods for the nearby sectors while 
removing barriers to their operations. 
  
Developing the private sector in fragile states requires particularly pro-active approach. In 
these countries enabling investment climate is a necessary but only one condition for private 
sector development. Since fixed costs of entering new activities and niches in these countries 
are  particularly  high,  government  interventions  are  needed  to  connect  the  missing  links. 
Hence the focus of this new industrial policy should not be on picking winners, but rather on 
stimulating  the  discovery  process  in  high-potential  industries  and  sectors  and  providing 
supporting institutions as needed. Given the small size of markets in many fragile states, 
where feasible (e.g., Burundi, Rwanda) private enterprises should seize opportunities from the 
regional integration and become part of regional and global value chains.   
 
I.2.3. Preparing for the next crisis 
 
a.  Building social safety nets to assist the most vulnerable 
 
The recent global financial crisis has shown the importance for Africa to create mechanisms 
in Africa to protect the most vulnerable segments of population against unexpected shocks. 
The need for social safety nets was also demonstrated in 2008, when unrests erupted because 
of  rising  food  prices  in  several  African  countries  (e.g.,  Egypt,  Senegal,  Somalia,  Cote 
d’Ivoire). While in most African countries, social spending was preserved during the crisis, in 
some (Nigeria) it was cut. The low coverage of the programs reminded of the importance to 
create more robust nets before the next crisis hits. As the global financial crisis has turned into 
the job crisis, countries throughout Africa have realized that more attention should be paid to 
public works programs, especially where labor-intensive infrastructure building is involved.  
 
In addition to short-term social safety nets, well-targeted longer term protection programs 
would support shared growth.
17 In practice, a key obstacle to reforming social safety nets is 
the limited knowledge of the existing ones and in particular of prevailing good practices. 
Closing this knowledge gap and utilizing good practices from other developing regions will 
go a long way to reducing vulnerability and improving well-being of people in Africa.  
 
b.  Mobilizing resources to increase resilience 
 
                                                 
16 Hausmann, Klinger and Lopez-Calig (2010) illustrate this approach for Algeria, a country characterized by 
particularly low level of export diversification.  
 
17 The African Union adopted in 2008 a social policy  framework  for Africa to strengthen  social protection 
systems, combat hunger, create decent work opportunities for all, and improve access to basic social services. 12 
 
Given the low domestic savings that characterize African countries, especially those in Sub-
Saharan Africa, most countries face significant resource gaps. Financing options for closing 
them include mobilizing: (i) domestic resources, both public and private; (ii) official aid; and 
(iii) private capital flows.  
 
Effective ways to raise domestic tax revenues (public savings) – in particular broadening of 
the tax base through strengthening tax administration and formalizing the informal sector –
should be pursued further as feasible. It is less clear how to raise private savings, and methods 
vary from country to country. In addition to the banking sector reforms, some innovative 
ways  such  as  leveraging  the  local  wealth  (land,  houses)  or  securitizing  future  flows 
(remittances, oil revenues) are being explored (e.g., Ghana).
18 
 
As measures aimed at domestic resource mobilization will take time to implement, many 
African countries, especially the LICs, will rely on aid to supplement their resources. To be 
effective, donors need to provide aid on a timely, predictable and sustained basis. On their 
part, countries need to ensure that the increased reserves due to higher aid are not just sitting 
idle.  Moreover, a substantial part of aid received should finance domestic investment.    
 
Nevertheless, given the substantial development needs to reach the MDGs, especially when 
combined  with  the  climate  change  financing  needs,  domestic  revenue  mobilization  and 
foreign aid will not be sufficient. Countries will need to increasingly rely on private-public 
partnerships and private capital flows (below).  In this context, it needs to be emphasized that 
debt  sustainability  and  development  objectives  need  to  be  carefully  balanced  to  achieve 
strong, sustainable and  shared  growth.  In particular, a greater flexibility  of the  IFI’s debt 
sustainability framework agreed at the end of 2009 is a step in the right direction. 
 
Box I. Macroeconomic Policies for Strong, Sustained and Shared Growth –Actions 
 
A.  Actions by African countries 
 
1.  Exit strategies from the crisis interventions 
 
￿  Where feasible, African countries should not rush, but opt for exits that are gradual, 
orderly and coordinated among countries and policies.  
 
￿  Many  countries  may  want  to  start  with  fiscal  consolidation  which  can  be  more 
politically complex, followed by the withdrawal of accommodative monetary stance.  
 
￿  Expenditures on infrastructure and social services should be protected even during the 
fiscal consolidation phase. 
 
￿  African policy makers need to communicate their policies effectively to the public to 
reduce uncertainty, gain political support, and boost investor confidence.   
 
                                                 
 
18 High levels of capital flight, including illicit outflows, continue to impede efforts to raise domestic savings and 
should  be  reversed.  On  the  positive  side,  in  the  run  up  the  crisis  the  outflows  declined  due  to  improved 




2.  Macroeconomic policies for the decade ahead 
 
￿  Increasing flexibility of macroeconomic policy frameworks while maintaining their credibility 
by introducing rule-based frameworks with sufficient room for discretion. 
 
￿  On monetary policy side, this implies moving towards flexible inflation frameworks where 
conditions allow (e.g., frontier market economies); all countries may want to pay more attention to the 
private sector credit as a key transmission mechanism. 
 
￿  Removing  pro-cyclical  bias  of  fiscal  policy  by  balancing  budget  (after  grants)  over  the 
medium term. Introducing or strengthening medium term expenditure frameworks.  
 
￿  Exploring and introducing new industrial policy to facilitate the private sector growth, which 
is an important source of growth over the medium term.  
 
￿  Building social safety nets, including public work programs, before the next crisis hits and to 
reduce probability of its occurring.  
 
￿  Mobilizing resources to build resilience including through financial sector development and 
also innovative mechanisms such as leveraging remittances and future oil revenues. Adapting to local 
conditions the best practices in these areas from other regions, such as Asia or Latin America.  
 
B.  Actions by G-20 countries and other development partners 
 
￿  Withdrawal from stimulus policies in advanced countries need to take into account impacts on 
Africa.  Protectionist  measures introduced  during  the  crisis should  be  abolished  and  long-standing 
barriers (agriculture) removed to help Africa’s exports recover.  
 
￿  As feasible, scale up official aid in line with the 2005 commitments. Abolish the stop-go 
patterns of the past and deliver adequate aid in timely and predictable manner. Financial aid in new 
priority areas (climate change) should not crowd out other development needs. 
  
￿   Asian countries could share knowledge in policy areas such as industrial policy while taking 




PART II. MAJOR ISSUES FOR AFRICA’S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT  
 
II.1. Towards inclusive finance 
 
The state of development of the financial sectors in Africa varies greatly across countries. 
While the financial sectors in LICs are among the world’s least developed, in middle-income 
countries they are much larger and have a broader institutional coverage.
19 The limited depth 
and breadth of the African financial sectors in LICs has been hindering their development. 
Albeit increasing in some African LICs in recent years, credit to the private sector in terms of 
GDP has remained low, even in comparison to LICs worldwide (Figure 4). For instance, the 
constrained rural credit contributes to the low productivity in agriculture, while the inadequate 
access to finance by SMEs impedes private sector development in industry or high-value 
                                                 
19 IMF (2006) covers the pre-crisis challenges of financial sectors in sub-Saharan Africa in detail.  
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added services. In 2009, about 326 million (or 80 percent) adults in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
were unbanked, i.e. they did not use formal banks or semi-formal banking institutions to save 
or  borrow.  In  addition  to  those  financially  excluded,  many  of  those  with  some  access  to 
financial services remain underserved.  
 
While demographic and socio-economic factors matter, they are not the only determinants of 
the  usage  of  financial  services.  Other  factors,  such  as  enabling  regulatory  environments, 
effective policy actions, and well-targeted and pro-active approaches of financial institutions 
can raise levels of financial inclusion (Chaia et al., 2010). For African policy makers and 
multilateral financial institutions, bringing the unbanked into the formal financial sector and 
increasing  their  access  to  credit  then  pose  an  important  challenge,  which  was  only 
exacerbated by the global financial crisis (Mafusire and Kamara, 2009). 
 
Figure 4. Credit to the private sector in Africa’s low income countries, % of GDP, 2008 1/ 
 
 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators. 1/ 2006 for Ghana; 2005 for Rwanda and Guinea.   
 
Due to the limited integration into the international financial markets, the global financial 
crisis affected Africa less through the financial channels than other regions. Macro-prudential 
reforms undertaken by many countries in recent years also helped the continent weather the 
crisis. Still, in SSA, growth of credit to the private sector fell (IMF, 2010).   
 
Among SSA oil exporters especially, the declining export proceeds contributed to falling of 
foreign assets of the banking sector and a sharp decline in the growth of the private sector 15 
 
credit in 2009 (Figure A.7).
20 These developments have slowed deepening of Africa’s capital 
markets and reiterated the importance of diversification and financial sector development.  
 
II.1.1.Limited access to trade finance  
 
Despite the overall limited financial integration, several African countries (e.g., Nigeria) saw 
their trade credit lines dry up when the financial crisis hit. While the global trade finance 
situation  has  mostly  improved  with  the  ongoing  recovery,  many  markets  in  Africa  have 
remained under stress as of mid-2010. Despite high demand, banks tightened liquidity for 
countries  considered  to  be  ‘higher  risk’  to  the  point  that  the  trade  credit  has  become 
prohibitively expensive, especially for small traders.
21 Implementation of the existing capital 
adequacy regime has thus contributed to the drying up of trade finance. Implementation of the 
Basel  II  rules  had  increased  the  capital  intensity  of  trade  finance  lending,  which  has 
constrained the banks in lending short-term trade credit. Given the inherent pro-cyclicality of 
the framework, the constraint has become greater during the crisis. Going forward, changes to 
the Basel II framework should be considered to allow more proportionate capital weightings 
for traditional trade finance transactions (International Chamber of Commerce, 2010).  
 
Regardless of the crisis, for many African low-income and export-dependent countries the 
limited access to trade finance has continuously impeded trade and needs to be addressed.
22 
The evidenced-based policy recommendations and actions are constrained by the limited data, 
the  available  information  suggests  that  in  addition  to  multilateral  trade  finance  programs, 
development of national guarantee programs would facilitate flow of trade at all times.  
 
II.1.2. Innovative ways of financing agriculture 
 
In Africa’s low income countries, the lack of access to rural credit and the limited range of 
financial services available are often mentioned by smallholder farmers and others as the key 
constraint to production. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the attempts to invigorate lending 
to agriculture through agricultural development banks did not yield intended results. While in 
the 1990s microfinance institutions and concepts such as group liability and micro-insurance 
helped reach the unbanked in nonagricultural areas, the progress with agricultural financing 
has been lagging. Since the early 2000s, new innovative approaches to financing agriculture 
have thus emerged, often utilizing the modern communication technology. Examples are: 
  
￿  Through mobile banking, the Equity Bank in Kenya has slashed transaction costs and 
brought financial services to the previously unbanked population in some of the most isolated 
rural parts of Kenya. In partnership with other institutions, the Equity Bank has established a 
                                                 
20 In Morocco, where the state-owned enterprises play a key role in the economy, the annual growth rate of 
credit contracted markedly between 2007 and 2009, from about 30 percent in 2007 to less than 10 percent 
growth in 2009, in part due to stringent banking regulations (Faye and Triki, 2010). 
  
21 Even exporters from countries considered ‘lower risk’ were charged markedly more for endorsing a letter of 
credit and insurance in early 2010 than before the crisis. 
  
22 Trade finance also helps African banks and companies integrating into regional and global trade networks in 
and outside of Africa, and thus facilitates knowledge sharing.  
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US$50 million loan facility with accelerated access to affordable financing for farmers and 
agricultural value chain members.
23 
  
￿   To address the very low commercial lending to agriculture, Standard Bank of South 
Africa, in partnership with the Alliance for Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), established a 
US$100  million  facility  to  provide  financing  to  small-scale  farmers  and  agricultural 
businesses in Africa. The guarantees of these loans, provided by AGRA and the Millennium 
Challenge Account (MCA), are to be lowered over time.  
 
￿  The  Rabo  Development  (RD),  subsidiary  of  Rabobank  (Netherlands),  invested  in 
banks  in  Tanzania,  Zambia,  Mozambique  and  Rwanda  with  a  view  to  provide  financial 
services  to  the  underserved  in  rural  areas.  RD  aims  at  transforming  the  local  banks  into 
leading banks with rural orientation, and hence limits its participation to minority stakes (10-
40  percent).  Financing  through  RD  is  accompanied  by  technical  assistance  from  Rabo 
International Advisory Services (van Empel, 2010).  
 
￿  Also, new innovative ways to address the causes of under-provision of credit in rural 
areas, such as the asymmetric information about borrowers’ intentions and ability to repay 
their loans, are on the way. In Malawi, biometric technology was used in a pilot case to reduce 
information asymmetries and monitor repayment rates of rural borrowers. In the study the 
technology increased repayment rates, with the benefits of improved repayments outweighing 
the costs of technology adoption. More research is required to find out whether the biometric 
technology can be scaled up effectively for application on a wider basis (Gine, 2010).  
 
II.1.3. Inclusive finance for SMEs: leveraging remittances 
  
While in advanced economies SMEs are often engines of growth and job creation, in many 
African  countries  they  often  operate  on  the  margin  of  the  economy,  in  low-productive 
activities in the informal sector. The entry barriers and the limited finance for SMEs and 
generally the lack of competitive pressures shield larger firms from the need to adopt new 
technologies  and  raise  productivity.  Subsequently,  the  share  of  SMEs  in  employment  in 
African  low-income  countries  (about  30  percent  or  less)  is  well  below  that  of  advanced 
economies, where SMEs account for the majority of employment. 
 
The causes of underperformance of the Africa’s SME sector are complex and often country-
specific. Still, the lack of access to finance is cited by many entrepreneurs across countries as 
the key constraint. Lenders everywhere, and in Africa in particular, consider the SME sector 
risky because of SMEs’ lack of credit history, a lack of collateral, higher risk of failures, and 
greater obscurity in their operations than in larger firms. In Africa, additional challenges stem 
from the flaws in legal and regulatory  environments and underdeveloped capital markets. 
Removing the information constraints, i.e. improving available information about potential 
borrowers, and improving access to finance and long-term capital for SMEs would increase 
the rate of their start-ups as well as help expansion in the existing ones.  
 
A range of approaches to increasing access of African SMEs to finance have been tried over 
the  years,  with  mixed  results.
24 In  this  context,  facilitating  the  channeling  of  remittances 
                                                 
23 Salami, Kamara, and Brixiova (2010) cover the alternative financing mechanisms in Kenya and South Africa 
in more detail.  
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through formal financial institutions may contribute to alleviating the credit constraint faced 
by  SMEs.  In  particular,  the  potential  entrepreneurs  seeking  to  start  SMEs  can  leverage 
remittance inflows as a substitute for collateral and credit histories. Alternatively, where stable, 
the inflows can be used during the risk assessment of the remittance-receiving client. This way, 
remittances allow the entrepreneurs to get cheaper and/or higher credit. However, as Comstock et 
al. (2009) point out, for this option to be implemented in practice, instruments to leverage 
remittances specifically for productive purposes need to be put in place. Creating framework for 
securitization of remittances would be particularly helpful in this regard.
25  
 
In addition to the innovative mechanisms, more traditional approaches are another key for 
achieving  financial inclusion for SMEs. They include raising competition in the  financial 
sector and creating market-based incentives for delivery of sustainable financial access and 
broad range of affordable services. The property rights should be also strengthened to ease the 
collateral bottlenecks that hamper SME access to credit. The legal and regulatory framework 
should be applied even-handedly to minimize distortions.  
 
 
Box II.1.1 – Towards Inclusive Finance -- Actions 
 
Trade Finance – Actions for African countries and G20 
 
￿  Improve data collection for trade finance to facilitate evidence-based policy analysis and 
its implementation.  
 
￿  Develop  national  guarantee  programs  along  side  of  multilateral  program  for  trade 
finance. 
 
￿  Increase the ability of banks to lend short-term trade credit by reducing capital intensity 
of trade finance in the Basel framework (for G20). 
 
Agricultural Finance – Action for African countries and G20 
 
￿  Promote utilization of modern communication methodology to overcome impediments to 
agricultural lending in Africa. Explore other ways for reducing transaction costs, as was done 
through  mobile  banking  in  Kenya  and  for  overcoming  information  asymmetries,  as  is  being 
investigated with biometric technology in Malawi.  
 
￿  Encourage sharing of knowledge and best practices across African countries.  
 
SME Finance – Actions for African countries 
 
￿  Create framework for securitization of remittances so they can be leveraged for SME 
lending (as collateral or in banks’ risk assessment). 
 
￿  Raise competition in the financial sector and create market-based incentives for delivery 
of sustainable financial access and broad range of affordable services for SMEs.  
 
￿  Strengthen property rights and apply the legal and regulatory frameworks even-handedly.  
 
                                                                                                                                                         
24 Options for financing SMEs in Africa include traditional way, i.e. obtaining the bank credit, raising funds on 
capital markets (through corporate bonds, venture capital stock shares), and asset-based financing. 
25 Steps for securitization of future flows, including remittances, can be found in Kethar and Ratha (2009).  18 
 
II.2. International Linkages and Regional Integration  
 
II.2.1. International Linkages: Making the Most out of Globalization 
 
a.  Attracting private capital inflows while managing their volatility 
 
With  low  savings  rates,  volatile  export  revenues,  and  substantial  investment  needs  that 
characterized many African economies before the crisis, capital inflows were an indispensable 
source of financing. After years of relatively slow growth, net private capital inflows to Africa 
accelerated in the early 2000s and surged between 2004 and 2007, reaching almost US$60 
billion in 2007. They exceeded several times the official flows. The large inflows in 2000s 
made  some  African  emerging  and  frontier  market  economies  vulnerable  to  the  risks  of 
“sudden stops” and reversals of capital flows.
26  
 
On balance, Africa’s overall financial integration remained limited. Africa was thus mostly 
shielded from the impact through the financial channel when the crisis hit. SSA in particular 
was more immune to the impact through this channel than other developing and emerging 
market  regions,  and  it  experienced  only  relatively  small  decline  in  private  capital  flows 
(Figure A.8, Annex). With FDI predominating, the continent suffered less from the global 
credit crunch than other regions with a large composition of portfolio flows (Tong and Wei, 
2009). However, when it comes to official capital inflows, in 2009 SSA received less official 
capital inflows (even in relative terms) than most other developing regions, except Asia.
27   
 
The limited availability of the official aid in the years ahead also underscores the importance 
for African countries to attract adequate private capital flows to fuel growth, while managing 
their volatility. Clearly, generalizations for a continent as diverse as Africa are likely to be 
simplistic or even unsuitable. Still, several points regarding management of capital flows in 
the post-crisis environment are worth highlighting. 
 
First, capital flows to Africa have so far not reached levels comparable to those in other 
regions or those needed to close the resource gaps.
28 Hence bringing in additional – and stable 
– flows remains a key policy objective for the majority of African countries.  
 
Second, in the future, as Africa’s financial integration progresses, the issue of capital flows 
management will gain more attention. Two basic approaches can mitigate possible negative 
consequences  of  large  capital  flows:  (i)  a  flexible  macroeconomic  framework;  and  (ii) 
management on capital inflows and outflows.  
 
￿  Africa’s resilience during the crisis illustrated the importance of building sufficient 
policy space in the macroeconomic frameworks to mitigate shocks. Such flexibility can be 
achieved through appropriate accumulation of fiscal reserves and foreign exchange reserves 
during  the  boom  times  as  well  as  by  increased  flexibility  in  the  exchange  rate  regimes. 
                                                 
26 Further discussion of trends in capital flows, savings and FDI as well as their impact on Africa’s economic 
performance before and during the crisis is in Brixiova, Kouakou and Abderrahim (2010).  
27 According to OECD (2010), official aid projected for 2010 will amount to less than 90 percent of what was 
committed in 2005.   
 
28 At the other extreme, during 1990s Peru received annual capital flows of 11 percent of GDP. Similarly, 
Estonia’s net capital flows amounted to 11 percent of GDP in 2006 and 20 percent of GDP in 2007.  
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Developing  domestic  bond  markets  and  gaining  access  to  international  bond  markets  on 
favorable terms would help in this regard. 
  
￿  Even if macroeconomic frameworks and policies are sound, surges in capital flows can 
cause problems through, for example, exchange rate overshooting or asset price bubbles. This 
is in part because of pro-cyclical features inherent in the Basel II system. Moreover, where 
investors act according to the herding behavior, ‘sudden stops’ of capital flows can occur. In 
such  cases,  targeted  controls  especially  at  short  term  inflows  could  be  considered  on  a 
temporary basis to reduce volatility in the future. For countries that want to prevent “sudden 
stops” or abrupt capital outflows during downturn, controls on outflows can be an option.
29  
 
Third, it is not clear how quickly in practice the temporary capital controls can be imposed 
relative  to  other  macroeconomic  policies  and  to  what  extent  they  may  become  semi-
permanent. But the large disparities between the de jure and the de facto capital controls 
suggest that with time, capital controls lose their effectiveness as firms and individuals tend to 
find their way around them. This disparity points to the case for introducing capital flow 
controls only on temporary basis, with a clearly set exit.  
 
b.  Boosting development-friendly FDI 
 
In  the  post-crisis  world  characterized  by  reduced  risk  appetite  of  investors  and  limited 
availability of official aid, the economic progress of many African countries will hinge on 
receiving adequate private capital flows, especially FDI. While in the past research on the 
impact of FDI on the host countries was often inconclusive and sometimes even controversial, 
more recent work has shown under what conditions FDI can be a catalyst for development.  
 
Specifically, a competitive environment in the host country is needed for foreign investors to 
enhance productivity of existing activities and generate positive spillovers. Open trade and 
investment regimes can contribute to creation of such environment, through creating external 
competition  and  thus  reducing  the  industry  concentration.  Over  time,  open  markets  and 
improved business environment tend to create welfare gains through re-allocating resources to 
their most productive use, and hence increasing productivity and growth.
30 However, to gain 
political support and mitigate the social costs of such measures, reforms in these areas should 
be accompanied by establishment of well-functioning social safety nets.  
 
When designing their strategies towards FDI inflows, policy makers need to take into account 
that the factors driving  FDI are complex and vary across countries, sectors and firms.  In 
addition to natural resources and the market size (mostly lacking in Africa), these typically 
include political stability, sound macroeconomic policies, high economic growth, trade and 
investment openness, and high quality of institutions. Recognizing the benefits that FDI can 
have for their economies, in the 1990s a number of African countries introduced important 
policy innovations and shifted from targeting FDI for specific sector to establishing broad 
                                                 
29 The Chilean experience showed that controls on short-term inflows distort incentives for efficient portfolio 
allocation and raise cost of financing for small- and medium-sized firms. Controls on capital outflows in South 
Africa in recent years led to real exchange rate appreciation, which reduced export competitiveness. Experience 
of Korea with capital account management is summarized in the standalone annex, available upon request.  
 
30 A related strand of research has shown that when FDI inflows are accompanied by increased trade, as is often 
the case in emerging market economies, host countries tend to accelerate their growth rates. 
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enabling environment. These “pull factors”, together with investors increasingly searching for 
new sources of profit and resources led to more FDI inflows going to Africa.  
 
The aggregate numbers mask important differences – in 2009, the FDI inflows to China were 
almost twice as large as those to the entire Africa. Moreover, resource rich countries and the 
mineral sectors continue to receive the main share of the flows, even though in recent years 
some LICs such as Rwanda, Uganda, and Zambia have gained attention of foreign investors.
31  
 
In the light of these trends and consensus on the positive impacts that FDI can bring to the 
recipient economies, what can African countries, especially the LICs, do to attract adequate 
flows  of  development-friendly  FDI?  An  empirical  research  suggests  that  some  minimal 
threshold of development is needed for the host countries to benefit from FDI (Borenzstein et 
al., 1998; Alfaro et al., 2004; Wang and Wong, 2009). Put differently, if the institutional, 
technological and human capital gap with the investor’s country is wide, the host country will 
lack capacity to absorb the technological and “know-how’ transfers. Efforts to raise human 
capital and technological capacity are crucial to attract ‘development-friendly’ FDI and reap 
its maximum benefits.  
 
Moreover,  since  adequate  domestic  resources  are  needed  to  co-finance  FDI  projects, 
strengthening  of  domestic  financial  systems  and  capital  markets  to  facilitate  savings  and 
credit  in  the  host  countries  would  help  attract  FDI.
32 The  African  countries  aiming  to 
encourage  intra-African  FDI  and  maximize  its  benefits  may  want  to  adopt  measures 
encouraging  regional  integration  and  trade  (below).  This  could  attract  additional  market-
seeking FDI flows from developed economies as well.  
 
As evidenced by the longer-term decline of the share of the manufacturing sector in GDP and 
limited foreign investment this sector has received, many investors still do not consider Africa 
as a profitable location for investments in manufacturing. Presumably, they are not sure that 
the expected returns would be high enough to justify the costs, especially given the high 
perceived risks As for the risk factors, three of them are particularly relevant: macroeconomic 
instability; loss of assets due to non-enforceability of contracts; and the poor physical and 
technological infrastructure. Moreover, given that the African governments typically lack the 
financial  and  human  resources  to  negotiate  effectively  or  lack  the  appropriate  legal 
frameworks,  the  agreed  contracts  are  either  not  implemented  or  face  high  probability 
renegotiations. This deters private investment.   
 
While macroeconomic frameworks and outcomes have improved markedly prior to the crisis, 
African countries could take a number of steps to address the other two weaknesses. Reducing 
transaction costs through investment in infrastructure would be one way to make African 
countries  more  attractive  to  investors,  improving  trade  policy  instruments  another.  Poor 
physical  infrastructure,  in  particular,  raises  significantly  trade  costs  and  reduces 
competitiveness  of  Africa  relative  to  other  regions.  Nevertheless,  while  policymakers  and 
                                                 
31 The composition of FDI sources has also changed during the past two decades. While intra-African FDI flows 
remain overall low, they constitute an important source of investment funds in several countries, especially in 
Southern Africa (e.g. Mauritius). More recently, Nigeria became active investor in the banking sectors of other 
African countries as well as outside of the continent. 
  
32 Aghion et al. (2009) provide theoretical framework and empirical evidence.  
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donors agree in principle on the need to address this bottleneck, in reality the situation will 
take time to rectify (Kandiero and Ndikumana, 2010).   
 
African  countries,  especially  LICS,  would  benefit  from  technical  and  financial  assistance 
from  G20  and  development  partners  to  build  up  their  capacity  to  negotiate.  In  sum,  the 
contracts must be perceived as fair by African countries to be durable, which so far often has 
not been the case, especially in resource rich countries and fragile states. Strengthening of 
legal frameworks would help contract implementation.   
 
The  positive  impact  of  FDI  on  growth  and  development  of  host  countries  is  unlikely  to 
materialize unless the other participants of this process, e.g. multinational enterprises, the 
sending  countries  and  the  international  community,  implement  supporting  policies.  For 
example, given that trade and FDI reinforce each other and some FDI is even contingent on 
trade,  further  trade  liberalization  in  sending  countries  would  be  FDI-enhancing.  Equally 
important is that sending companies take into account technological priorities of recipient 
countries and where feasible ‘clean’ technologies to facilitate sustainable development. As 
OECD (2002) points out, MNEs have a key role to play, by utilizing adequate technology, 
sharing knowledge, and adhering to good standards of corporate behavior.  
 
As  mentioned  above,  private  sector  investment  to  African  countries,  especially  LICs,  is 
hampered by (i) high perceived risk of investing in Africa and (ii) uncertainty surrounding the 
contracts between foreign investors and African counterparts. To address these bottlenecks, 
Africa asks the G20 to support (i) the African catalytic investment portfolio guarantee fund to 
reduce the investment risk and (ii) the African investment-enabling legal facility to assist 
African governments to acquire the necessary legal capacity to negotiate complex commercial 
contracts in their best interests.  
 
c.  Removing remaining barriers to trade  
 
Given the dual linkages between FDI and trade, opening up to trade is one venue through 
which African countries can attract FDI and reap greater benefits from it. In addition to the 
FDI channel, trade openness is often considered a direct key determinant of growth and job 
creation, at least in the medium term. Prior to the crisis, the value of Africa’s trade (imports 
and exports) had broken the US$ one trillion mark. Still, with Africa’s exports accounting for 
less than 4 percent of world exports and Africa’s imports for less than 3 percent of world 
imports, the continent’s participation in the global trade has been marginal. Reversing this 
marginalization in the global trade and moving Africa’s trade up on the technology ladder are 
then key policy challenges for both African and advanced economies. 
 
 The global economic crisis put Africa’s trade performance to the further test. Due to the lack 
of export diversification, African trade fell in the second half of 2008 till the first half of 2009, 
in response to both the collapse in commodity prices and import demand in trading partners. 
This was reflected in a sizeable decrease in export value of 30.9 per cent, and a slightly lower 
fall in import value of 19.5 per cent in 2009. The relatively less weakened import demand in 
Africa was driven by the fall in commodity prices which favored the net importers. On the 
more positive note, exports and imports are estimated to recover in 2010 at 15.3 and 11.3 per 
cent, respectively, driven mostly by the gradual global recovery (ECA and AUC, 2010). 
 
Africa’s  trade  response  to  the  crisis  has  been  mostly  determined  by  its  trade  bias,  with 
approximately 80 percent of exports being oil, minerals and agricultural goods; fuels and 22 
 
mining products accounting for the largest part. Further, the US and EU receive nearly two 
thirds of Africa’s exports whilst intra-regional trade barely accounts for 10 per cent of total 
African trade. This lack of diversification, both in terms of export products and destinations, 
explains both the high volatility of African trade in recent years, as well as the strong impact 
of the crisis through the trade channel. As the relatively strong East African performance 
during the crisis illustrates, the regional integration could in part reduce this volatility (below).  
 
In recent years, Africa has diversified its trade and investments links into Asia and other 
emerging market economies. Still, the growing South-South trade with Asia has remained 
unbalanced, with Africa’s trade accounting for only about 2 percent of Asia’s imports. In 
contrast, Asia accounted for almost 40 percent of Africa’s exports in 2008. Overall, the weak 
diversification of African trade both in terms of products and destinations will require special 
focus. The Aid for Trade initiative provides an opportunity to address these challenges if 
infrastructure, trade facilitation and building productive capacities are well prioritized. 
 
In the near future, the trade is expected to increase given the double-coincidence of needs 
(Asia needs natural resources while Africa needs manufactured  goods). Over the medium 
term, the gradual technological upgrade in China’s production will create (and to some extent 
has already created) space for Africa to develop its underperforming manufacturing sector. To 
seize this opportunity, Africa needs to remove key bottlenecks that hindered its structural 
transformation and industrialization in the past. 
The  main  bottlenecks  that  Africa  needs  to  remove  to  achieve  greater  and  more  diverse 
participation in the global trade and investment include: weak trade policy (high tariff and 
non-tariff barriers) in some key sectors (agriculture, manufacturing); supply-side bottlenecks 
(poor infrastructure such as road transport, rail, ports and customs); relatively weak business 
environment as well as barriers to competition, and other ‘behind-the-border’ constraints. 
  
While  conceptually  straightforward,  reforms  to  address  these  constraints  are  politically 
difficult to implement. This is because their costs would fall rather quickly on well-defined 
groups, while the benefits would be less tangible and dispersed over time and larger segments 
of population. Nevertheless, several countries have made progress in these areas, showing it is 
possible and setting examples for others.  
 
Reaping benefits from multilateral trade linkages 
 
The  fact  that  after  a  decade  of  negotiations,  the  Doha  Development  Round  has  not  been 
concluded is a major setback to international trade. A positive outcome in the Doha Round of 
international trade negotiations of the World Trade Organization (WTO) remains critical to 
Africa’s  increased  participation  in  global  trade.
33 Africa’s  negotiations  on  the  Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with the EU are also key. A rapid conclusion of the Doha 
Round and resolution of the outstanding issues in the EPAs negotiations would raise Africa’s 
medium term prospects in both regional and international trade. Clear linkages between the 
Doha Round and the EPAs also need to be established. 
 
 
                                                 
33 These are the most challenging regional trade agreements, given the inclusion of LDCs in African sub-groups 
negotiations,  the  reciprocal  nature  of  trade  relations,  the  burdens  such  relations  pose  on  Africa’s  regional 
integration and industrialization agenda, achieving compatibility with WTO regulation without washing down 
African preferences, as well as the limitations on South-South cooperation.  
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II.2.2. Moving ahead with Regional Integration 
 
a.  Maximizing benefits, mitigating costs   
 
For  more  than  four  decades  now,  regional  integration  has  been  at  the  centre  of  Africa’s 
development vision.
34 It would help African economies to diversify and build up protection 
against external shocks. It would also bring about substantial benefits due to the economies of 
scale.  Coordinated  macro-economic  policies,  enhanced  flexibility  and  the  collective 
exploitation of resources, all preconditions for successful regional integration, could go a long 
way towards finding new sustainable growth paths that many African countries need.  
 
On the more cautious side, the prevailing lack of resource and production complementarities 
between  many  African  countries  limits  both  intra-  and  extra-  regional  trade.  Without 
integration  though,  most  countries  risk  to  remain  dependent  on  the  world  economy  as 
producers of primary commodities and importers of manufactured goods. 
At the same time, regional integration generates not only benefits, but also substantial costs, 
especially  during  the  transition  period,  which  make  it  essential  that  countries  assess  the 
prospective  benefits  and  costs  of  the  process  carefully.  So  far,  concerns  about  unequal 
distribution of benefits of integration and polarization of the process around the larger anchor 
countries  have  gone  unaddressed.  Integration  programs  have  no  provisions  for  handling 
possible imbalances in neither economic benefits, nor are there compensation mechanisms 
(excepting a few examples) for losses to government revenue that could arise from trade 
liberalization. To be effective, regional integration strategies should include a transparent, 
equitable, rule-based system for sharing gains and resolving disputes. At the national levels, 
creating social safety nets for those most adversely affected by regional integration (e.g. job 
losses due to trade liberalization, etc.) could help gain political support for the reforms. 
 
b.  Challenges to regional integration 
 
The prevailing institutional landscape is over-crowded with – often overlapping – regional 
trade arrangements (RTAs). Overall, RTAs have been ineffective in fostering intra-regional 
trade, as evidenced by its low volumes and over-concentration in a few commodities. To a 
large  extent,  these  patters  reflect  the  lack  of  resource  and  production  complementarities 
among  the  RTA  members.  Existing  RTAs  need  to  be  streamlined  as  countries’  multiple 
memberships make the regional integration framework ultimately too costly. 
 
More  specifically,  the  rudimentary  stage  of  manufacturing  in  most  African  countries 
constrains  the  scope  for  increased  production  to  supply  diverse  range  of  products  to  the 
enlarged  regional  markets.  The  mere  extension  of  the  consumer  market  will  thus  be 
ineffective in boosting intra-regional trade. The underdeveloped infrastructure, particularly in 
energy and transport, acts as an additional serious bottleneck. It adds to the already high cost 
of doing business, undermining the competitiveness of African products, both regionally and 
internationally.  Increasing  sophistication  of  the  domestic  production  and  strengthening 
competitiveness are thus key steps for raising intra-regional trade. Finally, regional strategies 
                                                 
34 Africa’s integration vision is in the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community (AEC) which came 
into force in May 1994. The realization that Africa’s integration needed a fresh impetus led African governments 
to reaffirm the importance of integration in the Constitutive Act of the African Union, promulgated in July 2000. 
The African Union (AU) maintains the thrust of the Abuja Treaty of forging an economically (and perhaps 
politically) unified continent. The revitalization of Africa’s integration through the establishment of the African 
Union process was bolstered by the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), a program of the AU.  
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have to focus on developing areas of industrial complementarity to raise countries’ capacity to 
trade. 
 
Enhancing factor mobility 
 
Many factors hinder the mobility of production factors in Africa and need to be addressed. 
The  labor  market  is  protected  and  reserved  primarily  for  nationals,  although  other 
complementary qualified and productive workers may be available across the border. The 
presence  of  massive  foreign  workers  leads  often  to  tension  with  nationals,  especially  in 
periods of significant unemployment. This, in turn, may create tensions with countries of 
origin  of  the  migratory  labor.  The  restrictions  affecting  the  access  to  more  vibrant  labor 
markets  lead  to  illegal  immigration  that  further  exacerbates  frictions  between  individual 
countries; these impediments need to be removed. Africa thus needs to revamp immigration 
policies to ease mobility of skilled workers to help address skill shortages.  
 
The export of capital, including profit, is also still subjected to numerous restrictions. The 
restricted access for foreigners to some factors (e.g, land) or sectors (e.g., insurance, banking, 
telecommunications and energy) is another limitation to the free movement of capital into and 
among  African  countries.    The  emergence  of  sub-regional  capital  markets  may  help 
circumvent  such  capital  flows  restrictions,  although  these  markets  are  yet  to  prove  their 
capacity to significantly attract such flows.  Although many countries (e.g., Sierra Leone) 
adopted  generous  investment  codes  aimed  at  attracting  FDI,  the  response  in  terms  of 
increased  FDI  flows  has  been  weak,  underscoring  once  again  the  importance  of  overall 
enabling investment climate rather than sector-specific incentives.
35  
   
Financing of integration 
 
Financing  permeates  the  entire  integration  process.  The  major  sources  of  funding  of 
integration  institutions  and  programs  in  Africa  are  (i)  assessed  contributions  by  member 
states; (ii) self-financing mechanisms; (iii) limited income generating activities by RECs; (iv) 
grants from regional and sub-regional financial institutions; and (v) cross-border investment 
from member countries, including FDI. All these sources of funds have their limitations. 
 
The difficult financial situation is exacerbated by the fact that most development assistance by 
donors focuses on national development frameworks. Yet, given the challenges that Africa 
faces and the limitations of the small nation-states, regionalism needs to be mainstreamed in 
development programs. Loans for regional programs are also hard to obtain for a number of 
reasons  including  inadequate  capacities  to  formulate  bankable  regional  projects.  The 
procedures or criteria for granting such loans, especially involving multiple countries, have 
been opaque and difficult to deal with by African countries in the context of their integration 
aspirations; they need to be streamlined. 
 
All these factors lead to a relative abundance of integration programs and projects in Africa 
that cannot be realized because of the lack of funding. The key challenge in this area is then 
bringing the number of projects in line with available financing. On one hand, this calls for 
enhancing  support  from  donors  for  regional  programs  and  projects.  Developing  loan 
guarantee schemes for regional programs could be helpful. Still, given the return to fiscal 
                                                 
35 Even when the incentives entice the FDI flows, the development impact of such flows is unclear (Brixiova, 
Kouakou, and Abderrahim, 2010).  
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prudence in donor countries after the crisis, alternative financing sources need to be sought. 
At  the  same  time,  the  projects  need  to  be  streamlined  and  prioritized  to  reflect  more 
realistically the available funding.  
 
Mainstreaming regional integration at national level, involving civil society 
 
Regional agreements and projects are rarely incorporated into the national development plans 
and  budgets.
36 The  weakness  of  national  mechanisms  often  manifests  itself  by  failure  of 
countries to translate commitments in regional treaties into substantive changes in national 
policies, legislation, and regulations. Better implementation of regional integration decisions at 
the national level is thus needed. 
 
As with most major reforms, governments cannot accomplish regional integration without 
support  of  their  people.  So  far  the  integration  has  been  driven  mainly  by  governments. 
Involvement  of  civil  society  in  formulation  and  execution  of  national  policies  is  key  for 
ensuring that these policies will be implemented. If strategically involved, the civil society 
can contribute its creative energies and ideas to the community building and consolidation of 
programs. It can also provide ‘checks and balances’ on governments’ policies and actions. 
Finally,  effective  government  communication  and  well-targeted  outreach  programs  to  key 
constituencies could be helpful in gaining popular support for regional integration.    
 
Box II.2.1. Making the Most out of Globalization –Actions 
 
Actions by African countries 
 
Facilitate Global Economic Linkages, on Mutually Beneficial Terms 
 
Capital Flows: (i) Increasing flexibility of macroeconomic frameworks to create room for managing 
their volatility; (ii) In countries where inflows large, temporary controls on inflows or outflows can 
be considered, together with a plan for their removal. 
 FDI:   
 
 In general, (i) create competitive environment, remove barriers to trade and investment; (ii) 
Accompany these measures by building social safety nets for the most vulnerable; (iii) 
strengthen domestic financial systems; raise human capital and technological capacity. 
 
 Specifically, G20 should support: (1) the African catalytic investment portfolio guarantee 
fund and (ii) the African investment-enabling legal facility. 
Trade:  Strengthen trade policy (e.g., reducing tariffs and non-tariff barriers); remove supply-side 
bottlenecks (e.g., building infrastructure); reduce ‘behind the border constraint’ (e.g., improving 
further business environment).  
 
Move ahead with Regional Integration 
 
￿  Encouraging  Trade:  Streamline  and  reduce  the  number  of  RTAs.  Create  a  transparent, 
equitable, rule-based system for sharing gains and resolving disputes from trade and integration.  
 
                                                 
36 For  instance,  in  many  countries  regional  integration  matters  are  scattered  among  several  ministries  and 
departments (Finance, Economic Planning, Trade and Industry, Foreign  Affairs, Regional Integration) in an 
uncoordinated manner. Even when a ministry is specifically created to take charge of regional integration issues, 
it is often not adequately empowered or equipped to ensure effective coordination and oversight. 26 
 
￿  Enhancing  Factor  Mobility:  (i)  Streamline  the  cross-border  regulation  so  that  foreign 
workers with the right skills can move efficiently to the countries with relevant job opening; (ii) 
Phase out restrictions on regional mobility of capital including profit repatriation; (iii) Remove 
restrictions on access of foreigners to factors of production or profitable sectors.  
 
￿  Financing  of  Regional  Integration:    (i)  Rationalize  procedures  for  granting  loans  for 
regional integration programs; (ii) Bring the number of regional integration projects down through 
prioritizing and the realistic assessment of the available sources of financing. 
 
￿  Involving  Civil  Society:  (i)  Incorporate  regional  projects  into  the  national  development 
plans  and  budgets;  (ii)  Involve  civil  society  in  design  and  execution  of  national  policies;  (iii) 
Conduct effective  outreach  to  communicate the  national  policies  and regional  programs  to  key 
constituencies.  
 
Actions by G20 countries and other development partners 
 
Capital Flows: Improve international regulations to reduce the cyclical bias inherent in the Basel II 
system. 
 
FDI: (i) Remove trade barriers in advanced/emerging market economies to enhance FDI flows to 
Africa; (ii) Encourage sending companies to utilize modern and clean technology, share knowledge, 
and adhere to good standards of corporate behavior. 
 




II.3. Human Resource Development 
 
II.3.1. Human Resource Development in Africa 
 
Human resources and economic growth 
 
By enhancing the skills, knowledge and abilities of individuals, human resource development 
(HRD) serves to improve the productivity of people, which supports economic and social 
development. Therefore, the development of human resources or human capital is critical 
component of development strategy. 
 
Africa’s challenges in human resource development 
 
Human development is one of the major challenges facing Africa today. Human resource 
development is a critical factor in the fight to reduce poverty. Poverty reduction in Africa will 
be  achieved  only  through  high  and  sustained  economic  growth,  which  in  turn  requires 
significant enhancement in human resources.  
 
Poverty in Africa threatens the most basic component of human resources, namely health. 
About 200 million people are chronically malnourished and 43 percent of children under five 
are stunted because of malnutrition. On average nine out of ten malaria deaths globally occur 
in SSA. Furthermore, more than 20 million people in Africa live with HIV/AIDS. 
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The deficiency in education hinders the accumulation in human capital in Africa. 38 percent 
of  the  adult  population  in  SSA  is  illiterate  and  37  percent  of  children  will  not  complete 
primary school. Only 5 percent of the relevant age group is enrolled in tertiary institutions.  
 
 
II.3.2. Africa’s progress in Human Resource Development 
 
Although the lag in HRD is an obstacle to economic growth, the last decade saw a stride in 
Africa’s  human  resource  development.  Africa  continues  to  make  progress  toward  the 
achievement  in  HRD-related  Millennium  Development  Goals  (MDGs),  but  the  progress 
continues to considerably lag behind most of other regions of the world. The region made 
substantial  progress  also  in  Education  for  All  (EFA)  which  is  monitored  by  UNESCO. 
Progress  in  all  the  three  parts  of  human  resources  has  been  achieved:  population  health, 




Population  health  is  a  precondition  for  further  development  in  human  resources  such  as 
education and employment. Substantial progress has been made in Africa in improving the 
health status of the population. Since 1990 the mortality  rate for children under  age five 
(MDG 4) in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries dropped by 22 per cent – from 184 deaths 
per 1,000 live births to 144 in 2008.  
 
The risk of death from  HIV/AIDS or malarias is declining. The downward trend in HIV 
prevalence  rate  and  deaths  associated  with  AIDS  is  due  to  improvements  in  access  to 
treatment, changes in behavior, and reduction in infection among the most vulnerable groups. 
HIV/AIDS-related  deaths  fell  from  2  million  in  2001  to  1.4  million  in  2007  and  new 
infections declined from 3 million to 2.7 million during the same period.  In spite of this 
progress there is still long way to go; Sub-Saharan Africa which accounts for 72 per cent of 
all new HIV infection in 2008. Child deaths from malarias declined mainly due to the wider 
usage of insecticide-treated nets (ITNs). Thanks to increased allocation of financial resources, 
sixteen SSA countries have at least tripled ITN usage among children under five since 2000. 
Nonetheless, overall ITN usage still falls short of demand. 
 
Resolving the poverty and hunger is essential for human resource development. In this respect 
Africa is making steady progress. The proportion of people living on less than $1.25 a day 
(MDG 1), dropped by 7 % points from 58 % in 1990 to 51 % in 2005. The percentage of Sub-
Saharan African people suffering from hunger is on a steady decline. It decreased to 26 per 
cent in 2005-07 from 31 per cent of 1990-92. Nevertheless this ratio is still high and progress 
is slower than in other regions. In addition the lingering effects of the food price hike in 2008 




Africa  has  made  significant  achievements  in  educational  attainment  (Figure  5).  Progress 
towards universal primary enrolment in particular has been significant in the region since the 
World Education Forum in Dakar, despite mixed results and slower gains in recent years. 
SSA has registered remarkable progress since 1999 in reducing its out-of-school population 
by nearly 13 million, down to 32 million in 2007. Some countries with large out-of-school 
populations  in  1999  had  made  significant  reductions  by  2007  (e.g.  Ethiopia,  Kenya, 28 
 
Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia). Between 1999 and 2007, the average net enrolment 
ratio (NER) in sub-Saharan Africa increased from 56% to 73%. Still, challenges remain -- an 
estimated 38 percent of the adult population in SSA, or 153 million adults, lack the basic 
literacy  and  numeracy  skills  needed  in  everyday  life.  On  a  more  positive  note,  the  adult 
literacy rate in SSA has been increasing during 2000s, to reach about 60 percent in 2007.  
 
Improvements in education attainment hinge critically also on a better quality of education. 
Many countries in SSA – including Burkina Faso, Burundi, the Niger and Senegal– have 
more than doubled the teacher workforce, in most cases improving the pupil-teacher ratio. 
According to UNESCO (2010) an additional 1.2 million teachers have to be recruited in sub-
Saharan Africa to reach universal primary education by 2015 
 
Figure. 5  Net primary enrollment and primary completion rate for African countries 
 
Source: ECA, AU, and AfDB (2009), p.14. 
 
SSA’s  progress  towards  achieving  the  Education  for  All  has  been  facilitated  in  many 
countries by increases in government spending and international aid for education. Strong 
economic growth and poverty reduction gains have contributed to progress. Public spending 
on primary education in sub-Saharan Africa rose by 29% in real terms between 2000 and 
2005.  International  aid  is  vital  for  the  financing  of  education  in  sub-Saharan  Africa.  The 
region is the largest recipient of total official development assistance, accounting for about 
one in every three dollars. Averaged over 2006 and 2007, total annual aid to education to sub-
Saharan Africa amounted to US$3.9 billion, up from US$2.7 billion a year in 1999 and 2009 
(UNESCO, 2010). 
 
Workforce and employment 
 
In SSA, employment rates are higher than in other developing regions. At the same time, 
working poverty and vulnerable employment are very prevalent in SSA. For instance, the 29 
 
proportion of employed people living below $ 1.25 a day was expected to reach 64 percent in 
2009, in part due to the economic crisis. The  ILO’s  estimates of the  share of vulnerable 
employment for 2009 range from 75.7 per cent to  up to 79.6 per cent, which would take the 
region back to 2003 levels of working poverty (ILO, 2010). 
 
II.3.3 The role of G20 in Africa’s human resource development 
 
The challenge of youth unemployment 
 
In Africa – as in other regions, young people (ages 15 – 24 years) are disproportionately 
affected by working poverty, unemployment and vulnerable employment. The youth in SSA 
in mid-2000s made up about 40 percent of the working-age population, but 60 percent of the 
total  unemployed,  reflecting  that  this  group  is  particularly  impacted  by  labor  market 
imperfections. Moreover, the young people are more likely to be in the informal sector than 
adults,  and  less  likely  to  be  wage  employees  or  self-employed.  Specifically,  in  2005  in 
Ethiopia,  81.4  percent  and  12.5  percent  of  youth  were  in  the  informal  sector  and  self-
employed, respectively, in comparison to 43 percent and 49.6 percent for the adults. The still 
high fertility rates along with the ongoing demographic in Africa are likely to increase the 
pressure for job creation over the coming decades. 
 
G20’s role in bridging better human resources to more employment 
 
Africa’s youth follow two paths in their transitions to working life: many go to work directly 
with little benefit of formal schooling, while others join the work force after a time in the 
formal school system. Those who enter the labor market directly without formal training are  
more likely to end up in low productivity jobs. To help Africa reduce youth unemployment,   
G20 can cooperate with African countries in the following areas: secondary education, higher 
education, technical and vocational education and training (TVET), and knowledge sharing 
for policy capacity.  
 
Increasing access to secondary education   
 
The gap in secondary enrollment rates between SSA and other developing regions widened 
between 1990 and 2000, though it has been slowly narrowing since then. In the early 2000s, 
the average enrollment rates for SSA were well below those in other regions (Figure 6). This 
gap  in  secondary  enrollments  has  serious  consequences  for  competitiveness  and  growth. 
Competitiveness, especially in high value-added and knowledge-based sectors of the economy, 
depends on knowledge, skills, and competencies associated with abstract reasoning, analysis, 
language and communication skills, and the application of science and  technology. These 
assets are acquired most efficiently through secondary schooling.  The Association for the 
Development  of  Education  in  Africa  (ADEA),  national  governments  and  bilateral 
development agencies, and the World Bank recognize the increased enrollment in secondary 
schooling to be a priority for most of SSA, also to create base for higher education.  
 
Reforming higher education systems 
 
To transform African countries into knowledge-based societies, a comprehensive overhaul of 
higher education systems is needed in a number of countries.  In today’s knowledge-based 
world,  no  country  can  reach  strong,  sustained  and  shared  growth  without  a  capacity  to 
generate, transmit, and  utilize new knowledge.  Despite this recognition, Africa’s stock of 30 
 
human  capital  with  tertiary-level  skills  is  below  that  in  countries  with  similar  levels  of 
development; this applies especially to sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, there is substantial 
mismatch  between  the  demands  of  modern  economies  and  skills  possessed  by  the  recent 
university graduates in most African countries. While unemployment among the educated is 
high, shortages of skills, especially in ICT, high-level technical skills and foreign languages 
persist. To reform Africa’s higher education systems though, new sources of financing for 
higher education need to be identified, including from the private sector. Different forms of 
state support should also be explored, including credit-guarantees, loan subsidies, and grants. 
 
Africa asks G20 countries to raise the emphasis on higher education in their development 
agenda  in  Africa;  this  is  beyond  the  MDGs.  Specifically,  donors  need  to  increase  aid 
allocation to higher education in African countries in support of the enrolment capacity and 
quality of education provided by the African tertiary institutions.  
 
Table 1. Distribution of youth and adults by job status (in percent) 
 
 Recited from World Bank (2009), p.5. 
 
 
More skills for African youth through Technical and Vocational Education and Training 
 
There  has  been  debate  about  responsibility  of  government  for  providing  Technical  and 
Vocational Education and Training (TVET) and the trade-off between the achievement of 
skills development with TVET and the provision of universal basic education. Nevertheless, 31 
 
skills development for participants in the labor force is important in Sub-Saharan Africa today 
for several reasons. Technological change and the increased competition require higher skills 
and productivity among workers. Furthermore, TVET is vital for investment promotion in that 
the availability of skilled labor is a critical determinant of foreign investment. 
 
 
Figure 6. Gross Enrollment Ratios in secondary education, by region (2004 or latest) 
 
Source: Verspoor (2008), p.24 
 
 
A  key  challenge  for  African  economies  over  the  next  decade  is  to  create  productive 
employment opportunities for the 7 to 10 million new entrants to the labor force annually. In a 
typical African country, as much as 85% of total employment is engaged in the informal 
economy,  with  most  of  this  in  smallholder  agriculture.  Growth  in  the  informal  sector  is 
probably  a  permanent  feature  of  African  labor  markets  for  the  near  future.  Reaching  the 
informal sector with skills development will be increasingly important for poverty reduction 
and sustained growth. 
 
State-sponsored training systems play an important role in all countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The challenge is how to reform these institutions to make them more responsive to markets 
and more effective in the use of resources. Among the various providers of TVET, state-
sponsored training frequently responds to the demand for more costly skills and provides 
better geographical coverage, but it also suffers from poor quality and a lack of connection 
with market needs. Budget pressures since the past decade have limited capital improvements 
and operating expenses, with adverse consequences.  
 
Governments have a public interest in removing skills constraints to economic development 
and in promoting access to skills for those who are socially and economically disadvantaged. 
Meeting the evolving market needs will require combined efforts of governments and the 
private sector in designing, financing, and operating demand-driven TVET institutions. 
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The performance of public sector in Africa is critical for poverty reduction and sustained 
economic  growth.  In  many  African  countries  public  governance  and  accountability  have 
improved with the introduction of democracy and the commitment to the rule of the law since 
the 1990s. Nevertheless, capacity in public sector management remains weaker than in other 
developing regions. The role of the public sector is essential human resource development as 
a means for sustained economic growth. The enhancement in public capacity in Africa is 
especially  critical  for  the  establishment  of  an  environment  that  is  conducive  to 
entrepreneurship. 
 
Support from the G20 for capacity building in the public sector would help Africa enhance 
human resource development and job creation. The knowledge and know-how learned from 
the development experiences of G20 member countries including Korea who achieved rapid 
economic growth in part due to active roles of government might provide African countries 
with valuable lessons and help avoid possible errors in policy-making. Sharing of knowledge 
and experience of G20 members would be a good vehicle to support public capacity in Africa. 
 
The support for capacity building needs to address three dimensions of public sector capacity: 
human  capacity,  organizational  capacity,  and  institutional  capacity  (World  Bank  2005). 
Workers in the public sector are supposed to have skills to analyze development needs, to 
design and implement policies, and to deliver services. Public organizations should be bound 
by a common purpose, with clear objectives and the internal structures, processes, systems, 
and other resources to achieve them. Lastly, institutional capacity implies the formal ‘rules of 
game’ and informal norms that provide the framework of goals and incentives within which 
organizations and people operate.  
 
G20 members could put their knowledge, human resources, and financial resources to support 
improvement in these three dimensions. Correspondingly, the ownership of African partners 
is essential for the success of capacity building programs. While external assistance can help 
by  providing  inputs  to  enhance  the  functioning  of  the  public  sector,  it  cannot  directly 
influence the cultural factors and political economy dimensions underpinning the demand for 
public sector performance. Therefore, capacity building efforts will succeed only where they 
take  adequate  account  of  the  prevailing  local  political  and  institutional  realities,  and  are 
country-owned rather than donor-driven. 
 
Box II.3.1.  A case for knowledge sharing: Korea’s KSP 
 
Korea represents economic success among the countries that had experienced colonization 
and late industrialization. Moreover, Korea is one of the few countries which have become an 
aid donor country from a recipient country. As the host country of G20 summit in 2010 and a 
member of DAC, Korea wants to repay the benefits from international society by expanding 
its commitment to development cooperation. 
 
One of the major features in Korean economic development since the early 1960s was the 
active role of the government in the rise of industries and private sectors. During the process, 
the  Korean  government  introduced  and  implemented  successfully  many  policies  such  as 
export promotion, gradual import liberalization, capital and exchange market liberalization, 
privatization  of  state-owned  enterprises  and  banks,  special  economic  zone,  ICT  industry 
promotion, and so on. 
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 From its development process, the Korean government learned that building policymaking 
capacity  and  accumulating  knowledge  for  development  in  public  sector  is  essential  for 
successful economic development. In addition, the Korean government recognized that the 
experience and knowledge that it had earned during its development process would be very 
valuable assets that can be shared with developing countries. Against these backgrounds, the 
Korean government took it as a pillar of its international development cooperation to share its 
own development experiences with others. 
 
This development experience is institutionalized as the 'Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP)' 
which  is  run  by  the  Ministry  of  Strategy  and  Finance.  Consultation  teams,  comprised  by 
former  senior  government  officer,  experts  from  policy  institutes  and  universities,  provide 
policy consulting services to the developing countries. These policy recommendations are 
based on Korea's developmental experiences, but are customized with considerations of local 
environments in recipient countries. 
 
The areas of the KSP include economic development strategy, industrialization and export 
promotion,  knowledge  based-economy,  economic  crisis  management,  human  resource 
development. From 2004 to 2009, Korea shared its knowledge with 15 developing countries 
in 134 policy topics through KSP. Korea's policy recommendations and its knowledge were 
capitalized, for instance, in the establishment of Vietnam Development Bank in 2006 and the 
Navoi Special Economic Zone of Uzbekistan in 2008, and served as a reference for the WTO 
membership negotiation of Azerbaijan.  
 
The KSP might be considered as a model of 'global knowledge partnership' envisioned by 
international  society.  The  Korean  government  will  expand  the  size  and  area  of  KSP  and 
operate it jointly with multilateral development banks such as World Bank, AFDB and ADB. 
 
II.4. Structural transformation for strong, sustained, and shared growth  
 
II.4.1. Labor productivity in Africa: gaps and opportunities 
 
Africa’s  pre-crisis  boom  and  its  surprisingly  fast  and  strong  recovery  have  reiterated  the 
continent’s  immense  economic  potential.  Moreover,  the  pre-crisis  boom  was  broad-based 
across  countries  and  wide-spread  across  sectors,  with  many  (e.g.,  mining,  retail, 
telecommunications,  banking,  agriculture)  contributing  to  high  growth.
37 Moreover,  the 
growth  acceleration  was  not  just  driven  by  the  commodity  boom,  but  reflected  markedly 
improved pre-crisis macroeconomic policies and structural reforms, such as reforms of the 
financial sector and labor regulations, and strengthened business environment.  
 
Surely,  at  only  3  percent  of  world  GDP  and  trade,  Africa’s  current  weight  in  the  global 
economy is low.
38 Moreover, low-productivity agriculture still accounts for most (about 60 
percent)  of  employment  in  many  African  LICs,  while  the  surplus  labor  from  agriculture 
typically  works  in  the  informal  urban  sector.
39  A  significant  and  long-standing  labor 
                                                 
37 The sectoral trends are documented in AfDB and OECD (2010) and McKinsey&Co. (2010).  
 
38 According to the IMF WEO database, in 2008 Africa accounted for only 2.1 percent of world GDP in current 
prices and for 3.2 percent in PPP terms. Share of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) was about 2 percent. 
    
39 While the productivity in the urban sector is above the agricultural productivity, it is still often markedly lower 
than in the formal sector. This leads to the low aggregate productivity.  34 
 
productivity gap between many of Africa’s LICs and other developing countries has thus 
emerged. On a more positive note, in some frontier markets (e.g., Uganda, Mozambique), 
labor productivity accelerated in recent years and grew as rapidly as in India (Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7. Labor productivity, Index (1991 = 100), 1991 – 2008 1/ 
 
Source: African Development Bank, ILO and authors’ calculation. 1/ Labor productivity is measured in terms of 
number of people employed, not working hours.  
 
Furthermore, the large productivity gaps with advanced economies imply that through the 
catch  up  process,  African  countries  could  reach  real  GDP  growth  rates  approaching  10 
percent annually.
40 With such rates African countries possibly could, on average, converge to 
the per capita income levels of the new EU members around the year 2050 (Klein, 2006). 
However,  for  this  convergence  to  happen,  structural  transformation  from  subsistence 
agriculture  to  industry  and  high  value-added  services  would  need  to  markedly  accelerate. 
Other factors, such as an enabling external environment and improved educational systems 
would also need to be in place.  
 
The lack of structural transformation has been the Achilles heel of reform efforts in most 
African countries so far. While the share of agriculture decreased somewhat over the last two 
decades (from 18.2 percent of GDP in 1990 to 16.5 percent in 2008), it was due to shifts into 
mostly low-value added services (e.g. trade) and/or mining, even though in some countries the 
share of financial services and telecommunications has also increased. The manufacturing 
sub-sector remained underdeveloped and in fact has steadily declined since the early 1990s; in 
2008 it amounted to about 10 percent of GDP compared to more than 30 percent in East Asia 
(Figure A.9). Several African middle-income countries (Egypt, South Africa, Tunisia) have 
well-developed manufacturing sectors and buoyant services (McKinsey&Co., 2010).  
 
                                                                                                                                                         
 
40 One of the underlying assumptions is that the population growth is slightly above 2 percent.   
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Overall, due to the limited structural transformation and diversification, most countries are 
heavily dependent on the production and export of traditional primary products and highly 
vulnerable to external shocks. As many African economies are dominated by natural resource 
extraction sectors that require very specialized set of skills, diversifying of production and 
increasing the technological content are challenging. Several exceptions aside (e.g., Egypt, 
Mauritius, Morocco, South Africa, and Tunisia), the lack of economic diversification and the 
low technological level have been constraining ability of many African countries to compete 
globally. They also hampered regional integration. The global financial crisis has reiterated 
the need for Africa to diversify its economies and find new and sustainable sources of growth. 
 
Despite this overall somewhat bleak aggregate picture on labor productivity trends, several 
middle-income countries (Algeria, Botswana, Egypt Libya, Mauritius, Morocco, South Africa 
and Tunisia) give rise to hope. About forty companies located in these countries have been 
expanding regionally and in some instances globally. In fact, with annual growth of revenues 
of about 24 percent during 2003 – 08, these companies grew faster than established firms in 
advanced economies; they were also more profitable (Boston Consulting Group, 2010).  
 
Pockets of dynamism can also already be found in many African frontier markets, pointing to 
the entrepreneurial spirit throughout the continent.  For example, the cut-flower business in 
Kenya and Uganda has blossomed, while refined leather products from Ethiopia have entered 
high-end fashion stores in New York. The Nigerian film industry, ‘Nollywood’, one of the 
largest  in  the  world,  has  been  very  active  in  recent  years  and  became  a  major  source  of 
employment in the country (Klein, 2006). The key question is then how such dynamism can 
be extended to the rest of the sectors in these countries and elsewhere on the continent.  
 
II.4.2. Advancing structural transformation, raising productivity  
 
In most African LICs, boosting productivity in agriculture is a key challenge and precondition 
for increased productivity in other activities.
41 While causes of low productivity in agriculture 
are numerous and country-specific, often they stem from the lack of access to markets, credit 
and  technology.  These  constraints  need  to  be  addressed,  together  with  strengthening 
institutions  (e.g.,  land  ownership),  providing  training  to  enhance  skills,  and  removing 
obstacles to trade. Promoting regional value chains and – more broadly – regional integration 
will help Africa overcome the additional limitations of small national markets and populations 
(UNECA and UUC, 2009). Improved infrastructure, human capacities, technology transfer, 
and increased funding for research could also help raise agricultural productivity.
42 
 
For  the  structural  transformation  and  productivity  to  take  off,  constraints  to  new  high-
productivity firms in industry and high-value added activities need to be removed. Given the 
supply-side bottlenecks, a key for reducing production costs continues to be investment in and 
maintenance  of  infrastructure.  In  some  countries  (e.g.,  South  Africa),  the  demand 
inefficiencies  caused  by  energy  pricing  below  full  recovery  of  costs  should  be  removed 
                                                 
41 Golin, Parente and Rogerson (2002) showed in a calibrated general equilibrium model that agricultural growth 
is central to development, as its low productivity can substantially delay industrialization.  
 
42 Salami, Kamara and Brixiova (2010) discuss constraints to raising productivity of agriculture in East Africa.  
Ravallion (2008) highlighted lessons in this regard that Africa can draw from China’s experience and found that 
to reduce poverty,  African countries should: (i) raise productivity of agriculture through both  market-based 




43 Africa would benefit from increased competition in product markets; more 
developed financial markets, and strengthened governance. Reforms before the crisis and few 
success stories (e.g. Rwanda) notwithstanding, the rigid business environment still reduces 
Africa’s competitiveness (Eifert, Gelb and Ramachandran, 2005; Figure A.10). Labor markets 
would function better if they were deregulated and social safety nets developed. Moreover, 
the importance of strengthening institutions and improving governance in Africa cannot be 
overstated. 
  
Experiences from other developing regions point to the central role played by industrial policy 
and  other  sectoral  strategies  in  bringing  about  faster  industrialization  and  structural 
transformation to high-value added activities. This is particularly the case in Africa’s LDCs, 
where successful activities and entrepreneurship are often associated with mere survival rather 
than involvement in highly productive activities (Bonaglia and Fukasaku, 2007). The policies 
range  from  incentives  for  technology  development  and  adoption  to  pro-growth  oriented 
macroeconomic stance. The new industrial policy should not pick winners, but remove overall 
obstacles  to  entrepreneurship  in  high-potential  sectors  and  industries.  At  the  same  time, 
policymakers  should  avoid  subsidizing  energy-intensive  and  carbon-intensive  industries 
through these initiatives, but facilitate Africa’s move to new and green growth path.  
 
For these reforms to yield the intended results (e.g. structural transformation and increased 
productivity), additional policy space is needed both at the national levels and in multilateral 
trade and financial agreements. This requires to mobilize increased domestic savings, deepen 
capital markets and widen access to credit for firms in general and SMEs, farmers, and small 
investors in particular (AfDB and OECD, 2010). Meanwhile, multilateral and bilateral donors 
would facilitate this transformation through increasing their financial support to Africa, along 
the lines of statements at the 2005 Gleneagles summit. By working closely with recipient 
countries, they would make their financial support more effective through better coordination, 
increased flexibility and real country ownership of externally funded projects.  
 
Box II.4.1. Structural Transformation for Strong, Sustained and Shared Growth -- 
Actions 
 
Actions by African countries 
 
Raising productivity in agriculture: (i) Increase access of smallholder farmers to markets, credit 
and technology; (ii) Strengthen institutions (e.g., land ownership), provide training to enhance 
skills,  and  remove  obstacles  to  trade;  (iii)  Promote  regional  value  chains  and  regional 
integration  overall;  (iv)  Improved  infrastructure,  human  capacities,  technology  transfer,  and 
increased funding for research.  
 
Facilitating structural transformation to high value-added industry and services: (i) Remove 
regulatory  constraints  to  creation  of  new  high-productivity  firms;  (ii)  Continue  to  invest  in 
infrastructure and maintain it; (iii) Phase out demand inefficiencies caused by energy pricing 
below full recovery of costs; (iii) Eliminate the remaining rigidities in the business environment 
to cut cost of production. 
 
Implementing effective industrial policy: (i) provide incentives for technology development and 
adoption in high potential industries; (ii) adopt pro-growth oriented macroeconomic stance; (iii) 
facilitate Africa’s move to new growth path, avoid subsidizing energy-intensive and carbon-
intensive industries.  
                                                 
43 OECD (2010) discusses these issues in detail.  37 
 
 
Create policy space to support structural transformation: Mobilize domestic savings, develop 
capital markets, and improve access to credit for SMEs and farmers.  
 
Actions by G20 and development partners 
 
Help  create  policy  space  to  support  structural  transformation:  Increase  financial  support  to 
Africa, along the lines of (growth-adjusted) statements at the 2005 Gleneagles summit. Improve 
donor coordination, increase flexibility of project funding and encourage real country ownership 
of externally funded projects.  
 
II. 5 Infrastructure Deficit: Challenge and Opportunity for Growth 
 
II.5.1 Africa’s Infrastructure Deficit: The Facts 
 
For several decades now, researchers, African policymakers, and donors have recognized that 
the  lack  of  infrastructure  networks  in  basic  areas  (electricity,  transport,  ICT  and  water) 
hampers  growth  and  sustainable  development  on  the  continent.
44 However,  Africa,  and 
especially sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), ranks consistently on the bottom of developing regions 
in  access  to  infrastructure  services  (Table  2.a  and  2.b).  According  to  the  World  Bank 
estimates, Africa’s total financing needs in 2008 amounted to $93 billion a year. Of this, only 
$45  billion  is  currently  financed.  Even  if  all  reforms  aimed  at  raising  efficiency  of  the 
infrastructure sector were to succeed and reduce the gap by $17 million, a $ 31 billion a year 
gap would still remain unaddressed.
45  
 
The aggregate deficit numbers mask substantial differences across Africa’s sub-groups and 
sub-regions as well sectors. Specifically, the infrastructure deficit is most pronounced in the 
power  sector  where  many  countries  suffer  from  regular  power  shortages  and  expansive 
emergency  power,  while  the  ICT  gap  is  much  smaller.  In  fact,  several  African  frontier 
markets are ahead of major emerging market economies such as India in the usage of mobile 
phones,  demonstrating  that  in  an  enabling  environment  Africa  can  rapidly  adopt  modern 
technology (Figure A.11.a and A.11.b). As far as Africa’s sub-regions, infrastructure in East 
Africa particularly lags behind regional peers (e.g., South Asia) or more advanced sub-regions 
on the continent (e.g., Southern Africa). The infrastructure deficit of oil exporters relative to 
oil importers reflects in part that during the last commodity boom the extra oil revenues were 
mostly spent on consumption rather than investment (e.g., Nigeria).
46   
 
In addition to the limited overall availability, where the infrastructure services do exist they 
are very costly in comparison with other developing regions (Table 3). They also tend to be 
expansive  relative  to  the  purchasing  power  of  potential  users,  which  leaves  part  of  the 
networks unutilized as many of the potential users are simply ‘priced out’ of the market. Two 
main factors are behind the high prices of utility tariffs: (i) high cost of production due to the 
                                                 
44 Agenor (2010) develops a theoretical model of long-run development based on public infrastructure as the 
main engine of growth. In his model, a large shift toward spending on infrastructure will generate increase in 
growth only if governance is adequate, i.e. the degree of efficiency of public investment is sufficiently high.  
 
45 Of the annual $93 billion, about 2/3 are new capital expenditures and 1/3 is on operation and maintenance 
(Foster and Briceno-Garmedia, 2008).  
 
46 In part due to the war heritage, infrastructure gap in fragile states is particularly worrisome.  
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lack of economies of scale (e.g., power tariffs across Africa) or (ii) high profit margins due to 
the lack of competition (e.g., road freight tariffs).
47  
 
Table 2a. SSA’s Infrastructure Deficit  
 









Transport           
  Density of paved road network  1/  49  149  59  14  57 
  Density of total road network  1/  152  306  237  70  173 
ICT           
  Density of fixed phone line 2/  33  39  90  16  38 
  Density of mobile phone line 2/  101  86  208  118  97 
  Density of internet connections 2/  2.8  1.7  6.6  1.7  3.1 
Energy           
  Electrical generating capacity 3/  70  154  231  66  71 
  Access to electricity 4/  18  44  57  26  16 
Water and sanitation           
  Water 4/  63  72  75  59  64 
  Sanitation 4/  35  48  60  34  35 
Source: Yepes et al. (2008).  1/ km/1000 km2 (2001). 2/ subscribers per 1000 people (2004). 3/ MW per 1 
million people (2003). 4/ Percent of households with access (2002-2004).  
 




LICs  LICs 
ECOWAS  EAC  SADC  Central 
Transport               
  Density of paved road network 1/   31  134  38  8  92  41 
  Density of total road network  1/  137  211  144  105  214  132 
ICT               
  Density of fixed phone line 2/  10  78  28  6  74  13 
  Density of mobile phone line 2/  55  76  72  54  180  74 
  Density of internet connections 
2/  2 
3 
2.4  2.1  5.5  1.7 
Energy               
  Electrical generating capacity 3/  37  326  31  24  175  44 
  Access to electricity 4/  16  41  18  7  21  18 
Water and sanitation               
  Water 4/  60  72  63  64  71  58 
  Sanitation 4/  34  51  35  45  43  28 
 
Source: Yepes et al. (2008).  1/ km/1000 km2 (2001). 2/ subscribers per 1000 people (2004). 3/ MW per 1 
million people (2003). 4/ Percent of households with access (2002-2004).  
 
                                                 
47 The lack of economies of scale reflects the fragmented nature of Africa (with very large number of land-
locked countries) and the limited progress with regional economic integration. 
   39 
 
In  some  cases  (e.g.,  internet  provision),  both  factors  play  a  role.
48 The  high  costs  of 
infrastructure  services  markedly  reduce  the  continent’s  productivity  (by  half)  and 
competitiveness, while preventing it to reach meaningful gains in poverty reduction. 
 
Table 3. Cost of Infrastructure: SSA and other regions 
 
Tariffs  SSA 
Other developing 
regions 
Power ($ per kilowatt hour)  0.02-0.46  0.05-0.10 
Water ($ per cubic meter)  0.86-6.56  0.03-0.60 
Road freight ($ per ton km)  0.04-0.14  0.01-0.04 
Mobile phone ($ per basket/month)  2.60-21.00  9.9 
International phone ($ per 3 min. to US)  0.44-12.50  2 
Internet dial-up ($ per month)  6.70-148  11 
Source: Foster and Briceno-Garmendia (2008).  
 
High prices for services are one of numerous inefficiencies that permeate the infrastructure 
sectors.  Others include: (i) excessive allocation of public resources to ICT (especially in 
MICs) at the expanse of priority areas (energy); (ii) less than full implementation of the fiscal 
budgets  allocated  for  investment  on  infrastructure;  (iii)    insufficient  maintenance  which 
creates need for expansive rehabilitation; (iv) inefficiencies and losses during the distribution 
phase; (v) pricing of infrastructure services below the cost. Timely maintenance in particular 
could go a long way in reducing the funding needs, since estimates suggest that, for example, 
$1 spent on road maintenance saves approximately $4 in rehabilitation.    
 
The persistently high Africa’s infrastructure deficit has imposed major cost on the continent in 
terms of foregone growth and missed opportunities for poverty reduction. For example, if 
SSA were to reach the level of infrastructure of Mauritius, its growth of real GDP per capita 
would increase by 2.3 percentage points a year. Similarly, if North Africa had Mauritius’ 
infrastructure, growth would rise by 1.1 percentage point a year. The extra growth would stem 
mostly  from  building  additional  infrastructure,  rather  than  from  improved  quality  of  the 
existing one (Calderon, 2009).
49  
 
The key question is then how to generate financing that would reduce the infrastructure gap. 
Efforts to raise funds need to be accompanied by reforms to address the existing inefficiencies 
(improved regulation, governance, budgeting, better pricing). Such reform would not only 
reduce Africa’s overall infrastructure financing needs, but also increase returns on investment, 
thus making the sectors more attractive for private participation.  
 
II.5.2. Traditional and innovative sources of infrastructure financing 
  
In 2008, Africa’s infrastructure expenditures amounted to about $45 billion, of which 2/3 
were  financed  domestically  (mostly  from  budgets,  extra-budgetary  funds,  state-owned 
enterprises)  and  1/3  was  financed  from  external  sources  (ODA,  private  investors  and 
emerging market economies). In most African countries, public sector predominates financing 
                                                 
48  Foster  and  Briceno-Garmendia  (2008)  discuss  these  factors  and  other  challenges  related  to  Africa’s 
infrastructure.  
49 Similarly, if SSA had infrastructure of South Korea, it would grow by 2.4 percentage points a year more.  
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of water, transport and energy, while ICT has already gained substantial interest of private 
investors.  
 
Given  the  importance  of  public  funds  and  central  government  budgets  in  financing  new 
infrastructure investments, improvements/increased efficiency in allocation and disbursement 
of these funds must be a priority. In that regard, African countries may want to strengthen 
medium-term expenditure frameworks (discussed in Part I) and improve fiscal governance 
and transparency. These measures need to be supplemented by efforts to improve domestic 
revenue collection on countries where it is low (e.g., Uganda), while strengthening overall 
domestic resource mobilization across Africa. On their part, donors need to deliver financing 
for infrastructure in a timely and predictable manner and put appropriate emphasis on funds 
for maintenance, not only new investments.  
 
However, as improving domestic resource mobilization is likely to take time and the official 
aid  from  traditional  donors  will  clearly  not  rise  (sufficiently)  in  the  near  future,  African 
countries need to seek  new sources of funds,  either from emerging donors or the private 
sector. Among emerging donors, China has been particularly active in Africa for several years 
now.  Specifically,  China’s  infrastructure  finance  commitments  in  sub-Saharan  Africa 
increased from $ 0.5 billion in 2001 to $7.1 billion in 2006 and $4.5 billion in 2007, with 
many projects backed by natural resources or future revenue flows. For example, Chinese 
investments in Sudan, Angola and  Nigeria were backed by oil, the 2006 investment in Gabon 
by iron, and the 2007 investment in Ghana by cocoa (Foster et al. 2008). 
 
Regarding  increasing  private  sector  participation  in  infrastructure  beyond  ICT,  Kenya’s 
issuance of infrastructure bonds to finance roads serves as an example for other countries 
with more developed domestic financial markets to follow.
50 The purpose of issuance was to 
boost  growth  as  well  as  develop  capital  markets  and  raise  their  transparency.  The  first 
infrastructure bond (US$232 million), sold in February 2009, had maturity of 12 years and 
was over-subscribed by 45 percent. The second and third infrastructure bonds, issued later in 
2009, were twice over-subscribed. One of the incentives offered, which contributed to the 
bond’s over-subscription, is that holders can use the bond as collateral to acquire bank loans 
and banks can pledge it as collateral for repos.   
 
As  Kenya’s  experience  shows,  when  long  term  financing  needed  for  infrastructure  is  not 
available from the banking system, infrastructure bonds can be an efficient alternative. They, 
as well as other local currency bonds, reduce maturity and currency mismatches in banks’ 
balance sheets, thus reducing risk of banking crises.   
 
Ghana’s  2007  Eurobond  issuance  points  to  the  possibility  and  importance  of  accessing 
international markets on good terms, even though in Ghana’s case the resources generated by 
the bond issuance could have been used more effectively. The current plans of Nigeria to 
establish oil-financed infrastructure fund is worth exploring by other Africa’s resource rich 
emerging and frontier markets.
51 The need for the frontier markets to shift ‘away from aid 
                                                 
50 In  2001,  Kenya  has  embarked  on  revamp  of  its  domestic  bond  market.  Since  then,  it  has  succeeded  to 
lengthening the maturity profile of the debt.  
   
51 A sovereign wealth fund financed by oil revenue is expected to be set up by October 2010 with about $1 
billion, according to the statement by Finance Minister Aganga in early September.  
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dependence’  was  also  recognized  by  IFIs.  Correspondingly,  pace  for  non-concessional 
borrowing was made in the context of the debt sustainability framework. 
 
More  generally,  a  shortage  of  bankable  projects  remains  a  key  bottleneck  to  private 
investment in the infrastructure sectors, which needs to be addressed. Improving the ways 
infrastructure  financiers  and  facilities  work  together  could  also  go  a  long  way  in  closing 
Africa’s  infrastructure  gap.  Africa  asks  the  G20  to  support  the  African  infrastructure 
development initiative to develop an accelerated pipeline of bankable infrastructure projects 
with  focus  on  (i)  cross-border  investments,  (ii)  water  and  sanitation,  and  (iii)  renewable 
energy.  The  initiative  also  aims  at  introducing  collaborative  ways  between  infrastructure 
financiers and facilities.   Finally, when taking a broader view of sustainable growth (i.e. one 
encompassing  not  only  financial  but  also  social  and  environmental  aspects),  it  becomes 
important that African countries shift where possible to ‘clean energy financing’. Donors and 
multilateral  financial  institutions  need  to  support  them  in  this  endeavor.  The  African 
Development Bank’s issuance of its first clean energy bond in early 2010 and the subsequent 




Box II.5.1 Infrastructure Deficit: Challenge and Opportunity for Growth -- Actions 
 
Strengthen traditional mechanisms of financing infrastructure.  
 
￿  Specifically, improve and increase efficiency in allocation and disbursement of public funds 
through government budgets, also through strengthening medium term frameworks (G20). 
  
￿  Improve  further  fiscal  governance  and  transparency;  strengthen  resource  mobilization, 
including  through  better  tax  revenue  collection  in  countries  where  it  is  low  (African 
countries).  
 
Continue and enhance innovative ways of infrastructure financing 
 
￿  Explore  options  for/viability  of  issuance  of  local  infrastructural  bonds  (as  in  Kenya); 
sovereign bonds on international markets (as in Ghana), or  in case of resource rich emerging 
and frontier markets -- infrastructure wealth fund as planned in Nigeria (African countries).  
 
￿  Increase share of clean energy financing (African countries, G20, other partners). 
 
￿  Support the African infrastructure development initiative to increase the number of 
bankable projects in Africa (G20 and other partners).  
 
In parallel, address inefficiencies in building, maintenance and pricing of infrastructure to cut the 
financing gap. Ease regulations to raise competition in telecommunications, the energy sector, etc 







                                                 
52 These bonds were issued within the Bank’s Clean Energy for Development Investment Framework, which is a 
step towards shifting energy investments to favor low-carbon development paths. 42 
 
II.6. Green growth development path for Africa 
 
II.6.1. Introduction: Green growth as a strategic priority in the global economy 
 
On 21 June 2010, ahead of the G20 summit in Toronto, the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-
moon  urged  leaders  of  the  biggest  20  developed  and  developing  countries  to  focus  on 
development,  green  growth,  and  the  needs  of  the  most  vulnerable  in  designing  recovery 
strategies. According to him, “the best way to enhance the framework for strong, sustainable 
and balanced economic growth is to put development front and centre, and to invest in a green 
economic recovery for all.”
53 Indeed, in responding to the global financial crisis, the Toronto 
Summit reiterated their commitment to a green recovery and sustainable global growth.
54  
 
In the process of global economic recovery, green growth is considered a strategic priority by 
the G20, as well as major global institutions along with the traditional concept of growth 
based on GDP, while it encompasses a wide range of objectives that are critical to long term 
global economic development. To be specific, the objective of green growth is for reviving 
the  global  economy,  boosting  employment,  expediting  the  fight  against  climate  change, 
therefore, ultimately to achieve a sustainable growth in the world economy. In that sense, 
green growth is relevant beyond relieving the impact of the current economic crisis.  
 
The G20 has 66 percent of the world’s population, producing almost 90 percent of global 
GDP. They are also responsible for 80 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions, as well as 
commanding  much  of  the  world’s  annual  USD  150-250  billion  fossil  fuel  subsidies
55. 
Therefore, they are required to ensure that their investments set out to stimulate stagnant 
economies  contribute  to  mitigating  climate  change,  as  well  as  reaching  the  impending 
millennium development goals (MDGs) especially eradicating the poverty. In this context 
that, for the G20 meeting in Pittsburgh, the UNEP called on the 20 largest economies to 
engage in a Global Green New Deal by investing at least 1 percent of their total GDP in 
promoting green economic sectors.
56 UNEP suggested that the G20 countries use a significant 
proportion  of  their  investments  focusing  on  improving  energy  efficiency  in  buildings, 
supporting  renewable  energy  technologies,  sustainable  transport  technologies,  ecological 
infrastructure,  and  sustainable  agriculture.  Although  there  is  a  large  gap  to  fill  among 
countries,  progress  has  been  made  as  many  governments  put  in  the  effort  to  adopt 
expansionary stimulus packages, including green growth-oriented policies.
57  
 
                                                 
53 Referring to UN News Service “Ban urges focus on development and green growth ahead of G20 summit” 
on 21 June 2010  http://www.un.org/apps/news  
 
54 The G20 Toronto Summit Declaration, para. 41, 26-27 June 2010  
 
55 Global Green New Deal- An Update for the G20 Pittsburgh Summit p.1, UNEP, September 2009. 
 
56 Global Green New Deal- An Update for the G20 Pittsburgh Summit p.1, UNEP, September 2009. 
 
57 According to a report from UNEP report on a Global Green New Deal, almost 15 percent of the global 
stimulus packages to date can be considered green in nature, and these commitments are largely concentrated in 
a few leading members of the G20. Yet another report from HSBC Global Research by Robins at al. in 2009 and 
2010 about green stimulus, of the USD 3.3 trillion allocated worldwide to fiscal stimulus over 2008-9, USD 522 
billion was devoted to such green expenditures or tax breaks, and it seems that not only developed countries but 
some emerging economies like China (spending USD 218 billion from September 2008 through December 2009, 
which accounts to a third of its total fiscal spending) contributed to a significant extent.  43 
 
In consideration of the significance of green growth, the coming G20 Summit in Seoul will 
take the issue as a new approach for the development agenda, on which the host country 
would  like  to  focus  along  with  the  global  financial  safety  net.  As  the  premier  forum  for 
international economic cooperation, the G20 Summit deals with environmentally and socially 
sustainable economic growth and “green growth” is undoubtedly the central to the agenda.  
 
II.6.2. Clean development mechanism viable for Africa 
 
When it comes to green growth, the question of its viability or feasibility in applying green 
development strategies to developing or under-developed countries is raised, as it seems to 
require cutting edge technologies and a huge amount of investments. However, that question 
does not penetrate through the fundamental attribute of the issue. As it should be focusing on 
how to accomplish the way to have a green economy, rather than on whether it is viable for 
certain groups of countries. Many issues related to the development agenda, such as climate 
change, food and energy security, job creation, and poverty eradication, demand intensified 
international cooperation. Therefore, industrialized countries, as well as developing countries 
and lower income countries including many states on the African continent, should also be 
concerned about adopting clean development mechanism. While many African countries are 
among the most vulnerable to the impacts of the recent economic crisis and climate changes, 
it is critical to devise a clean development mechanism in the region.  
 
The recent global recession served as a wake-up call for the world leaders, including those in 
Africa. It caused a drastic drop in global demand and trade, which in turn affected on global 
output.  Facing  the  negative  impact  of  the  crisis  in  financial  and  commodity  markets,  the 
global economy is keen to find a new source or a new mechanism for sustainable growth. In 
this context, green growth has emerged as a central focus of to the daunting task of economic 
recovery  and  the  MDGs  achievement.  It  is  about  pursuing  economic  development,  while 
reducing  pollution  and  greenhouse  gas  emission,  enhancing  the  efficient  use  of  natural 
resources and maintaining biodiversity. That is, environment oriented investments are needed.  
 
Along with overcoming the current economic recession, Africa is given the daunting task of 
maintaining  stability  in  the  economy,  accomplishing  sustainable  economic  growth  and 
employment, and addressing food security and climate change. For dealing with the task, 
more investment is needed in Africa’s real economy. Infrastructure, transportation, energy, 
agriculture  and  communications  are  the  sectors  that  especially  need  such  intensified 
investments. By inducing more investments in these sectors, the continent could sustain the 
momentum  for  further  growth,  as  well  as  addressing  other  economy-related  issues.  The 
investments  with  green  growth  initiatives  in  Africa  have  critical  meaning  to  the  world 
economy, as it could broaden its markets by the results of the continent’s growth. From both 
perspectives of Africa and its international partners, green growth initiatives should lie in the 
centre of their concerns.  
 
In fact, Africa has shown resilience in confronting the current crisis maintaining 2.5 percent 
growth rate in 2009, while those of their international partners have been contracted. As for 
the sub-Saharan region, its real GDP growth rate in 2010 is projected to be 4.1 percent.
58 
Based on the data, the continent can be considered to be rich in potential as a new growth pole 
in the global economic system..The G20 has made its commitment for an environmentally and 
                                                 
58 See  “Regional  economic  outlook,  Sub-Saharan  Africa:  weathering  the  storm”,  Table  SA1:  real  GDP 
growth, Oct. 2009. 
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socially sustainable economic growth and actively engaged in a green growth deal.
59 For this 
purpose, African countries need to set a specific low carbon growth path in relation to the 
development agenda to induce more financing resources.  
 
Given the gravity of the issue in the long run, the coming G20 Summit in Seoul would take 
the development issue as a major element of the agenda. The development agenda itself is not 
a new subject to the international institutions or forums, even to the G20 Summits. For the 
Pittsburgh meeting, the leaders of the G20 were already called for contributing to sustainable 
economic growth by engaging in a global green new deal, which requests them to invest at 
least 1 percent of their total GDP in promoting green economic sectors. In the Summit in 
Seoul,  the  Korean  government  will  suggest  more  of  a  specific  approach  towards  the 
development agenda as to giving a new momentum to developing countries with a growth-
oriented strategy. And that would definitely be in compliance with the notion of green growth. 
As  a  G20  member  country,  Korea  has  been  working  on  advancing  the  progress  towards 
sustainable  low  carbon  economy  by  adopting  the  Green  Growth  Strategy.  The  country  is 
making enormous effort to transition into a green economy, which is a new paradigm to create 
jobs, as well as to have a new growth momentum. Of the total green spending in the Asia 
Pacific region that amounts to USD 342 billion, Korea has devoted a substantial amount while 
it  allocated  nearly  80%  of  its  total  expenditure  to  green  investments.
60 Along  with  that, 
showing the government-wide effort towards green growth, the Presidential Committee on 
Green Growth was established in February 2009
61 for implementing green growth strategies 
over the 5 year period from 2009 to 2013. The kind of effort that the Korean government has 
made is notable, as it could represent what benefits green growth strategies can bring about, 
while major economies that caused or were hit hard by the global crisis fall short of their 
commitment in relative terms.  
 
Korea has already shared its green growth vision with Africa in the second round of the 
Korea-Africa Forum as they adopted Korea-Africa Green Growth Initiative—an annex to the 
Seoul  Declaration—,  promising  to  achieve  sustainable  growth  in  a  coordinated  and 
harmonized manner. To be more specific, Korea and Africa “agreed to expand bilateral and 
multilateral channels for dialogue between Korea and Africa to build a consensus on green 
growth and hold policy forums to strengthen partnership for low-carbon green growth.”
62 By 
the accord, the two agreed to implement environmental cooperative projects, such as water 
supply, waste treatment, and other management natural resources. Furthermore, being fully 
aware of the need to transition into a new paradigm, which is expected to bring in more 
benefits by tackling the global environmental issue and the creation of green markets, both 
parties agreed on mutual cooperation for exploring clean development mechanism including 
transfer of green technologies.  
 
To  sum  up  the  aforementioned  facts,  it  is  safe  to  say  that  a  foundation  for  international 
cooperation in preparing a green growth path has been established, and developing countries 
including many in the African continent have shared the need for it. And as the host country 
                                                 
59 Global Green New Deal- An Update for the G20 Pittsburgh Summit p.1, UNEP, September 2009 
60 See Edward B. Babier, “Toward a Global Green Recovery: The G20 and the Asia-Pacific Region,” The 
Asia-Pacific Journal, 28-2-10, 12 July, 2010.   
61 See http://www.greengrowth.go.kr for more information about the Korean government’s taking initiatives 
for green growth. 
62 Referring to “Korea, Africa Share “green growth” vision” by Kim Sue-young, 24 Nov. 2009  
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2009/12/113_56038.html  45 
 
for  the  coming  Summit,  Korea  is  keen  on  taking  it  as  the  key  agenda  in  relation  to 
development for the post-crisis era.  
 
II.6.3. Policy recommendations 
 
To realize its abundant potential to become another major growth pole in the global economy 
addressing other issues like climate change and poverty eradication, Africa should show the 
world their willingness to do so.  
 
Domestic leadership matters: policy choices for the future 
 
To  cope  with  the  impact  of  the  crisis  and  to  seize  the  opportunities  to  develop,  African 
countries  can  learn  from  the  Korean  economic  development  history,  in  its  early  stage  of 
development where it was demonstrated that the willingness of the government to drive the 
direction of domestic industries plays a big role. With weak economic fundamentals, the role 
of  the  government  to  ensure  a  stable  environment  for  investments  cannot  be  emphasized 
enough. Therefore, to induce more investment to boost green growth strategies in Africa, 
governments of the continent need to pursue domestic reform, in order to create a conducive 
environment for cooperation with other actors, as well as specific schemes for development. 
 
African countries huge reserves for energy resources and growth potential continue to attract 
investors in the developed Western partners as well as emerging Asian economies. Compared 
to the Korean case, the starting point for devising and implementing development initiatives is 
strong, so much so that if the domestic leaders take the right strategies in forging an enabling 
macroeconomic environment for green growth path, it would help not only to protect the 
continent’s natural resources, but also to contribute to the world economy’s progress in the 
transition to new paradigm of sustainable growth.  
 
Devising a clean development strategy: preparing specific development mechanism  
 
Given its abundant natural and biological resources, good opportunities exist to set a low 
carbon growth and development path. With a coherent investment scheme in line with clean 
development,  the  continent  could  attract  financial  and  technological  support  of  investors 
including rich countries, and multilateral or regional institutions.  
 
For example, investing  in Africa’s renewable  energy sources, such as  solar, hydro, wind, 
thermal and biomass would be a good project to draw international financing, as it could 
contribute not only to addressing global climate changes and local energy shortage problems, 
but also to providing a chance to create a new global market.
63 This kind of investment can 
bring about more jobs and trade chances in Africa.  
 
A relevant example to the African context would be South Africa’s Green Economy Summit 
in May 2010, calling for the development of green growth policies and regulations which 
                                                 
63 For the need of green growth strategy in Africa, refer to Michael Keating, “Green Growth strategy viable 
for  African  economy”,  The  Great  Debate  UK,  Reuters,  12  June  2009,  http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate-
uk/2009/06/12/green-growth-strategy-viable-for-african-economy. 
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support the development of clean technologies.
64 The country anticipates gains in terms of job 
creation  by  boosting  the  renewable  energy  sector.  These  positive  experiences  should  be 
emulated in other countries.  
 
Cooperation with multilateral and regional institutions 
 
￿  Cooperation with international institutions  
 
Whilst the work of developing a “green growth strategy” requires a broad and flexible mix of 
instruments  in  several  policy  areas,  including  taxation,  technology,  human  resource  and 
natural resource management and other infrastructure establishment, it is necessary to devise 
those schemes in close cooperation with the international partners. Even though the level of 
socio-economic development of African countries varies and many are largely dependent on 
official development aid from abroad, they should take part in the coordinated effort of the 
international society by promoting their clean development strategies.  
 
When the world is keen on finding a new growth paradigm, many international organizations 
and multinational banks are pursuing projects in line with the trend. The OECD member 
countries consisting of major donors to the continent has recognized the importance of green 
growth,  pledging  their  continuous  effort  on  innovation  and  reforms,  for  tackling  climate 
change and setting the framework for green growth.
65 Extending this initiative, the Pittsburgh 
G20 Summit was requested to build on the joint work of EPOC and the Economic Policy 
Committee on the economic and environmental benefits of removing fossil fuel subsidies.
66As 
an OECD member country and the host country of the coming G20 Summit, Korea takes the 
agenda of  green growth as the basic principle for achieving a sustainable recovery and  a 
growth momentum, calling for more direct implementation of the existing commitment.  
 
Africa, as the continent on the centre of concerns for the international bodies in terms of 
global  economic  issues,  cannot  afford  to  stay  behind  in  this  multilateral  effort  for  clean 
development given its growing interdependence with the world economy. Undoubtedly, some 
takes a skeptical look on this notion for Africa, saying that it has little contributed to the 
world’s climate change but is unfairly compelled to share the responsibility as international 
community demands a new development scheme with higher costs. One of the reasons for 
skeptical opinions towards Africa’s  green  growth initiatives is because  implementation or 
application of green technologies is not viable for under-developed countries due to the higher 
the costs of adopting new technology.  
 
However,  this  problem  can  be  solved  though  for  knowledge  sharing  with  multilateral 
institutions, regional bodies as well as individual investors. By enhancing the cooperation 
                                                 
64 For further summarized information about the summit, see “summit calls for government to fast-track 
green  growth”,  South  Africa  The  Good  News,  21  May  2010  www.sagoodnews.co.za/economy/ 
summit_calls_for_govt_to_ fast-track_green_growth.html .  
  
65 To see more specific contents of commitment in relation to the coming G20 summit in Seoul, refer to the 
remarks by Angel Gurria, OECD Secretary-General, “The Korean G20 leadership: Assessing the key issues for 
2010-  New  sources  of  sustainable  and  balanced  growth”  17  Nov.  2009,  www.oecd.org/document/18/ 
0,3343,en_33873108_33873555_ 44080146_1_1_1_1,00.html .  
   
66  Quoted  from  the  remarks  by  Angel  Gurria,  OECD  Secretary-General,  at  the  Environment  Policy 
Committee meeting (EPOC) under the subject of “Towards green growth: how can the Environment Policy 
Committee contribute?”, 21 Oct. 2009.  47 
 
with these international organizations, African countries could tap more financial resources to 
invest and benefit from the transfer of green technology in support of sustainable economic 
growth.  
 
￿  Inclusion of the private sector 
 
Given that green growth encompasses a wide range of innovations, public resources alone 
cannot  fully  cover  the  costs  associated  with  climate  change  and  set  clean  development 
schemes  customized  for  each  country  in  Africa.  Therefore,  international  economic 
organizations and forums should discuss ways to incentivize private capital to participate in 
those clean development schemes in the region. In the process of development, the ultimate 
goal of relevant schemes should be independent market-oriented industrial development.  
Providing another African perspective, the AfDB has been working on diverse pilot programs 
to expand the sources of investments, such as renewable energy sector or infrastructure to 
utilize the given natural resources in the continent. By expanding investment opportunities, 
Africa could induce more finance to fill the gap between its demand for investments and 
public resources in hands. The G20 countries and other multilateral economic institutions 
should redefine their role, growing out of their traditional role as aid donors to partners in 
preparation for the coming era.  
 
II.6.4. Concluding remarks  
 
The world economy has been facing a critical phase transitioning towards a new development 
paradigm. As the green growth strategy is considered to be a must process for recovering 
from the current economic deadlock, it is put on the centre of the negotiation table set by the 
G20. Given its framework, the G20 Summit will not give hard-binding strategies for green 
growth in terms of development.  
 
Africa has been showing stable economic growth for the last decade and proved its potential 
to be a new growth pole in the post crisis global economy. With its growing interdependence 
with the global economy, the continent is required to participate in the international efforts for 
achieving sustainable economic growth by embracing green growth development mechanism. 
By doing so, many African countries could draw more investments from international public 
funds and private sector, providing a new source of growth. Thus, African countries have to 
ensure  determined  leadership  to  choose  the  right  policies  to  achieve  stable  political  and 
macroeconomic conditions and to align national interests with the global economic objectives 
of clean sustainable growth. Furthermore, they should actively utilize projects boosting green 
industries,  such  as  clean  energy  or  green  agriculture,  initiated  by  multilateral  or  regional 
institutions.  Cooperation  with  those  institutions  in  support  of  the  clean  development 
mechanism will yield economic benefits with minimal environmental costs.  
 
II.7. Global Governance and Africa’s Voice in the International Financial Architecture 
 
II.7.1 Current Position 
Although  Africa  currently  has  only  limited  linkages  to  the  global  financial  system,  the 
financial and economic crisis, and the preceding food price crisis – none of them of Africa’s 
own making -- demonstrated clearly that the continent is highly impacted by global volatility.  
Its  growth  prospects  were  diminished,  there  was  a  reduction  in  investment,  credit  and  in 
particular  trade  credit  dried  up.    Much  the  same  applies  to  climate  change:  Africa  has 48 
 
contributed the least to past emissions (and contributes less than 4 percent to global warming 
now), yet the continent is projected to be hit hardest by climate change. It is already feeling its 
effects, and bearing the costs.  
It has been said repeatedly that global crises require global solutions, taking fair account of 
the  interests  of  all  parties.    Many  African  countries  depend  on  access  to  concessional 
resources or loans from the IFIs, but have limited voice in governance of these institutions. 
The current international financial and economic architecture remains dominated by the major 
economies.    When  approached  by  developing  and  emerging  countries,  the  response  from 
capital and financial markets are also guided mostly by the stance taken by the IFIs.   
The G7 and traditional donors are the major shareholders in the IMF, and the World Bank, 
and substantial shareholders in the Regional Development Banks.  They dominate strategy 
and policy development, priority setting, and resource allocation, particularly for low income 
countries.    Until  recently,  a  broadly  shared  view,  the  so-called  ‘Washington  Consensus’, 
guided  the  approach  of  both  multilateral  and  bilateral  development  institutions.    It  had  a 
significant  impact  on  many  African  countries  through  decisions  on  for  example  policy 
conditionality; debt sustainability and fiscal space; eligibility and conditions for debt relief; 
credit  policies;  performance  based  allocation  systems.  Harmonization  and  coordination  of 
policy in practice meant as much the presentation of a common position by donors, rather 
than conformity with the strategic policy framework and choices of the recipient. Poverty 
reduction  strategies,  designed  to  ensure  country  ownership  behind  IMF  and  World  Bank 
lending, played in reality marginal role. However, the recent global financial crisis exposed 
the weaknesses of the Washington consensus and for African policy makers also reinforced 
search for new development paradigm.  
The  G20  is  now  emerging  as  the  leading  forum  for  international  economic  and  financial 
governance.  However  its  remit,  the  scope  of  its  work,  and  its  relationship  to  other 
international organizations is still evolving.   G20 Members recognize that its legitimacy and 
credibility will depend also on its composition.  Choices have to be made between inclusion 
and efficiency.  It is acknowledged that Europe is over-represented (unless economic size is 
the sole criterion) and that Africa is under represented.  G20 is seeking to reach out to non-
members.  
Consensus seems to have emerged that G20 Leaders meetings should retain a broad focus on 
economic  and  financial  matters.    It  is  uncertain  how  they  will  deal  with  issues  such  as 
development, energy, trade and climate change, and the extent to which there should be more 
overtly political issues discussed, such as peace and security – as is the case in the G8. There 
are discussions about setting up a permanent Secretariat, but for the moment the host nation 
retains a central role, usually in consultation with the host of the next meeting. With the 
initiative of Korea to put development forefront in the coming Seoul Summit it is likely that 
over time the G20 process will supplant the development agenda of the G8.  The host country 
decides on invitations to non-G20 members. 
Representatives  of  G20  Heads  (Sherpas)  will  meet  regularly,  but  much  of  the  policy 
preparation for the Summits will fall to Finance Ministers.  The G20 Finance group has a 
relatively well defined composition and mandate, Finance Deputies meet frequently and this 
places a premium of continuity of participation, expertise and experience in the issues being 
discussed.  The World Bank and IMF are observers in the G20 but can play a substantive role 
at the  finance level. The African Union was  represented in  London and Pittsburgh  as an 49 
 
observer, at the invitation of the host governments. As a result of this observer status, Africa 
has not been able to fully participate at the meetings of the Sherpas and Finance Ministers.    
The  crisis  has  added  weight  to  the  Basel  Committee  on  Banking  Supervision  and  the 
Financial  Stability  Board  on  which  Africa  has  also  scant  representation.    Although  not 
systemically important in the financial system so far, African countries are directly affected 
by the decisions taken in these bodies, which are not always in the best interests of their 
financial sectors.   
Basel II will become the framework for banking supervision and regulation globally. Potential 
implications  for  Africa  are  that  the  new  arrangements  might  adversely  affect  the  cost  of 
financing,  and  inhibit  cross  border  financial  flows  to  countries  where  public  and  private 
borrowers are rated at a higher level of risk.  By remodeling risk-weighted assets, Basel II is 
likely to influence also how credit will be allocated within countries, to the real economy.  
 
II.7.2 Assessment 
Other sections of this paper have shown the need for more innovative approaches; that “one 
size fits all” prescriptions are inadequate. Business as usual is not acceptable.  The G20 have 
agreed that as part of their own mutual assessment they will consider the impact of their 
policy actions on LICs.  This is welcome, but room must be created for input from the LICs 
themselves. 
A  cardinal  lesson  from  successful  development  elsewhere,  in  particular  Asia,  is  the 
importance of country ownership and commitment, of policy and strategies being determined 
by country circumstances, the country’s own priorities.  For instance, the balance between the 
market and the state will differ from country to country and from time to time.  More policy 
space has to be given to LIC and emerging economies.  This has to be reflected in the key 
policy and standard setting organizations, and when decisions are made on the allocation and 
use of resources. Africa therefore needs to be adequately represented, to have its voice heard, 
in  the  key  policy  and  decision  making  international  structures,  not  just  being  informally 
consulted. 
Africa’s  patterns  of  trade  and  investment  have  altered  significantly  over  the  past  decade.  
China, India and other emerging market (e.g., GCCs) countries have become major trading 
partners, have invested in Africa, and have become donors of development assistance.  Much 
of this has been bilateral rather than channeled through multilateral organizations. 
Other sources of finance, particularly remittances and FDI flows, have become an important 
source  of  funds  for  many  African  countries,  more  important  than  aid.  These  are  directly 
affected by economic circumstances and the policies in G20 countries.  At the same time, 
using these flows productively, providing the secure and enabling environment for domestic 
and  foreign  investors  while  attracting  development-friendly  FDI,  is  critical  for  Africa’s 
growth prospects.   
 
II.7.3 Recommendations 
Mobilizing domestic resources, making the most effective use, maximizing the value of the 
development resources is fundamental for Africa to reach its economic potential and become 
a global pole of growth.  African countries must provide the policy frameworks, the sound 
policies,  effective  institutions  and  accountable  governance  on  which  this  will  depend.  50 
 
Accountability of African Leaders is to their own citizens above all.  Both they and the donors 
of development assistance are right to expect results.   Equally Africa must be able to engage 
fully in key international governance bodies; it cannot continue simply to be the recipient of 
decisions made elsewhere. 
Of  course  all  53  African  countries  cannot  all  be  represented  individually  in  every 
organization.  Nor is it realistic to expect one country alone, such as South Africa in the G20, 
to set aside completely its own national concerns in order to represent all other countries. 
There has therefore to be more scope for continental and regional representation, scope for 
African-led institutions to be  able to engage on equal terms in  global  discussions, to put 
forward African perspectives and to draw attention to the implications for African countries.   
Africa should have permanent representation at the G20 to ensure participation at all levels of 
preparation towards the Summits. The African Union of course remains the primary political 
voice for Africa as such and should participate in G20 meetings.  Within the continent Africa 
has a number of overlapping regional organizations and economic communities; efforts to 
rationalize and streamline the structures and reduce duplication should continue.  Investing in 
African development institutions, where African countries have a majority shareholding such 
as the African Development Bank, should be a policy priority for G20 countries.   
Africa should be adequately represented on the Financial Stability Board, possibly through the 
Association  of  African  Central  Banks,  which  is  aimed  at  coordinating  and  monitoring 
progress in the strengthening of financial regulation.  
In  addition,  Africa  should  have  a  say  in  G20  recommendations  on  the  reform  of  the 
international financial architecture.   
 
II.7.4 Next Steps 
Existing commitments to increase African shareholding in the IMF and World Bank Boards, 
and to governance reforms in the IFIs, should be implemented swiftly.  
African countries themselves must improve their collective discussion on key financial and 
economic  issues  so  that  African  representatives  can  play  a  full  part  in  international 
discussions.  The Committee of Ten African Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors 
(the C10) should continue to meet regularly, provide advice to African Heads and to the G20. 
The  Paris  and  Accra  Accords  on  harmonization  should  be  given  full  effect  and  African 
countries should take the lead in proposing improvements in current practice. 
South – South cooperation and lesson learning have a good deal to contribute; Korea should 
encourage  the  emerging  country  G20  members  to  be  more  pro-active  and  develop 
comprehensive programs of cooperation with Africa as a continent.  
More space should be given for African countries to make their own policy choices and to be 
accountable for the results.  As a first step the current CPIA methodology and its application 
in Africa should be reviewed jointly by African countries, IDA/ADF Deputies, WB and AfDB 





PART III. AFRICA AS A NEW SOURCE OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC GROWTH 
 
III. 1. New Trend in Africa’s Economic Growth 
 
Africa has changed. It has become one of the world’s fastest growing economic regions, from 
a country which has been historically renowned as a slow growth region. Africa’s annual 
economic growth rate has increased to average 5.6 percent in the period of 2001-2008 from 
2.3 percent in the 1990s. It has exceeded the global average growth rate more than twice in 
the 2000s. Among all African countries, more than 1/3 (about 40 percent) countries recorded 
an average growth rate of over 5 percent between 2001 and 2008.  
 
This high growth trend seems to have gained a stable basis. Figure 8 shows the stable trend of 
economic growth in Africa in the 2000s until 2008. Even during the financial crisis, African 
countries recorded 2.5% of growth rate in 2009, while the world economy shrank significantly. 
The IMF estimated that African countries would grow by 4.6% in 2010 also. Despite anemic 
global economic downturn, Africa is maintaining a robust growth rate with its 2010 estimate 




Figure 8. Annual Growth Rate (percent) 
  
Source: Global Insight.  
 
What would explain this new trend of economic growth in Africa? Africa’s economic upturn 
was  caused  by  political  and  macroeconomic  stability  and  microeconomic  reforms.  Even 
though natural resources accounted for 24% of the whole growth, all the economic sectors 
contributed to the overall economic growth including resources, finance, retail, agriculture, 
transportation and telecommunication. This new trend indicates that there is a fundamental 
change occurring in Africa. McKinsey Global Institute (2010) argues that the key to Africa’s 
growth  surge  was  government  reforms  that  created  greater  political  stability,  improved 
macroeconomic  stability  and  invigorated  business  sectors.
68 Among  others,  Gueller  (2009) 
                                                 
67.Additional information on growth trends is in graphs A.12-A.16. 
 
68   McKinsey  Global  Institute  (2010),  「Lions  on  the  move:  The  progress  and  potential  of  African 
economies」.  June 2010.  
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emphasizes Africa’s economic environment improved by better macroeconomic management, 
better  fiscal  and  balance  of  payment  positions,  and  lower  external  debt  levels.
69 Political 
stability across the continent has improved as well. The economic reform index announced by 
the  International  Finance  Corporation  (IFC),  the  private  sector  arm  of  the  World  Bank, 
supports such movement. The African continent which used to be ranked at a lower level in 
the  past  was  placed  third,  following  East  Europe  and  OECD  countries,  showing  prudent 
economic reforms leading to the creation of a positive business climate in the region. The 
economic environment in Africa became more productive, due to all of these aforementioned 
fundamental changes. 
 
Africa’s new growth trend provides a new vision to the future of the continent and the global 
economy. Africa used to be a continent that needs international aid due to persistent war and 
poverty. The continent which has been dependent on aid is now showing promising economic 
growth with its own effort toward overcoming poverty and developing domestic industries. 
Africa  now  attracts  attention  from  the  world  not  only  as  an  aid  destination,  but  also  an 
investment  destination.  Fast  growing  African  economies  signal  the  second  generation  of 
emerging markets in this continent.
70 The world expects a new market and a new source of 
demand, which would contribute to the rebalancing of global economy. 
 
III.2. Possible Directions for Economic Growth in Africa 
   
Long-Term Growth Potential 
 
The McKinsey Global Institute (2010) draws rosy long-term prospects on the basis of growth 
potential in Africa.
71 First, natural resources will continue to increase wealth in this continent 
from a rising global demand. The continent is endowed with 10 percent of the world’s oil 
reserves, 8% of gas reserves, 40% of gold reserves and a wealth of other precious metals. Fast 
growing demand for raw materials will induce foreign direct investment not only to explore 
the resources, but also to develop infrastructure, which would have positive spillover effects 
to the neighboring region. The second growth potential is the sheer size of arable land. The 
size of Africa’s land is much greater than that of China, USA, Europe or any other region. 
With  the  increasing  number  of  population,  land  will  constitute  an  attractive  investment 
destination. The third asset us Africa’s labor force, which is expected to reach 1.1 billion by 
2040. The large workforce will form a basis of global consumption, as well as production.  
 
The  aforementioned  factors  will  induce  a  long-term  economic  development.  The  critical 
question now is, however, whether this region would be able to continue the high economic 
growth and take advantage of the favorable natural conditions. Due to the wide variations 
across African economies, it is not appropriate to adopt one growth strategy for all the regions. 
African regions are  classified often into three or four  groups; the oil-exporting countries, 
resource  poor  but  diversified  economies,  and  slow-growth  economies.  The  Slow-growth 
group includes coastal and land-locked economies because the access to international trade 
                                                 
69  Güller (2009), “Africa Rising: The Next Generation of Emerging Markets?” p.2.  
 
70 Nellor (2009) indentifies eight sub-Saharan African countries as new emerging markets: Botswana, Ghana, 
Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia.  
  




72 Given this wide variation, African countries may apply the 
flying-geese model or the growth-pole strategy to find possible directions of development. 
 
The Flying-Geese Model 
 
The flying-geese model, a theory of industrial development in latecomer economies, can be 
used to explore the prospects of African economies. Industrial development follows a pattern 
where  countries  transit  from  the  production  of  lower  to  higher  technology  goods.  The 
industrial structure of a country advances from consumption goods to capital goods industry 
through  diversification  and  differentiation  from  other  industries.  In  order  for  countries  to 
move from textiles and simple assembly to more complex products, they need to move up the 
learning curve, notably through investment and technology transfer from advanced economies.   
 
Economic development  in East Asia in the 1980’s illustrates this process. Japanese firms 
sparked an industrial boom in East Asia, where newly industrializing countries of the region 
played a central role in the rapid expansion of manufacturing in Asia. As such, one country 
can lead other economies toward industrialization, passing older technologies down to the 
followers as its own incomes rise and it moves into newer technologies. In Asia, Japan was 
the leader of this flying-geese model.  
 
Because there is such great variety in the African economies' stages of development, natural 
resource  endowments,  and  historical  heritage,  the  flying-geese  model  can  be  applied  to 
broaden the basis of economic growth. It is precisely this diversity that works to facilitate the 
flying-geese pattern of shared development, as each country is able to take advantage of its 
distinctiveness  to  develop  with  a  supportive  division  of  labor.
73 Africa’s  most  advanced 
economies  such  as  Egypt,  Morocco,  South  Africa,  and  Tunisia  have  already  established 
significant manufacturing and service sectors. The manufacturing sector of these countries 
already stands under competition pressure, due to the relatively higher unit labor costs than 
those in China or India. South Africa and Morocco started to move toward producing higher 
value goods by investing in automotive industries. If they shift the industries with lower value 
to neighboring countries which are ready to adopt them, the flying-geese model will begin to 
materialize in Africa.  
 
The Growth Pole Strategy 
 
Growth does not appear everywhere at the same time, but rather begins at a certain selected 
point, which receives concentrated resource inputs for fast growth. According to the growth 
pole  theory  by  Francois  Perroux,  growth  is  assumed  to  originate  in  a  region  where  a 
propulsive industry is located, which then spreads to surrounding regions. The concept was 
broadly  used  in  developmental  plans  for  developing  countries  in  the  1970s,  such  as  The 
National Land Development Plan in South Korea.
74  
The growth pole theory can have a significant implication for development in Sub-Saharan 
                                                 
72  Among others, See World Bank (2007), 「Africa Development Indictors 2007」.  
73 Refer on flying geese model to Kojima, Kiyoshi (2000): The 'flying geese' model of Asian economic 
development: origin, theoretical extensions, and regional policy implications. In Journal of Asian Economics 11, 
pp.375-401. 
 
74  In the U.S. the concept of growth poles has usually taken the form emphasizing geographic location which 
are called “growth center” related to the concept of agglomeration. England, too, has applied growth pole theory 
to regional policy since the 1960s. 
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Africa; the whole continent can enjoy positive spill-over effects of selected growth poles. The 
region’s recent performance offers evidence of this potential. Meanwhile, there are several 
conditions for the application to work. First, it is important to select efficient growth poles 
that have not only a large growth potential, but also an advanced supply-demand and market 
relations, so that propagation effects can take place effectively through various channels. The 
selected regions should be able to internally attain economies of scale, as well as to externally 
achieve  localization  along  with  associated  industries.  Additionally,  technological 
advancement  and  innovations  are  key  requirements  for  the  growth  pole  to  have  terminal 
effects  on  the  whole  economy.  Second,  the  unbalanced  development  that  is  a  crucial 
shortcoming  of  the  growth-pole  strategy  should  be  minimized.  As  limited  resources  are 
concentrated  on  selected  regions,  regional  discrimination  tends  to  worsen  following  fast 
industrialization. In order to ameliorate such a problem, urbanization should take place as 
economic growth progresses. The high urbanization rate of the African continent that exceeds 
any other region in the world can be an asset. The following table compares the rate of urban 
growth in various regions in the world. 
 
Table 4 .Urban Growth Rate in Different Regions (%) 
                    
Region  1950-55  1980-85  2000-2005  2010-15  2025-30 
World  3  2.7  2.1  1.9  1.5 
Africa  4.7  4.3  3.9  3.2  2.9 
Asia  3.5  3.6  2.5  2.3  1.8 
Europe  2  0.79  0.21  0.17  0.14 
The Caribbean  4.4  3  2  1.5  0.98 
North America  2.7  1.2  1.4  1.2  0.86 
New Zealand  2.8  1.2  1.4  1  0.82 
*Source: Maddison, Angus (2003), The World Economy: Historical Statistics. OECD, Paris  
 
As the table shows African cities grow faster than those of other regions. Now, 40 percent 
among the 1 billion African people live in cities. The urbanization drives development in 
Africa by boosting productivity, demand, and investment, taking use of economies of scale. 
Given the vast landmass and scarce capital, focused efforts to build a growth pole would be 
more feasible for Africa’s development. It will increase efficiency of investment to develop a 
core region in the urban area, which would act as a catalyst to growth in the neighboring 
regions.  The  growth  pole  strategy  may  fit  for  African  development  considering  its 
geographical and economic environment.  
 
There are many options to build growth poles in Africa according to the regional scale. At the 
level of an individual country, each country may consider developing certain cities as growth 
poles, while groups of countries may try to develop regions as specified growth poles such as 
export pole, tourism pole, IT pole, etc. Establishing special economic zones or international 
integration among related countries would help implement these ideas. Developing growth 




III.3. Possible Scenarios for African economic growth 
75 
                                                 
75  The discussion on growth scenario will be focused on mainly Sub-Saharan region, because the northern 
Africa has relatively better economic condition considering their absolute income level.  55 
 
 
Comparison with Fast-growing Group (FGG): Export-Driven Growth 
 
If African countries adopt the above-mentioned growth strategies, the fast growing countries 
in the region will be a reference for other countries. Let us pay attention to the four fastest 
growing countries among the non-oil exporting countries: Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, 
and Uganda. This Fast-growing Group (FGG) demonstrated an average growth rate of 6.8% 
between 2000 and 2008. The table below summarizes the average growth rate of each GDP 
component in FGG compared to that in Sub-Saharan Africa between 2000 and 2008. The 
exports growth rate in this group is significantly higher than that of the Sub-Saharan Africa, 
while government expenditure, fixed investment, and imports grow slower in FGG. Strong 
export growth has led economic growth in these fast growing countries.  
 
Table 5. Components of Economic Growth between 2000 and 2008: FGG and Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA), in percent   
Source: Global Insight. 1/ Fixed investment constitutes a relatively minor share of GDP.  
 
These countries are dependent on export revenues to finance investment and consumption. 
FGG supports an optimistic prediction about the region’s growth, in that the countries without 
oil resources, such as Mozambique and Tanzania are showing relatively high growth rates of 
approximately 6-7%. Even though the countries in the FGG are not oil-exporters, exports 
remain a driving mechanism for economic growth. The main prerequisite for this pattern of 
economic  growth  may  be  the  access  to  international  trade,  because  even  many  resource 
abundant  countries  in  Africa  cannot  increase  their  exports  due  to  the  lack  of  necessary 
infrastructure and international network for trade. Exports-led economic growth cannot take 
place instantly. It requires a longer term to take place due to technology transition, policy 
implementation, international cooperation, etc. Hence, it takes time for Sub-Saharan countries 
to follow the growth strategy of FGG.  
 
Comparison with Emerging Economies: The Capital Market Approach 
 
IMF named eight Sub-Saharan African countries that are showing high growth rates as the 
Second-Generation Emerging Market (SGEM) focused on their potential economic growth in 
its September 2008 issue of Finance and Development.
76 The countries in Sub-Saharan Africa 
are classified as emerging markets; if they have financial markets and attract investor interest. 
Nellor (2009) suggests to apply the following questions as criteria to discern the “emerging 
                                                 
76 The Term “emerging market” was coined by International Finance Corporation (IFC) in 1980 to refer to 
developing countries with stock markets that were beginning to demonstrate the features of the mature stock 
markets in industrial countries. IFC introduced new term ”frontier markets” to describe countries with markets 
that are smaller and less liquid than those in the more advanced emerging market.  Nellor (2009).  
  FGG  SSA excluding FGG 
Real GDP Growth  6.8  4.2 
Private Consumption Growth  6.8  5.1 
Government Expenditure Growth  7.4  8.5 
Fixed Investment Growth 1/  7.6  10.9 
Exports Growth  12.4  5.7 
Imports Growth  7.4  8.5 56 
 
market”: First, has there been a takeoff in growth? Second, is growth led by the private sector, 
and  has  public  policy  embraced  market-led  growth?  Third,  are  there  financial  markets  in 
which to invest? 
 
The SGEM consists of Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda 
and Zambia, who account for approximately 40 percent of the region's population outside 
South  Africa  and  almost  one-half  of  its  GDP.  The  eight  SGEM  countries  recorded  high 
economic growth rate of 8% during the period between 2000 and 2008, which is considerably 
higher than the average growth rate of Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. Per capita GDP level 
for SGEM countries will be US$10,282 in ten years and $16,652 in twenty years,
77 
 
The following table summarizes the average growth rate of each GDP component in SGEM 
and Sub-Saharan Africa, during the period of 2000 to 2008. Compared to Sub-Saharan Africa 
including SGEM, two distinct features are observed in SGEM. First, all the components are 
significantly  high  positive  around  10%  growth  in  every  field.  Second,  fixed  investment, 
imports, and exports grow considerably fast and lead the countries’ growth.   
 
Table 6. Components of Economic Growth between 2000 and 2008: SGEM and SSA (%) 
  SGEM  Sub-Saharan Africa including SGEM 
Private Consumption Growth  8.6  6.0 
Government Expenditure Growth  11.8  8.0 
Fixed Investment Growth  16.3  11.5 
Exports Growth  9.7  5.4 
Imports Growth  17.1  8.9 
 
African SGEM countries are very active in all economic fields from private consumption to 
exports. They import investment goods and expanded fixed investments to produce export 
goods. This pattern is not much different from that of advanced emerging markets. Distinctive 
features  with  the  SGEM  countries’  growth  pattern  are  high  fixed  investment  growth  and 
imports growth. Imports grow even much faster than their exports. These growths can be only 
realizable if they are able to attract external capital inflows. The open capital market has 
worked as the channel to induce foreign investment, which contributes to economic growth. 
 
Can other Sub-Saharan African countries follow the growth path of SGEM? Table 3 compares 
the  growth  rate  of  Sub-Saharan  region  with  that  of  developing  countries  and  emerging 
economies. Sub-Saharan African countries have already caught up with the real GDP growth 
rate of developing countries, although not with emerging economies. Sub-Saharan countries 
show  higher  growth  rate  than  emerging  economies  in  private  consumption,  government 
expenditure, and fixed investment. However, they grow slower in both imports and exports. 




Table 7. Average Growth Rate (%) 
 
                                                 
77 According to Global Insight, the estimated population growth rates are 1.8% between 2011 and 2020 and 
1.4% between 2021 and 2030. 
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   Emerging Markets  Developing Countries  SSA Countries 
Period  1990~99  2000~08  1990~99  2000~08  1990~99  2000~08 
GDP  3.5  6.0  2.5  4.8  1.9  4.9 
Private Consumption  3.8  5.4  3.0  4.7  2.8  6.1 
Gov. Expenditure  3.2  5.0  2.0  5.5  1.0  7.9 
Fixed Investment  4.9  9.3  6.3  7.3  2.4  11.6 
Exports  7.1  10.8  4.8  6.4  0.8  5.3 
Imports  7.6  11.9  1.9  7.7  1.9  8.8 
 
Even though Sub-Saharan countries have achieved high growth, the remain exposed to high 
volatility. All GDP components appear to be highly volatile in Sub-Saharan Africa compared 
to SGEM countries. This remains a challenge for medium to long term growth.    
 
Possible Scenarios for African Economic Growth 
 
In this section, we examined the possible economic growth path that follows fast growing 
SSA  countries  and  the  pattern  of  Second-Generation  Emerging  Markets,  which  are  also 
currently  showing  rapid  growth  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa.  The  exports-led  growth  strategy 
requires  access  to  the  international  trade  market,  which  would  take  time.  The  emerging 
market strategy needs a relatively open financial market, in which the private sector is the key 
driver of growth.  
 
There is no specific strategy that fits all the economies in Sub-Saharan region. Each country 
should pick up a strategy which would be most suitable for its own economy. However, any 
strategy  requires  careful  preparation.  Establishing  and  opening,  and  operating  a  financial 
market,  takes  much  time  and  effort.  Infrastructure  for  trade  would  also  require  much 
investment.  
 
The  discussion  on  possible  growth  scenarios  emphasized  that  the  international  linkage  is 
essential to accelerate economic growth, regardless of which strategy a country would choose. 
FGG countries use exports as a vehicle for economic growth, whereas the SGEM uses foreign 
capital  as  an  instrument  for  growth.  Moreover,  growth  rates  of  exports  and  imports 
demonstrate the continent’s potential as a huge market. If economic growth in Sub-Saharan 
Africa takes off as considered in this section, the region can contribute to global economic 
growth in an unprecedented manner with increasing international linkages.  
 
III.4. Conclusion: Africa as a New Source of Global Economic Growth  
 
Africa  has  shown  unprecedented  economic  growth  since  2000.  There  are  fundamental 
changes  going  on  in  the  continent  showing  an  improving  economic  and  socio-political 
environment. Higher economic growth resulted from these changes. Some countries adopted 
an export-led growth strategy and achieved over 6 % annual growth rates. Other countries 
realized high economic growth by using foreign capital as a trigger to expand production 
capacity.  Even  though  there  are  still  many  vulnerable  factors  that  may  destabilize  the 
economic  environment,  African  economies  showing  positive  signs  of  continuous  growth.  
Especially,  the  resilience  that  fast  growing  economies  have  shown  after  the  global  crisis 
points to a stable trend of economic growth in Africa.  
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The flying-geese model and the growth pole strategy may be adopted if the leading group 
gains a stable basis to become a first runner of geese or a growth pole. All the fast growing 
countries in Africa are connected to the international market via trade or capital flows. The 
followers  will,  however,  take  time  to  join  the  advanced  African  countries.  International 
cooperation may be needed to shorten time and lessen the burden. 
 
African economies are expected to become a new source of global economic growth.  If other 
African countries would catch up the recorded 7% rate of fast-growing countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa, and continue to grow by this rate for another ten years, the GDP per capita on 
the continent will double and then quadruple in 20 years.  
  
Africa’s long-term economic potential including natural resources, a growing labor force, and 
rapid urbanization points to an economic boom in the African continent in the future. The 
McKinsey Global Institute (2010) estimated Africa’s collective GDP in 2020 at $2.6 trillion, 
and  consumer  spending  at  $1.4  trillion.  The  institute  states  that  Africa  will  play  an 
increasingly important role in the  global  economy, if recent trends continue. On balance, 
Africa is emerging as a new source of global economic growth and it will play a significant 
role in rebalancing of the global economy. As we examined here, Africa has a large potential 
not only as a source of economic growth for the global economy, but also as a profitable 
market with a large population. Hence, supporting the region’s current efforts to realize its 




Africa’s impressive pre-crisis growth and its fast and strong rebound from the crisis have 
reconfirmed the continent’s immense economic potential. Still, growth was not sufficient to 
reach the MDGs or even meaningfully reduce the income per capita gap with the advanced 
economies. Bringing Africa on a strong, sustainable and shared growth path is thus a key 
policy priority. The main pillars for achieving this type of growth are: 
 
￿  Flexible,  but  credible  macroeconomic  frameworks.  As  policy  moves  from 
overemphasizing stability to focusing on growth, countries need to utilize their policy 
space judiciously. Past procyclical policies should be replaced by rule-based counter-
cyclical frameworks that still leave room for discretion whenever needed. 
 
￿  A  vibrant  private  sector  and  productive  entrepreneurship  across  regions  and 
sectors supported by well-designed industrial policy. Industrial policy should not pick 
winners, but remove obstacles in high-potential sectors and industries.  
 
￿  Social  safety  nets  to  protect  the  most  vulnerable  in  the  case  of  shocks.  Social 
protection programs need to be built to ensure shared growth in the medium term.  
 
￿  Inclusive financial system, with fewer obstacles to accessing credit, especially for 
small  exporters,  SMEs  and  smallholder  farmers.  Innovative  methods,  such  as 
leveraging remittances, can help ‘bank the unbanked’.  
 
￿  Trade,  FDI  and  Regional  Integration.  Global  trade  and  investment  are  key 
components  of  strong  economic  growth.  As  the  financial  crisis  showed,  regional 
integration can be a great source of resilience and growth, and should be encouraged – 
not only in trade but also in intra-continental investments.  59 
 
 
￿  A  stronger  human  capital  base  is  needed  to  transform  African  countries  into 
knowledge-based  societies.  Reforming  higher  educational  systems,  including  their 
financing, would reduce the mismatch between the demands of modern economies and 
skills of the recent university graduates in most African countries. 
 
￿  Modern and well-maintained infrastructure. Africa’s current infrastructure deficit 
severely  constrains  its  prospects  for  growth  and  urgently  needs  to  be  closed. 
Innovative  forms  of  financing  need  to  be  utilized,  including  local  currency  
infrastructure bonds, sovereign bonds and sovereign wealth funds for infrastructure. 
 
￿   Adoption  of  low-carbon  technology.  African  countries  should  actively  utilize 
projects boosting green industries, such as clean energy or green agriculture. They are 
well positioned to do so given the continent’s abundant natural resources.   
 
￿  Amplified  Africa’s  voice.    Africa’s  representation  in  the  key  policy  and  decision 
making international structures needs to be enhanced. Greater scope is also needed for 
African-led institutions to engage on equal terms in global discussions. 
 
To conclude, Africa has changed – from a historically slow growth region to one of the fastest 
growing regions in the world. If reinforced, emerging positive perceptions would lead to even 
more  private  investment,  increased  trade,  and  accelerated  growth  in  Africa.  If  Africa  can 
achieve at least two decades of annual average growth at or above 7 percent a year, it would 
become a new source of dynamism in the global economy -- not only through exports, but 
also as a major consumer market. While Asian markets continue their raid expansion, China 
and  India  would  have  to  increase  their  consumer  spending  markedly  and  quickly  just  to 
replace the demand lost by the United States in the past two years. Supporting Africa’s efforts 
to realize its immense economic potential would thus soon be beneficial to the entire world.  
 
In Africa an alternative can be found to what is now the new normalcy in the global economy 
of low growth, high unemployment and instability on the one hand, and high absolute poverty 
and  underutilized  human  potential  on  the  other.  Poverty  can  be  substantially  reduced  by 
growth  that  is  strong,  shared  and  sustained.  The  world  needs  a  new  driver  of  consumer 
demand, a new market, and a new dynamo, which can be Africa. Future growth in the world 
economy and in the developing world will depend on harnessing both the productive potential 
and the untapped consumer demand of the continent. Therefore, every job not created, every 
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APPENDIX TABLES AND GRAPHS 
 
Table A.1. Selected Macroeconomic Indicators Prior, During and After the Last Two Crisis 
1986-90 1991 1992 1993 2004-08 2009 2010 2011
before crisis before crisis
Real GDP growth (%) 4.0 3.6 2.7 1.2 5.5 0.4 3.6 4.1
Inflation (%) 8.3 10.1 9.6 9.4 5.6 7.8 5.2 5.0
Current account balance (% of GDP) -1.6 -0.7 0.1 -0.6 5.4 -2.0 -0.1 0.6
Fiscal balance (% of GDP) -5.2 -1.5 -2.2 -4.5 3.9 -1.3 -1.1 -0.5
Real GDP growth (%) 2.6 0.3 -1.0 0.2 5.8 3.2 4.8 5.3
Inflation (%) 21.3 20.5 22.1 19.9 8.6 8.6 6.6 5.7
Current account balance (% of GDP) -7.0 -7.1 -8.9 -8.3 -7.9 -11.6 -10.7 -10.7
Fiscal balance (% of GDP) -6.6 -8.2 -8.0 -7.4 1.0 -1.3 -1.9 -2.7
Real GDP growth (%) 4.8 0.1 0.3 4.3 6.4 4.4 5.3 6.0
Inflation (%) 41.9 27.9 40.7 44.4 9.1 9.0 7.8 6.5
Current account balance (% of GDP) -5.2 -5.2 -5.6 -7.7 -5.2 -8.6 -7.8 -6.9
Fiscal balance (% of GDP) -7.8 -3.3 -4.8 -6.6 -1.8 -4.9 -4.6 -4.0
Real GDP growth (%) -0.3 -1.8 -7.1 -8.9 7.0 3.5 6.2 5.4
Inflation (%) 25.6 40.1 32.0 23.7 10.2 13.2 9.9 7.8
Current account balance (% of GDP) -5.9 -3.9 -9.8 -7.1 -7.9 -16.3 -13.5 -13.5
Fiscal balance (% of GDP) -7.8 -18.1 -11.9 -9.5 2.7 -0.8 2.0 -0.2
Middle Income Countries
Low Income Countries
Low Income Countries, Frontier Markets
Low Income Countries, Fragile States
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the African Development Bank database.  
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Figure A.1.a. Inflation and growth in Africa’s LICs, 1990-1999 
 




















































Figure A.1.b. Inflation and growth in Africa’s LICs, 2000 - 2008 






























































Figure A.2.a. Real GDP growth and inflation in oil exporters and importers 
 
Figure A.2.b. Fiscal and current account balance in oil exporters and importers  
  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the African Development Bank database.  68 
 
Figure A.3.a. Africa’s frontier markets: average and standard deviation of growth 
 
Figure A.3.b. Africa’s fragile states: average and standard deviation of growth 
  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the African Development Bank database.  69 
 
Figure A.4.a. Changes in fiscal and current account balances in Africa, 2009 vs. 2008 1/  
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1/ Negative sign means deterioration in 2009. Both fiscal and current account balances include grants. Correlation coefficient 
is 0.537 at 1 percent significance level.  
Figure A. 4.b. Changes in fiscal and current account balances in Africa, 2010 vs. 2009  
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1/ Negative sign is deterioration. Fiscal and current account balances include grants. Correlation coefficient is 
0.477 at 1 percent significance level.  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the African Development Bank database.  70 
 
Figure A.5. Foreign exchange reserves, end-2009  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the African Development Bank database.  71 
 
Figure A.6.a. Fiscal degree of freedom 1: fiscal deficit, 2010 (projection), percent of GDP 
 
Figure A.6.b. Fiscal degree of freedom 2: size of the fiscal shock, 2009 (percent of GDP)1/ 
 
Source: African Development Bank and authors’ calculations.  1/Negative numbers mean deterioration of the 






















































































































































































Source:  Authors’  calculations  based  on  the  IMF  WEO  database  (April  2010).  1/CEE  denotes  Central  and 
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Sources: African Development Bank, World Bank and authors’ calculations.  
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Correlation Coeff. = 0.8174 
 




Figure A.11.b. Internet subscription in frontier markets and India (2008) 
  





















Figure A. 13. Real GDP at PPP per capita - Level 
(Per Capita GDP in 2005 PPP$) 
 






Figure A.14. Real Private Consumption - Growth 
                                                 













Figure A.15. Real Government Expenditure - Growth 
(Percent change from a year earlier) 
 






Figure A.16. Real Fixed Investment - Growth 77 
 
(Percent change from a year earlier) 
 






Figure A.17. Real Exports - Growth 
(Percent change from a year earlier) 
 









Figure A.18. Real Imports -Growth 78 
 
(Percent change from a year earlier) 
 





Figure A.19.Forecast of Real GDP at PPP per capita - Level 





Table A.2: Countries in included Each Group 
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